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Dissociative identity disorder (DID), formerly called multiple personalities, is a 
condition in which aspects of experience and memory are separated from each other and 
from awareness.  The current study adds to the literature in this area by utilizing a broad 
conceptualization of memory functioning in DID, combining ecologically valid memory 
tests with experimental paradigms, and examining shareability, switching, and integration.  
Eleven women with DID participated in a two-session experiment that included a variety of 
memory measures.  Participants were given no instructions regarding switching among 
alters, but were later asked how often they had switched.  They reported significantly 
higher levels of trauma than did a group of 13 female university students.  DID participants 
were faster than student participants at producing autobiographical memories in response to 
cue words.  DID participants also showed a decreased ability to answer detailed questions 
about a story containing fear, compared with a neutral story.  This decrease did not appear 
in the student group.  In a procedural learning task, DID participants improved more than 
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did the student group on percentage of mirror-reversed words read correctly.  Although 
these results were not statistically significant, effect sizes were moderate to high. 
Shared and unshared autobiographical memories had similar properties, although in 
the DID group the unshared memories included significantly more taste imagery than did 
the shared memories.  The student group scored significantly higher on a measure of 
overall memory than did the DID group.  Percentage of alters who knew about the 
unshared memory was significantly negatively correlated with how long ago the memory 
was formed.   
DID participants switched among alters an average of 5.8 times during the 
memory-testing session, and switching was highly correlated with high levels of lifetime 
betrayal trauma.  This study also introduces the Integration Measure (IM), which is the first 
standardized measure of integration in DID.  Integration was related to switching, though 
this relationship may be complex.  Regression analyses demonstrated that lifetime high 
betrayal trauma was the best predictor of switching.  Frequent switching may also slow 
reaction time in a variety of tasks.  Directions for future research and suggestions for 
researchers are also discussed.
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION TO DISSOCIATION 
 
 
Dissociative identity disorder (DID), formerly known as multiple personalities, is 
one of the most fascinating enigmas in psychology.   This condition, with its long and 
checkered history, has been somewhat controversial.  A growing research literature is 
now uncovering the underlying etiology and mechanisms involved in DID, but much is 
still unknown about the functioning of the cognitive processes, especially attention and 
memory, that underlie its symptoms.  Before exploring these processes, it is useful to 
summarize what is known about the phenomenology of multiple personalities. 
 This chapter considers several different definitions of dissociation in general.  It 
then provides a brief introduction to the literature on multiple personalities, including a 
few of the many controversies associated with this condition.  Finally, the chapter 
examines the major theories about how high levels of dissociation develop.   
Definitions of Dissociation 
 Many definitions and theories attempt to illuminate the complex construct of 
dissociation.  Variously defined as a discontinuity of states and as an important survival 
mechanism, dissociation provides a method of sectioning knowledge and storing it in a 
largely state-dependent manner.  There is some evidence, discussed below, that 
pathological dissociation arising out of trauma is qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, 
different from more “normal” kinds of dissociation.   
Dissociation has been defined as a jump between behavioral states, or as a special 
and distinct state of profound disconnection (Putnam, 1997).  The American 
Psychological Association defines it as a separation between processes that are normally 
integrated, such as events, emotions, and memories.  It has been conceptualized as a 
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response to trauma, as a neural network, as a survival mechanism, and as a 
compartmentalization of information processing.  One conceptualization that has been 
common in the past is the psychodynamic interpretation that dissociation is a defense 
mechanism that protects against unbearable anxiety, and as such is considered a relatively 
“immature” defense (e.g., Bowman, Blix, & Coons, 1985; McElroy, 1992).  Sometimes 
dissociation is seen as a form of self-hypnosis.  There is some evidence to support many 
of these interpretations, as discussed further below.  Possibly the most useful definition of 
dissociation from a clinical perspective is that it is an experience of disconnection from 
the self, from the world, from emotions, from memories, and from others. 
What these definitions have in common is a separation of information.  Whether 
dissociation is seen as a jump between states, as a special state, or as a functional (rather 
than physiological) separation, all definitions agree that dissociation allows memories, 
skills, affects, and other knowledge to be sectioned off and stored in less easily-accessible 
ways.  The state-dependent nature of dissociated memories is not disputed, although the 
motivations assumed to underlie this segmentation can vary by theory.  Whereas 
psychoanalytic theory views dissociation as a primitive defense against being 
overwhelmed by unacceptable or unmanageable emotions, other theories (such as 
attachment theories, including Betrayal Trauma Theory, discussed later) emphasize that 
the most salient danger is not that of being threatened by one’s own emotions, but rather 
the very real danger of losing an essential attachment relationship and with it the physical 
and emotional care necessary for survival.  Putnam (1997), in his Discrete Behavioral 
States theory, discussed below, defined pathological dissociation as an aberrant 
developmental pathway made necessary by abuse and begun as young as infancy; but, 
according to this theory, other forms of dissociation are non-pathological.  In fact, 
Putnam’s is the only definition that includes an explanation for the development of non-
pathological dissociation as well as dissociation arising out of trauma.   
 Defining dissociation as an extension of self-hypnosis was more common in the 
1980s than in recent research.  This definition was the one that most conceptualized 
dissociation as a voluntary process.  However, more carefully controlled studies seem to 
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lead to the conclusion that hypnotizability and dissociation are related, but not 
isomorphic.  Children do seem to be more hypnotizable than are adults, and also more 
dissociative; both hypnotizability and dissociation decline with age (e.g., Ogawa, Sroufe, 
Weinfield, Carlson, & Egeland, 1997).  Empirical evidence linking dissociation with 
trauma is well-replicated, however, while evidence linking trauma and hypnotizability 
has been elusive.  While emphasizing that hypnosis is not synonymous with dissociation, 
Putnam (1996) pointed out that “there may be a complex, nonlinear interaction […]  If 
one selects out a subgroup of traumatized, highly hypnotizable or highly dissociative 
individuals, then it is possible to demonstrate a stronger statistical relationship between 
hypnotizability and dissociation” (p. 292).   
Theory of Structural Dissociation 
 Nijenhuis’ theory of structural dissociation has gained prominence in recent years, 
partly because it provides testable hypotheses about dissociative responses to various 
situations.  Nijenhuis distinguishes between two possible kinds of states: the emotional 
personality, or EP, and the apparently normal personality, or ANP.  EPs hold traumatic 
memory, often being stuck in the sensory experience of the memory and unaware of the 
passage of time.  Their purpose is to survive any threat, for example by freezing, fighting, 
or submitting, similar to the defensive responses of animals (Nijenhuis, 2003; Nijenhuis, 
van der Hart, & Steele, 2002).  ANPs, in contrast, manage the tasks of daily life, such as 
working, and the functions of attachment and caretaking.  They may be emotionally 
unconnected to, or amnesic for, past traumatic events (Nijenhuis & van der Hart, 1999).   
One benefit of this theory is that it can explain what appear to be opposite 
responses to threatening stimuli, depending on whether the personality being tested is an 
EP or an ANP.  For example, ANPs seem to deal with threatening stimuli by averting 
their gaze, while EPs pay close attention to any potential threat; simulators cannot 
reproduce this pattern of results (unpublished research cited in Nijenhuis, et al., 2002).  
The two types of systems evaluate memories and stimuli differently and may even 
become afraid of each other.  Because these two systems are so different, it is difficult for 
integration to occur across them, particularly under conditions of neuroendocrine 
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instability that are produced by chronic childhood stress and arousal.  In fact, the 
activation of traumatic memories in an EP state can actually inhibit access to other kinds 
of memories (Nijenhuis & van der Hart, 1999).  This theory also explains the 
perpetuation and increase of dissociation, as the ANP is not equipped to deal with the 
emotional trauma held by the EP, and must therefore re-dissociate the traumatic 
memories and avoid anything that will trigger the emergence of the EP (Nijenhuis, et al., 
2002).     
Neural Network 
 Li and Spiegel (1992) proposed a unique conception of dissociation from a neural 
network perspective.  They defined dissociation as “a special form of consciousness in 
which events that would ordinarily be connected are divided from one another” (p. 144).  
Similar to Putnam’s (1997) theory of discrete behavioral states (DBS), Li and Spiegel 
believed that jumping from one state to another produces dissociation.  These jumps are 
due to the neural network behaving in a rigid fashion that has been constrained by 
trauma. 
 In this model, a neural network stores information in a series of connection 
strengths.  The network’s “state” can be seen as a point that moves over a conceptual map 
of all the connections, finding a location where all of its constraints are satisfied.  This 
point does not move until conditions change, at which time it must satisfy the new 
constraints and move to a new location.  Trauma is one such constraint. 
 Intense psychological trauma constrains the neural net by “cementing” just a few 
connections into a schema, which is a rigid pattern of connection strengths that is built 
out of experience and emerges when it is needed.  Trauma produces such powerful 
emotions that they override other constraints.  This process leads to an inability to 
respond flexibly to situations, even when the trauma is no longer present (Li & Spiegel, 
1992).  Therefore a traumatized person’s consciousness may rapidly “jump” to a state of 
consciousness that includes flashbacks or abreactions.  The person behaves with similar 
affect and thought processes as during the trauma, even if such behavior is no longer 
appropriate.   
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 This particular definition of dissociation is fairly unique in that it also attempts to 
explain the functioning of a normal system that is not dissociative and has not 
experienced trauma.  The concept of “states” is similar to Putnam’s definition of 
dissociation, discussed in more detail later, but Putnam did not specifically describe how 
the system as a whole chooses which state will best satisfy the current constraints of the 
situation.  Li and Spiegel’s theory could also use expansion.  The authors stated that 
trauma produces strong emotions that constrain the network, but they do not explain very 
much about what these emotions could be or why they are so strong and so salient.  Li 
and Spiegel’s neural network theory combines well with Putnam’s DBS theory (and with 
Forrest’s orbitalfrontal explanation of it; see below).  All of these theories view 
dissociation as a way of organizing thoughts, memories, affects, and physiology to serve 
as an important, if involuntary, coping mechanism and survival skill.    
In adults, there is also some evidence that pathological dissociation is distinct 
from high levels of normal dissociation, an idea first advanced by Janet in the 1800s.  
Putnam (1996, 1997), Macfie and colleagues (2001), and Gleaves and colleagues (2001) 
summarized taxometric research by Waller and colleagues that led to the development of 
the DES-T, or taxon.  This subset of items measures only the aspects of dissociation that 
are differentially experienced by those with a diagnosed disorder, such as hearing voices, 
and does not assess high levels of what Putnam classified as normal dissociation, such as 
becoming absorbed in a book or movie.  The taxon could reliably distinguish people with 
a dissociative disorder from people with another disorder and from people with no 
disorder (although recent research suggests that the taxon may not be as stable as was 
once assumed; Watson, 2003).  The results of these studies support an understanding of a 
distinct type of dissociation, distinguished by depersonalization and amnesia, and unlike 
more normative dissociation.  
However, Putnam’s (1997) distinction between normal and pathological 
dissociation is imperfect.  Normal dissociation is comprised of activities such as 
absorption in a good book, and a narrowing of attention with no significant state-
dependent memory.  Pathological dissociation, according to Putnam, includes profound 
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amnesia and significant alteration in identity, with significant state-dependent memory 
for autobiographical information.  These definitions are intimately connected to a 
Western, industrialized culture that sees identity alteration as pathological rather than as a 
routine method of accessing higher states or deities, such as during meditation or prayer.  
In addition, state-dependency of autobiographical memory is an established part of such 
normative dissociative states as amok.  
The most useful conceptualization of dissociation probably varies with the 
context.  Depending on what the objectives of a particular study are, it may be more 
appropriate to view dissociation as a continuum in some cases and as a taxon in others.  
Dissociation’s dual nature has been likened to the nature of light as both a particle and a 
wave (Putnam, 1997); using whichever definition seems most useful at the time does not 
eliminate the possibility of using the other. 
What is DID? 
 Dissociative identity disorder (DID), formerly called multiple personality disorder 
(MPD), is currently defined by the presence of two or more identities, each of which 
takes control of the body.  Its five most prominent symptoms are amnesia, 
depersonalization, derealization, alterations in identity, and identity confusion.  These 
disturbances cannot be the result of drugs or a medical condition, nor can they, in 
children, be the result of an imaginary companion (e.g., ISSD, 1997; Gleaves, May, & 
Cardeña, 2001; Maldonado, Butler, & Spiegel, 1998; Steinberg, 2001).  People with 
multiple personalities often exhibit a wide variety of confusing and seemingly bizarre 
physical, mental, and emotional symptoms (Putnam, 1989, provides an excellent 
overview of DID phenomenology).  DID is almost always the result of severe and 
chronic childhood abuse.  Patients with DID are highly polysymptomatic, presenting with 
almost every other disorder in the DSM.  Because of this factor, they are often 
misdiagnosed and spend years in unproductive treatment, receiving many incorrect 
diagnoses (e.g., Arbour, 1998; Maldonado, et al., 1998; Ross, Norton, & Wozney, 1989).   
The prevalence of DID has been estimated at 1% of the general North American 
population, although the rate of diagnosis is higher in women and among psychiatric 
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inpatients (e.g.,  Gleaves, et al., 2001; Maldonado, et al., 1998; Putnam, 1995).  
Compared to boys, girls may have a higher risk of encountering more types of abuse, 
more abuse perpetrated by caregivers, and more chronic abuse (e.g., Putnam, 1989; 
1995).  Bowman (2002) reported that, across 11 studies, women received the diagnosis of 
DID nine times as often as men.  There is some evidence that men may have a more 
subtle presentation than women, although there are very few other differences that are 
reliably found between men and women with DID, and those differences that exist may 
be due more to gender socialization than to the DID (e.g., Akyüz, Dogan, Sar, Yargiç, & 
Tutkun, 1999; Loewenstein & Putnam, 1990; Bowman, 2002). 
What Is an Alter? 
 Definitions of an alter vary according to training, experience, and ideology.  The 
definition of an alter is intimately connected with the question of whether alters are 
separate people (see below), and hence whether they have moral or legal rights.  In the 
past, it was common to view dissociated alters as demons or possessing spirits; this view 
is still prevalent in some cultures outside the mainstream U. S. culture.  The 
psychoanalytic concept of introjects has also fallen into relative disfavor as an 
explanation for DID, although some modern writers pair this idea with more recent 
conceptualizations.     
 A definition that is fairly standard and reflective of the views of many clinicians 
and researchers is that an alter is “a distinct identity or personality state, with its own 
relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment 
and self (Modified from DSM-IV).  Alters are dissociated parts of the mind that the 
patient experiences as separate from each other” (ISSD, 1997, p. 132).  The DSM 
definition is the one that focuses most on the separateness of alters, and the one that treats 
them as most complex and person-like.  This definition is misleading, however, because 
it is clear in other language that alters are not actually full people and should not be 
treated as such.  The ISSD elaborated further that, although the DID patient experiences 
parts of the mind as functioning autonomously or semi-autonomously, they are ultimately 
all part of the same person (1997). 
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 Another set of definitions that has been very influential comes from the work of 
Frank Putnam.  In his book on adult dissociation he defined an alter as a discrete state of 
consciousness “organized around a prevailing affect, sense of self (including body 
image), with a limited repertoire of behaviors and a set of state-dependent memories” 
(Putnam, 1989, p. 103).  He later elaborated his discrete behavioral states theory and 
explained that alters are “…complex, enduring, identity-based, discrete dissociative states 
that evolve during childhood and adolescence [and] arise in the context of severe trauma 
occurring early in childhood.  […]  Over time, they become increasingly 
differentiated…” (Putnam, 1997, p. 175).  Many scientists and theorists have definitions 
similar to these, which focus on shifting states of consciousness.  These definitions are 
appealing because they provide clues for measurement of different alters’ characteristics 
in the laboratory.  States of consciousness can be studied; state-dependent memory is a 
well-established effect.  Putnam’s 1997 definition also takes the traumatic developmental 
course into account, which is an important consideration in understanding DID.   
In an article influenced by Putnam’s work, Forrest (2001) conceptualized alters as 
different Me-concepts that are not integrated into a Global Me.  This view comes from 
the work of Piaget and William James, and postulates that infants start to develop 
concepts of “me” when they can direct their thinking onto themselves.  Experiences in 
the world provide the context for different Me-concepts, such as the “social me” and the 
“me-in-relation-to-a-caregiver.”  Each of these Me-concepts is held by a different set of 
neural networks, and the relation to the caregiver helps the infant regulate transitions 
between the states, developing a Global Me that is stable across contexts.  The 
orbitalfrontal cortex probably aids this process, and when it fails, alters are the result.     
A third view of alters comes from Ross, who views alters as “abnormally 
personified containers of schemas and cognitive errors” (Ross, 1997, p. 361).  According 
to Ross, alters are merely serving as containers of mental patterns, most of which are 
incorrect.  His definition is similar to the others in that it treats alters as patterns that, over 
time, have become more like separate people.  His therapy style emphasizes getting the 
alters to realize that they are all part of the same person.   
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Diagnosis 
A variety of instruments is available for the diagnosis of DID, including the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D), the Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES) and the DES-taxon (DES-T), the Dissociative Disorders 
Interview Schedule (DDIS), and others.  For children, there are the Child Dissociative 
Checklist (CDC) and the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL), and others.  Most of these 
measures are structured clinical interviews, although several are self-report 
questionnaires.  Most of them have been validated and normed and can reliably diagnose 
DID (see below).  The SCID-D can even catch cases of DID that have been previously 
missed (Steinberg, 2001).  The best way to diagnose DID involves taking a very detailed 
history of current symptoms, including somatization symptoms and Schneiderian first-
rank symptoms, the five core symptoms of DID, as well as a history of childhood and 
past diagnoses (e.g., Maldonado, et al., 1998; Putnam, 1995).  
 An issue of the Journal of Trauma and Dissociation was devoted largely to a 
debate over whether the criteria for DID should be changed.  The main article in this 
section was written by Paul F. Dell (2001a), who argued that there are at least ten major 
disadvantages to the current diagnostic criteria, and offered his own alternative system of 
diagnosis for the dissociative disorders.  In summary, he stated that the current DID 
criteria are not user-friendly, are out of date, are not based on taxometric analysis, have 
poor reliability and low validity (causing misdiagnosis), imply that DID is completely 
understood, discourage future research, cause controversy, disregard important 
information, and artificially reduce the base-rate of diagnosis.  His alternate classification 
system is “Major Dissociative Disorder,” which encompasses a wide range of criteria that 
cover all the current DSM dissociative diagnoses.  The main advantage of this system is 
that people with some dissociative symptoms who do not meet the criteria for full DID 
will automatically receive a lesser dissociative diagnosis, which would be more 
descriptive and more appropriate than the current DDNOS.  Dell proposed that the new 
criteria would lead to less misdiagnosis, thereby reducing the amount of time dissociative 
patients spend unproductively utilizing the resources of the medical system before they 
10 
 
can get adequate treatment.  I believe, as do the other commentators, that he is correct in 
his assessment of the need to revise these criteria, if not in his statements of their 
problems.  
 Although Dell’s taxonomy is certainly an interesting reconceptualization of the 
DID diagnosis, I and others disagree with many of the purported weaknesses of the 
current criteria.  I agree with Cardeña (2001) and Steinberg (2001) that Dell ignores the 
vast evidence of the reliability and validity of the DID criteria.  Dell did not provide 
sufficient evidence for his claim that the average clinician cannot reliably diagnose DID 
(although we know that misdiagnosis does occur by the numbers of previous diagnoses 
and years in the mental health system that DID patients often accrue).  He admits that 
measures do exist that can reliably find DID but did not cite the considerable evidence of 
their utility.  In fact, his new proposal has almost no empirical support at all; his 
“Preliminary empirical validation” (2001b, p. 69) is unconvincing and has been criticized 
as merely a very long and tedious version of the DES (Cardeña, 2001).  Cardeña argued 
that Dell’s criteria will result in more under-diagnosis of DID, rather than less.  Coons 
(2001) and Spiegel (2001) also agreed that Dell’s criteria are extremely complex and long 
to read, especially for a clinician who has little training or experience in the dissociative 
disorders; in fact, even Dell admits this point (2001b).   
 Despite the problems with Dell’s proposed criteria, it is true that there has been an 
explosion of new research in this area since DSM-IV came out, and the criteria need to 
change to reflect it.  For example, as Putnam (1997, pp. 94 – 95) pointed out, currently a 
diagnosis can be made solely on the basis of self-report because the clinician is not 
actually required to witness any alter personalities, although they are the focus of the 
definition.  I agree with Putnam (who also prefers the term MPD over DID, as do I) that, 
while the current diagnostic criteria leave something to be desired, the underlying 
concept is valid, robust, and useful. 
Integration 
One unique aspect of this dissertation is the preliminary development of the first 
standard instrument to measure integration.  Integration, or the fusion of all alters into 
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one personality, is a controversial topic.  It is often a lengthy and subtle process, but a 
few studies have begun to show that treatment works and leads to stable integration (e.g., 
Coons & Bowman, 2001).  Integration is associated with a wide variety of benefits, 
including reduction of non-dissociative symptoms (Coons & Bowman, 2001; Kluft, 
1993b).  Still, there are disagreements about its necessity, with some arguing that it is 
merely a by-product of therapy rather than its explicit goal (Fine, 1996). 
Full integration may be more important in children than in adults, because they 
are still developing.  Integration is also faster, easier, and sometimes totally spontaneous 
in children (Kluft, 1985a; Waters & Silberg, 1998).  But the spontaneous fusion of alters 
without working towards it seldom happens in adults for the alters that are relatively 
complex, with a wide range of affects and functions.  Kluft (1993b) suggested that 
therapists use images of rebirth or union rather than dying, elimination, or subtraction as 
metaphors for integration.  In particular, adolescents find the prospect of integration more 
frightening, and they fear being left alone or dying (Waters & Silberg, 1998).   
Kluft (1993a) described at least three different approaches to integration.  
Whereas in strategic integrationalism integration is the product of a primary focus on 
eroding dissociative defenses, in tactical integrationalism the therapy is planfully focused 
on specific goals, one of which is integration.  The personality-focused approach is more 
concerned with getting all the alters to collaborate and solve problems together in a 
diplomacy; integration may be pursued but is not the main goal.  These three approaches 
frequently alternate during the course of treatment, depending on the current context and 
needs of the client.   Sinason (2002) made the point that it is very important not to 
integrate forcefully or violently, or against the client’s wishes.  Kluft (1993b) agreed, and 
says that his stance is not to push it or argue about it, but to wait and see whether 
integration is attractive to the client later on. 
As an alternate opinion, Southgate (2002) proposed that the goal of therapy for 
DID is to aid the person in becoming an “associating multiple person.”  His conception of 
self is that all people have some degree of multiplicity within themselves, and those who 
are healthy have the ability to be flexible, attached, and creative by choosing which state 
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of self is appropriate for each situation.  This position is not to say that the person still has 
DID, but rather, the person is now only as multiple as everybody else.  However, I must 
agree with Rivera (1989) in her feminist view of why full integration is important for 
female trauma survivors: it gives women more power, choices, and maneuverability 
within the power structures of our patriarchal society.  Given that all participants in this 
dissertation research are female, this perspective may be particularly relevant to their 
experience.   
This dissertation assesses integration as an important component of understanding 
memory functioning in DID.  Previous research has neglected this important aspect of the 
experience of functioning with DID.  “Switching”, or changing which alter is in control 
of the body, is also related to integration and has also been understudied.  It is probable 
that the switching of alters due to lack of integration affects the performance of DID 
participants on a variety of laboratory tasks; therefore, measures of these two phenomena 
are an important contribution of this dissertation. 
Does DID Really Exist? 
There has been considerable debate in the past over whether DID exists as an 
entity, or whether it is merely a fad or even iatrogenically created.  It has been called 
merely a variant of schizophrenia, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), hysteria, or 
borderline personality disorder (see Gleaves, May, & Cardeña, 2001).  Supposedly it can 
be convincingly faked by college students, or brought on by media exposure.  Kluft 
(1985b, 1986) pointed out that actual presentations of multiple personalities in the 
clinician’s office bear very little relation to what is portrayed in the movies.  Many people 
with DID hide their alters rather than flaunt them; they lie to cover their memory lapses; 
they try to “pass” and they are often quite successful (e.g., Kluft, 1986).  In a study 
comparing people with genuine multiple personalities to simulators, Kluft (1987) found 
that the malingerers did a poor job of convincing experts of their purported multiple 
personalities.  Although some of the symptoms can be easily malingered, none of the 
simulators was able to be consistent in memory, personality, or voice patterns.  None 
endorsed as many Schneiderian first-rank symptoms as the genuine patients, and none 
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gave the characteristic history of treatment failure and multiple diagnoses.  In addition, 
Kluft (1987) pointed out that dissimulation, or pretending not to have multiple 
personalities, is far more common than simulation.     
Some people have argued that DID is merely an artifact of Western civilization 
and diagnostic criteria (see Maldonado, et al., 1998).  Still others have made the claim 
that all people have multiple personalities in some way (see Rivera, 1989, for a 
poststructuralist examination of “self”).  Despite these assertions, DID does exist as a 
valid and reliable category, even if there is room for improvement in the diagnostic 
criteria, and as such it is treatable.  This dissertation examines only the phenomena 
associated with the Western label of DID, although many cultures include dissociative 
phenomena and rituals with culturally-specific meanings and expressions that differ from 
the Western conceptualization of this disorder.    
In the past few years, considerable evidence has accumulated that DID is a 
distinct category that can be found in similar manifestations all over the world and 
reliably distinguished from other conditions.  For example, Akyüz, Dogan, Sar, Yargiç, 
and Tutkun (1999) report that cross-cultural similarities in the expression and diagnosis 
of DID have been found in North America, the Netherlands, and Turkey.  In their study 
of a general population in Turkey, Akyüz and colleagues found that the prevalence and 
presentation of DID were almost equal to those found in other parts of the world, even 
though the Turkish sample had no exposure to Western psychotherapy and no public or 
media awareness of the disorder.  The prevalence rate was probably lowered by the social 
pressures involved in reading the DES aloud to illiterate participants.  Similarly, 
Maldonado and colleagues (1998) report that DID has been found multiple times in all 
racial and ethnic groups and all classes across various cultures, including African-
Americans, European-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Hispanic Americans, and 
residents of Canada, India, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the Caribbean.    
DID is also one of the best-documented Western diagnoses, with cases dating 
back over two centuries.  Numerous studies show that it can be reliably distinguished 
from other disorders and conditions with which it is associated (other dissociative 
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disorders, psychosis, and other psychiatric disorder in general), as well being 
distinguished from having no disorder at all, from complex partial seizures, and from 
PTSD (Gleaves, et al., 2001; Putnam, 1997).  It can also be distinguished from 
schizophrenia, even though these two disorders share several overlapping features of the 
Schneiderian first-rank symptoms (hallucination, delusions, passivity experiences).  
Although DID patients actually report more of these first-rank symptoms than do 
schizophrenic patients, the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-Dissociation 
(SCID-D), Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule (DDIS), Dissociative Experience 
Scale (DES), and DES-Taxon (DES-T) have all been shown to discriminate these groups 
successfully (e.g., Gleaves, et al., 2001; Putnam, 1995, 1997; Steinberg, 2001).  Watson 
(2001) also was able to show that dissociation is distinct and separate from schizotypy, 
although both were related to each other and to abnormal sleep experiences.     
Are Alters “Real People”? 
The issue of whether alters are real people depends on one’s definition of “real” 
and of “person.”  The cognitive and neurological evidence reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 
demonstrates that alters do have some qualities of separate people, although they are not 
completely separate from each other.  Several of these studies also included control or 
simulation conditions, and some of the neurobiological effects could not reliably be 
produced by simulators (e.g., Sternlicht, Payton, Werner, & Rancurello, 1989).  The fact 
that some information “leaks” between alters is not inconsistent with the evidence 
showing separation, as demonstrated best by Dorahy’s (2001) logical synthesis of the 
results.  Merckelbach, Devilly, and Rassin (2002) argued, in an extremely biased and 
selective review, that there is no valid evidence for the reality of alters.  Their statements 
are based largely on atypical or questionable cases of DID (such as the “Hillside 
Strangler”), unconvincing analogues (college students pretending to be murderers), and 
incomplete discussion of the empirical literature.   
 Ignoring the alters does not make them go away; in fact it is associated with 
treatment failure (e.g., Arbour, 1998; Coons & Bowman, 2001; Ross, 1997).  If alters are 
unwelcome in therapy they may stop appearing, but that does not mean that they have 
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been integrated.  Putnam (1997) noted that treatment for other symptoms that are 
adaptations to trauma and concurrent with dissociation (such as substance abuse and 
promiscuity) will fail unless the dissociation is addressed.   
Kluft (1996) said, “DID is that mental disorder that dissolves in empathy” (p. 
317).  Therefore it is important to call the alters by their names and allow them room to 
expand, but, to maintain order, they must all go by the legal name in public and all are 
responsible for the actions of the body.  The system’s responsibility for the actions of all 
its members is also a point emphasized by other therapists (e.g., Putnam, 1997; ISSD, 
1997).  As a key part of therapy, Ross (1996, p. 364) “specifically and repeatedly” 
reminds his patients that all their alters are part of the same person, and he thinks that the 
idea that they are all separate people is a key cognitive error (1996, 1997).  Putnam 
(1989) agreed with Ross that it is a serious therapeutic error to treat alters like separate 
people.  However, he disagreed with Ross in that he observed that it is useless to get tied 
up in trying to prove it.  Therapists should rather empathize with a feeling of separateness 
while implicitly emphasizing wholeness.  Kluft (1993a) agreed. 
Alters are in fact real, argued Putnam (1997), but not as individual people, rather 
as discrete states of consciousness that are demonstrably dissociated from each other 
(different respiration rates, muscle tone, skin tone, etc.).  Therapy should focus on the 
whole person, although there are times when it is appropriate to engage the alters.  
Addressing alters individually is a technique best reserved for adult patients, who are at a 
lower risk than children of dissociating further in response to therapist suggestion 
(Putnam, 1995, 1997).  An interesting side note is that Steele (2002) reported that many 
of the participants in his study experienced the administration of the Adult Attachment 
Interview as threatening to them, because the interviewer assumed that there was only 
one valid voice telling the story of their early family experiences.    
Evidence is beginning to accrue that treatment for DID can be effective in the 
long term (e.g., Coons & Bowman, 2001; Maldonado, et al., 1998).  Successful 
integration is associated with a host of benefits encompassing both dissociative and non-
dissociative symptoms, and can be maintained for at least ten years (the longest follow-up 
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so far).  Simpler cases (i.e., fewer alters) have shorter treatments, but even for those who 
take longer, the vast majority of patients see improvements in their functioning, even 
while they are still in therapy (Maldonado, et al., 1998; Putnam, 1995).  Putnam (1997), 
however, counters this cautious optimism with the reminder that treatment is very hard 
and not automatically successful, even with children.  There is a definite need for more 
and better-designed treatment outcome studies that have better control over a number of 
variables such as clinician training and experience.  Few longitudinal studies exist, and 
only one study followed up on patients after more than three years.  However, slowly but 
surely the studies are showing that DID can be successfully treated, once the correct 
diagnosis is made.  Treating dissociative patients for only one or two of their numerous 
comorbid conditions will usually result in failure unless the dissociation is also 
addressed. 
The Developmental Course of Dissociation 
The study of dissociation in children has been complicated by the fact that 
behaviors that are considered normal in children, such as extensive fantasy play and 
imaginary companions, are “clearly pathologic” in adulthood (Putnam, 1996, p. 285; 
though Putnam does not explain exactly why this distinction is clear).  In general, 
dissociation is high in children and declines with age, in part due to the high percentage 
of time children spend in fantasy play and imaginary worlds.  There has been some 
debate over whether imaginary companions are a marker of pathology, and if so, what 
kind of imaginary companions; however, most research has shown that imaginary friends 
are usually normal (e.g., Taylor, 1999) and that children’s high dissociation is mainly a 
function of high hyponotizability and absorption, which are not pathological (Putnam, 
1997). 
Dissociation in children has been the focus of several interesting studies.  Macfie, 
Cicchetti, and Toth (2001) found that, during the preschool years, dissociation increased 
for maltreated children but did not increase for non-maltreated children.  Their study is 
unique because it includes both teacher reports of children’s dissociation and children’s 
self-reports of their own dissociative experiences.  Their findings suggest that abuse can 
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lead to a qualitatively different developmental trajectory and increasing fragmentation of 
the self.  Children who had not been maltreated had a slight decline in dissociation over 
the course of a year; children who were abused, however, had a significant increase in 
dissociation.  These different patterns of development led the authors to conclude that the 
preschool years are a sensitive period for the development of dissociation and the 
consolidation of the self (Macfie, et al., 2001).  The finding of a different pattern of 
development also supports the notion of pathological dissociation as a distinct taxon, 
rather than just the extreme end of a normal developmental process.    
A large, multi-site study of dissociation in various types of samples also provided 
evidence for the taxometric nature of pathological dissociation.  Different diagnostic 
groups, such as people with schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, and DID, 
showed different mean dissociation scores, consistent with previous research.  However, 
these group differences were not the result of smooth distributions of dissociation scores; 
rather, the group differences were determined by the percentage of people in each group 
who clustered into a distinct high dissociation category (Putnam, Carlson, Ross, 
Anderson, Clark, Torem, et al., 1996).   
A longitudinal study of children from infancy through adolescence provided 
further support for a dissociative taxon (Ogawa, et al., 1997).  The authors concluded that 
dissociation, while normal in young childhood, is an increasingly pathological response 
in adolescence.  Rather than being on the high end of a continuum, children who had 
experienced severe trauma exhibited a qualitatively different pattern of responses, which 
is consistent with Putnam’s (1997) conceptualization of pathological dissociation as a 
separate and abnormal developmental pathway, as well as with the results of Macfie and 
colleagues (2001).  Ogawa and colleagues’ study found three groups of dissociation 
scores: low normal, high normal, and high clinical.  Membership in the clinical group 
was assigned on the basis of the DES taxon, which was a clear breaking point in the 
distribution of scores.  Clinical group membership was predicted by very different factors 
than the factors that predicted membership in the high normal group.  The clinical group 
had experienced more neglect than either of the normal groups, but compared to the high 
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normal group, the clinical group was less likely to have experienced emotionally 
unavailable caretaking and less likely to witness interparental violence (Ogawa, et al., 
1997).  There is some evidence that pathological dissociation arising out of trauma is 
qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, different from more normal kinds of dissociation.  
Besides being more severe, pathological dissociation also seems to follow a different 
developmental trajectory.   
Children presenting with dissociative disorders are often easier to treat than 
adults, since their defenses are not as entrenched or complex.  Fagan and McMahon 
(1984) reported on four children who seemed to be in the process of developing full-
blown multiple personalities but were able to be treated before it progressed.  Peterson 
(1991) proposed an entire distinct diagnostic system for dissociative children, which 
recognizes their incomplete separation into different alters.  Putnam (1997) also 
emphasized that dissociative children are easier to integrate than adults, and Waters and 
Silberg (1998) reported effects of integration in children that are slightly different from 
effects in adults.  
However, dissociation can also be more difficult to recognize in children than in 
adults.  Dissociative children may be difficult to diagnose because the full-blown 
symptoms of a dissociative disorder may not appear until adulthood (Waters & Silberg, 
1998).  Further, pathological dissociation in children may mimic normal dissociation that 
occurs in fantasy, pretend play, and imaginary companions.  The age regression that may 
occur due to dissociation can be mistaken for normal phases of regression that occur in 
many children (Peterson, 1998).  Dissociative disorders may also be masked by or 
mistaken for more common childhood disorders such as oppositional defiant disorder, 
conduct disorder, learning disorders, or attention deficit disorders.  Other disorders (such 
as autism, schizophrenic disorders, and mood disorders with psychosis) that are not 
dissociative in nature sometimes mimic some of the same symptoms (Silberg, 1998).  
Children are often accused of lying when they are amnesic for their actions or are trying 
to hide their lapses in time and memory.  In addition, the sense of self in children is still 
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developing, which may make them both more vulnerable to dissociative disorders and 
more difficult to diagnose.  
What Leads to High Trait Dissociation? 
 Models of dissociation continue to be revised as researchers become increasingly 
aware of the prevalence of trauma and of its effects.  Further, understanding the brain’s 
structure and function is a challenge that is now increasingly addressed with brain 
scanning and other physiological technology.  This section discusses possible pathways 
to high dissociation: trauma itself and several theories about disorganized attachment, 
shame, and genetics.   
Trauma 
  Severe dissociative disorders are almost always the result of childhood trauma 
(e.g., Maldonado, et al., 1998; Putnam, 1995; 1996).  Putnam has described a “window” 
for trauma leading to DID at around 3 to 10 years old.  Alters appear at around 4 to 8 
years old (Putnam, 1995), or at the latest by age 12 (Maldonado, et al., 1998).  Numerous 
correlational studies have confirmed a high incidence of childhood trauma—sexual, 
physical, and probably emotional abuse—in adults and children with dissociative 
disorders or very high levels of dissociation (e.g., Arbour, 1998; Bowman, et al., 1985; 
Chu & Dill, 1990; Coons, 1994; Dalenberg & Palesh, 2004; Draijer & Langeland, 1999; 
Kisiel & Lyons, 2001; Loewenstein, 1994; Macfie, et al.  2001; McElroy, 1992; 
Nijenhuis, Spinhoven, van Dyck, van der Hart, & Vanderlinden, 1998; Ogawa, et al., 
1997; Ross, et al., 1989; Zlotnick, Begin, Shea, Pearlstein, Simpson, & Costello, 1994; 
Zlotnick, Shea, Pearlstein, Begin, Simpson, & Costello, 1996).  Many of these studies 
further find that an earlier age of trauma, more severe trauma, and more perpetrators also 
increase the risk of developing a dissociative disorder.   
It is difficult to know which aspect of trauma leads most specifically to 
dissociation, because many of the risk factors are confounded—for example, more severe 
and frequent trauma may begin at a younger age, involve more perpetrators and more 
force, and occur in a general atmosphere of family dysfunction (e.g., Putnam, 1996).  It is 
partly because of this complexity in research that Tillman, Nash, and Lerner (1994) 
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concluded, in an unwarrantedly selective review of literature, that the link between 
trauma and dissociation has not been definitively proven.  They are mistaken.  At least 
for high levels of pathological trait dissociation, the link has been repeatedly 
demonstrated in several kinds of populations, using various methods.   
Disorganized Attachment 
 Several models of dissociation fall under the general heading of “attachment” and 
have been influential in the field.  Liotti’s (1999) conceptualization of dissociative 
processes draws on the work of Bowlby and other attachment theorists.  Liotti examined 
various motivational systems at work in the behavior of humans and other animals.  The 
systems that affect social behavior, dependent on the limbic system of the brain, 
moderate care-seeking and care-giving, dominance and submission, courtship, and 
cooperation (Liotti, 1999).  Attachment is a vital piece of these social motivational 
systems. 
Dissociation may begin with an early disorganized attachment, even if no overt 
abuse is occurring (Hesse & Main, 2000; Liotti, 1999).  The key element being 
dissociated, argued Liotti, is what it means to feel vulnerable when one should feel most 
protected, i.e., in a relationship with a parent or caregiver.  “Therefore,” he said, 
“children can dissociate […] only when the attachment figures are the direct or indirect 
source of their traumatic experiences” (p. 779).  Barach (1991, p. 118) concurred, saying 
that detachment or dissociation “protects the abused child from crying out for help and 
finding out that he is alone,” which would be unbearable.   
When a parent with a history of trauma or loss interacts with the child, he or she 
may communicate in ways that are affected by past trauma.  Parents with unresolved 
trauma, particularly those who have an Unresolved/disorganized classification on the 
Adult Attachment Interview, are especially likely to have infants with disorganized 
attachment.  When external or internal stimuli trigger unresolved trauma, parents may 
appear dissociated, frightened, or threatening for no visible reason, which is scary for 
infants (Hesse & Main, 2000; Main & Morgan, 1996).  The child finds this interaction 
frightening and withdraws; however, loneliness is even worse, and drives the child back 
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to the parent for comfort.  Infants have no way to separate the frightening aspects of their 
parents from the comforting ones, and so they continue to seek comfort in the parents’ 
presence (Hesse & Main, 2000).  In such a situation, a child develops contradictory 
models of the self as frightening to the parent, but also comforting and loved.  The child 
develops disorganized and contradictory internal working models (IWMs) of both the self 
and the attachment figure.  When the attachment system is activated, IWMs rapidly 
switch between the self as victim, perpetrator, and rescuer.  This triad is played out both 
interpersonally and in the development of three different types of alters in adult DID.  
Therefore, the child’s ability to form an integrated view of the self and others is 
overwhelmed (Liotti, 1999).  Children with frightening caregivers are placed in an 
impossible bind, in which the parent is both the alarming stimulus and the stimulus that is 
sought in response to alarm.  In this situation, infants cannot develop coherent coping 
strategies; they may display simultaneous approach and avoidance behaviors (Hesse & 
Main, 2000; Main & Morgan, 1996; Schore, 2001b) with simultaneous sympathetic and 
parasympathetic arousal (Schore, 2001b).  One possible solution to this confusing 
situation is to split off good and bad representations of the caregiver, and good and bad 
representations of the self in response.  Here is the beginning of dissociation, which may 
be embodied not only interpersonally but also intrapersonally, with different dyads of 
alters playing out different kinds of attachment relationships (Blizard, 1997).  
If the child attempts to avoid the painful feelings of dissociation that this rapid 
switching in the attachment system causes, he or she may learn to interact through 
alternate motivational systems.  Adult symptoms are predicted by which motivational 
system is activated.  Liotti (1999) proposed that adults sexually abused as children will be 
more likely to interact sexually; adults, especially men, physically abused and humiliated 
as children will be more likely to interact aggressively; and adults whose parents were 
frightened by their own memories but not abusive may resort to compulsive caregiving.  
Disorganized attachment therefore increases vulnerability to dissociative disorders, but is 
not in itself sufficient without additional trauma (Hesse & Main, 2000).  Dissociative 
disorders emerge when the defense mechanism of these competing motivational systems 
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breaks down and attachment to a caregiver is massively activated, causing rapid 
switching of IWMs to occur.  These incoherent and multiple IWMs only increase the 
feelings of fear and anxiety in the face of a new trauma, and ensure that further 
dissociation will occur (Liotti, 1999).  In addition to the evidence given by Liotti, 
preliminary support for this model was found in an additional study that showed that a 
familial pattern of disorganized attachment may predispose children to dissociate in 
response to later trauma (Pasquini, Liotti, Mazzotti, Fassone, Picardi, & The Italian 
Group for the Study of Dissociation, 2002). 
Discrete behavioral states (DBS).  Putnam’s (1997) theory of discrete behavioral 
states has been very influential.  In brief, humans are born with the capacity for a few 
basic states (resting, dreaming, awake and alert, fussing, crying).  These discrete states 
can be distinguished by patterns of affect, motor activity, spontaneous verbalization, heart 
rate, respiratory patterns, and attention.  Later, development and experience contribute to 
the formation of more numerous and complex states.  The infant’s main task in the first 
few years of life is to acquire the ability to control his or her own behavioral state 
transitions.  Parents play a crucial role in this process, teaching children to recognize and 
control their own emotional states, and how to re-establish them if they are disrupted.  
Parents also help children to know which state is appropriate for various situations, and to 
integrate these various states across contexts so that a unified sense of self is developed 
(Putnam, 1997). 
Abuse disrupts these processes.  Instead of being helpful to the child, the abusive 
parent is actively reinforcing a situation in which the child is overwhelmed with 
unbearable emotional and physiological arousal, and has no way to manage it.  Abuse by 
parents also leads to the necessity of children having different senses of self for different 
situations, which they use in an attempt to control the state of their caregivers and not get 
hurt.  The vital importance of attachment prevents children from disconnecting entirely 
from abusive caregivers, but at the same time children are left reliant on parents who are 
actively undermining their growth.  When the caregiver does not help regulate transitions 
between states, metacognition is impaired and the child does not develop a unitary self 
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(Forrest, 2001; Putnam, 1997); in fact, abusive, dissociative, or inconsistent parents force 
the child to alternate rapidly between various behavioral states.  Under these 
circumstances, the child’s development takes a serious departure from what is normal.  
Dissociative states arise in response to social and environmental cues, and the child’s 
knowledge and skills are isolated into mutually inaccessible states and are not always 
available (Putnam, 1997). 
Schore (2001b) concurred with this conceptualization.  In a thorough examination 
of the effects of trauma on infants’ brain development, he explained that abusive 
caregivers not only do not help infants learn to regulate their arousal, but they actively 
induce dysregulation without repair capabilities.  This situation results in wild alterations 
of the infant’s biochemistry, with resulting damage to the developing brain.   
Orbitalfrontal cortex (OFC).  The orbitalfrontal cortex (OFC) may play an 
important role in the development of dissociation.  Forrest’s (2001) orbitalfrontal model 
is based on Putnam’s DBS theory and the neurobiology of OFC maturation.  The OFC is 
in the prefrontal cortex, which handles such functions as short-term memory, attentional 
set, and inhibitory control.  In particular, the OFC is responsible for inhibitory control of 
incoming information (both internal and external), which allows the maintenance of goal-
directed behavior.  It connects directly to the limbic system in the amygdala, aids in 
regulating states by regulating the autonomic nervous system, and is more developed in 
the right hemisphere than in the left.  It is also involved in the pleasurable effects of 
social interaction and the initiation of movement towards emotionally significant stimuli.  
In particular, it processes social signals, bonding, and emotions (Schore, 2001a, 2001b).  
Perhaps one of its most important inhibitory control functions is allowing delayed 
responses to stimuli so that the organism can react on the basis of stored information 
rather than immediate context (Forrest, 2001; Schore, 2001a).        
 The OFC develops substantially during the same years that attachment to a 
caregiver is being formed and emphasized, approximately age 10 to 12 months, with 
another period of rapid maturation between the ages of 6 and 9 years.  This development 
aids in regulating emotions and their related states so that the individual experiences 
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inner continuity across contexts, which is critical for the development of a coherent sense 
of self.  Interactions with the caregiver are the primary input used to shape the 
development and abilities of the OFC.  Securely attached infants are able to regulate their 
affect and sense of self, and can flexibly adapt to new situations throughout life (Forrest, 
2001; Schore, 2001a, 2001b).  However, in insecurely attached infants, the OFC has 
developed without interactions that teach the infant how to regulate his or her own states.  
Relational trauma during this early period results in drastic pruning in the OFC and 
subsequent information processing that relies on the amygdala instead, leading to fearful 
states without cortical input.  Infants therefore cannot learn to regulate their states 
effectively and soothe themselves.  Because of damaged connections from the right 
orbitofrontal area to the left language areas, affective information is not effectively 
transferred into language for processing, leading to difficulty expressing emotions 
(Schore, 2001b).  Similar to Liotti’s (1999) proposed attachment model, Forrest (2001) 
explained that infants with disorganized attachment show contradictory behavior, because 
they have a need for attachment and yet their attachment figure is frightening and their 
life is chaotic.  Contradictory parental behaviors do not provide a consistent pattern 
around which the child can organize a self (see also Blizard, 1997).   
In this case, the OFC prohibits the integration of different representations of the 
self into one coherent self.  When different contexts arise, the OFC responds on the basis 
of the immediate environment, which triggers different conceptions of the self to be 
active, without taking into account all the other senses of self from other contexts 
(Forrest, 2001).  This organization is quite adaptive in childhood, because it protects the 
developing child from having to be always aware of the frightening aspects of the parent.  
It is the brain’s attempt to deal with a lack of a stable environment, instead organizing the 
self around the immediate context (which results in switching behavior) and laterally 
inhibiting the knowledge in other systems (amnesia).   
This model makes testable predictions about the development of dissociative 
disorders.  It brings together evidence from neuroanatomical animal studies, attachment 
studies, cognitive research, and neurological research in humans.  It provides 
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explanations for many of the phenomena seen in abused children and adults, and offers 
intriguing areas of research for the future.         
Betrayal Trauma Theory   
Freyd’s (1996) Betrayal Trauma theory is based largely on attachment models.  It 
starts from two basic premises: infants need attachment, and the social human species 
needs to avoid cheaters.  As infants, humans are totally helpless.  They are dependent on 
their caregivers not only for basic physical needs of food, warmth, etc., but also for 
emotional needs of love and care.  Infants of many species, especially primates, which 
mature slowly and therefore have a lengthy period of dependence, have a very strong 
drive for attachment.  In most circumstances, this attachment is what enables infants to 
survive.  In situations of distress, such as hunger or loneliness, infants will seek the 
parents to whom they are attached, for example by crying or motioning to be picked up.  
Parents become attached to their offspring and take care of them; in return, babies give 
back love and affection.  Humans also have a strong motivation to avoid being cheated or 
betrayed (see Freyd, 1996, for further discussion of “cheater detectors”).  The most 
adaptive responses to being cheated are either to confront the cheater or withdraw from 
further contact, sometimes both.         
 When a young child is abused by a parent or caregiver, these two needs come into 
direct conflict.  Withdrawing from or confronting the betrayer threatens survival in direct 
and indirect ways.  Losing basic care may result in physical starvation, while losing or 
damaging the emotional care of the attachment relationship may result in emotional 
starvation.  In this situation, it is more adaptive to not know about the trauma that is 
occurring.  Therefore, the theory proposes, people become blind to betrayal to the extent 
that being aware of it would threaten a relationship in which they are dependent (Freyd, 
1996).   
Under this theory, the purpose of dissociation is not escape from pain, but 
maintenance of the attachment relationship by not-knowing about information that would 
threaten it (Richardson, 2002, proposed a similar logic).  The more important the 
relationship, the stronger the motivation to preserve it.  Thus, abuse by a parent or other 
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trusted caregiver would be more likely to lead to amnesia and/or dissociation than would 
abuse by a stranger.  Dissociation is therefore conceptualized as an adaptive survival 
response to a bad situation.  Splitting the abuser and the self into good and bad 
representations is a way to preserve attachment, as is internalization of the abuser 
(Blizard, 1997).     
Betrayal trauma theory is supported by empirical evidence that relationship to the 
perpetrator is related to rates of forgetting (e.g., Freyd, DePrince, & Zurbriggen, 2001), as 
well as by reports from people with DID that the betrayal by trusted family and 
caregivers was the part of the trauma that most disrupted their internal organization of 
self (Steele, 2002).  Kluft (1993a, p. 36) speaks of “multiple reality disorder” because 
abused children must endorse multiple realities, including ones in which the parent is 
idealized and ones in which the parent is abusive.  This basis of dissociation is consistent 
with Liotti’s (1999) conceptualization of how disorganized attachment leads to 
dissociative disorders.  Further support for this theory can be found in Freyd’s (1996) re-
analysis of previous data, as well as in many recent studies of sexual abuse that assess 
closeness and betrayal (e.g., Chu & Dill, 1990; Schultz, Passmore, & Yoder, 2003). 
Shame, Guilt, Externalization 
 Unresolved shame and guilt have been hypothesized to lead to the development of 
dissociation.  These emotions, which are often associated with having been abused, may 
act as a mediator for the differential development of a dissociative disorder; however, 
there is little evidence on this subject.  Irwin (1998), using a questionnaire technique, 
found that up to 36% of the variation in DES scores was accounted for by a combination 
of shame, guilt, gender, and age.  Irwin proposed that as dissociation increases, the 
trauma becomes less and less likely to be resolved, leading to higher levels of shame and 
guilt.  Proneness to dissociation would therefore be a function of proneness to guilt and 
shame.  One criticism of this study is that feelings of shame and guilt may have been 
primed by questionnaires asking about sexual abuse experiences.  Nonetheless, it is an 
interesting step in clarifying the relationship between trauma, dissociation, and specific 
affective responses. 
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 Talbot, Talbot, & Tu (2004) reported an additional piece of support for the 
contribution of shame to dissociation, again using questionnaires.  In a female 
hospitalized population, the authors found that shame-proneness was positively correlated 
with dissociation, especially in women who reported histories of child physical or sexual 
abuse, or adult physical abuse.  Shame and abuse both predicted dissociation, but no 
causal inferences could be drawn from this study (Talbot, Talbot, & Tu, 2004).   
 Dissociation may also be related to the development of externalizing phenomena.  
In a fascinating chapter, Heineman (1998) related dissociation to obsessive-compulsive 
disorder through a common need to control the situation and environment.  Dissociation, 
Heineman claimed, aids the abused child in maintaining an external focus so as not to be 
aware of inner pain.  When depersonalization occurs in response to psychological or 
physical pain, the body becomes disembodied, and a part of external reality rather than 
internal experience.  Thus, aversive emotions and memories do not become part of the 
self but are stored in separate fragments. 
 Heineman (1998) described how adults often collude with children in maintaining 
an external focus, for example by distracting them with thoughts of a reward when they 
are undergoing a medical procedure.  In the case of children who have been abused, 
adults may concentrate on concrete, pragmatic methods of addressing the trauma while 
downplaying children’s inner emotional world.  Some well-meaning adults direct their 
energies towards assuaging their own guilt, anger, and pain by making efforts to punish 
the perpetrator who has hurt their child, rather than asking the child what would be most 
helpful for him or her.  Sometimes this need for control is “contagious” from parent to 
child and they both develop ritualized behaviors, such as obsessive cleaning, in order to 
control the danger in the world and keep the child safe.  Perpetrators also deny the child’s 
inner world of pain and betrayal, instead imposing an alternate external reality: “This 
didn’t happen.”  The child then develops defenses with an external focus, such as a 
hypervigilance of others’ behavior.  However, healing cannot occur until the underlying 
emotional effects of the trauma are processed in therapy.  Therapy can never erase the 
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reality of the trauma that happened, but it can aid clients in regaining a true sense of 
control over their lives rather than an illusory one (Heineman, 1998).     
Genetics 
Recently, studies have been undertaken to determine whether dissociation has a 
genetic component.  Putnam (1996) reported that there is some preliminary evidence that 
parents and their children have moderately correlated scores on measures of dissociation, 
in both healthy and abusive families, and Ross, Norton, and Wozney (among others), 
have found high rates of dissociative disorders in the families of those diagnosed with 
DID (Braun, 1985; Ross, Norton, & Wozney, 1989).  However, these findings provide no 
clear support for a genetic contribution over and above family environment. 
Three studies have examined genetic contributions to pathological and non-
pathological dissociation.  In one study, family environment accounted for 45% of the 
variance in dissociation scores, and nonshared environment accounted for the rest; there 
was no significant genetic contribution (Waller & Ross, 1997).  Another study, however, 
found that shared environment was a nonsignificant contributor, with the variation in 
dissociation accounted for by nonshared environment (52%) and genetic influences 
(48%) (Jang, Paris, Zweig-Frank, & Livesley, 1998).  The study’s authors concluded that 
there may be a common genetic predisposition to dissociate, which is moderated by 
different environmental factors, leading to different kinds of dissociation.  These two 
studies, both using twin samples, provide an argument that genetics and environment are 
both important in the development of dissociation, but that further research is necessary 
to tease apart their effects. 
Becker, Deater-Deckard, Eley, Freyd, Stevenson, and Plomin (2004) examined 
genetic and environmental effects on individual differences in children and adolescents; 
previous studies had only included adolescents and adults.  This study was also unique in 
that it allowed analysis of how influences may change over time, because in one of their 
samples the children were re-evaluated every year for four years.  Becker and colleagues 
collected data regarding dissociation in adopted and full siblings, as well as identical 
(MZ) and fraternal (DZ) twins.  Parents and teachers completed a six-item scale derived 
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from the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL).  It is important to note that this scale is 
designed to measure non-pathological dissociation, and that their samples probably did 
not have high levels of abuse.    
Their results showed that, contrary to some theories, amount of dissociation was 
relatively stable from middle childhood through mid-adolescence.  Although dissociation 
is hypothesized to decline slightly with age, and there is some support for this assertion, 
this decline is probably driven largely by the presence or absence of abuse, and by 
whether hypnotizability is used as a measure of dissociation (see Putnam, 1997, for a 
review; cf. Macfie, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2001).  Becker and colleagues found that genetic 
dominance may be present, and that additive genetic factors and nonshared environment 
best accounted for individual differences.  There was no effect of shared environment.  
The authors hypothesized that environmental factors reinforce sibling differentiation 
rather than sibling similarity, and that the normative dissociation measured in this study 
may constitute an underlying diathesis that affects how children respond to later trauma.  
They pointed out, however, that their methods were based on the assumption that all the 
siblings of the same family (full siblings, adopted siblings, MZ and DZ twins) had the 
same environment, an assumption that may be faulty in some circumstances.  They also 
assumed that gene-environment interactions were minimal, which, again, is a limitation.  
Despite these limitations, however, the study is an important step in showing that, for 
normative dissociation at least, genetic factors do play a role in the development of 
dissociation.  This theory is bolstered by the findings of Ogawa and colleagues (1997) 
that temperament measured at the age of three months was one of the best predictors of 
dissociation in adolescence. 
Summary 
 This chapter has summarized the general phenomenology, prevalence, and 
development of dissociative identity disorder.  DID is a condition that develops in 
childhood due to severe abuse and that, if not properly treated, continues to affect 
functioning.  One aspect of DID is the development of separate pieces of consciousness, 
or alters.  The assessment of this separation will be explored further in the next chapter.  
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The degree to which alters are fragmented or integrated is of particular relevance to this 
study, which examines and measures integration and switching among alters.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
  
DISSOCIATION IN THE LAB, PART 1: NEUROLOGICAL STUDIES OF 
DISSOCIATION  
 
 
 
 Since the 1980s, an increasing number of published articles have examined the 
physiological and neurological phenomena of dissociation in an attempt to understand its 
biological bases.  Although the exact brain mechanisms of this complex process are still 
largely unknown, there is an emerging consensus about how dissociation can be 
measured in the laboratory.  Decades of research now support a conceptualization of 
dissociative identity disorder (DID) as a genuine condition that may have widespread 
physiological underpinnings.  Despite the limitations of each of the studies described in 
this chapter, as a group they provide compelling evidence that there are measurable 
neurophysiological differences among alters in DID.   
Neurological Studies of Dissociation 
 Modern techniques allow us to capture images of the brain in motion, but pioneers 
of this research have been systematically examining neurophysiological evidence of 
dissociation for well over 20 years.  In one of the earliest studies, Prince and Peterson 
(1908) found, in a woman with three personalities, that personality A showed galvanic 
skin response (GSR) changes in response to words that related to the experience of a 
different alter.  Personality A did not personally experience the event, nor did she know 
about the other’s experience.  Prince and Peterson (1908) also found that an alter who 
was co-conscious but not participating during a peripheral vision test could describe the 
details of the stimuli presented in that test, even though the alter who was participating 
could not consciously see the objects.     
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GSR, ERPs, and Other Physiological Measures 
Several of the cognitive studies described in the next chapter also included 
neurological measurements.  Ludwig, Brandsma, Wilbur, Bendfeldt, and Jameson (1972) 
performed a variety of tests on a male patient with four personalities.  GSR for 
emotionally laden words varied across personalities, and interestingly, the pattern of GSR 
followed the reported pattern of memory sharing among the alters.  That is, all the alters 
reacted to words that were emotionally salient to the host.  Each alter also showed 
increased GSR in response to words that were emotionally relevant to that alter only, and 
did not react to the words that were emotional for the other alters (Ludwig, et al., 1972).  
The results of a conditioning paradigm measuring GSR were inconclusive, however.  In 
addition, EEG results showed that the alters had qualitative differences in alpha 
frequencies and amplitudes.  One alter also differed from the others by having deficits in 
two-point discrimination, taste discrimination, and sense of pain (Ludwig, et al., 1972).  
Another case study also found physiological differences between alters: visual 
average evoked responses from EEGs differed between alters to the same degree that 
separate people differ (Larmore, Ludwig, & Cain, 1977).  However, a slightly later study 
using a single male participant found that changes in EEG readings among alters could be 
explained by amount of alertness, without the need for conceptually different 
personalities (Cocores, Bender, & McBride, 1984).  Cocores and colleagues also argued 
that alpha rhythms do not provide compelling evidence for differing patterns of EEG 
readings. 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) have also been used to study dissociation.  The 
P300 component of ERPs is often used as a measure of subjective “surprise” or perceived 
stimulus infrequency.  It probably reflects the time taken to update an internal model, and 
it appears only for stimuli that are relevant to the current task.  Interestingly, it can 
potentially be used as a measure of how self-relevant a stimulus is, even when the self is 
not relevant to the task at hand (Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004).  Therefore, 
future research should investigate the feasibility of applying this technique to studying 
transfer of information among alters in DID.   
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One study compared four ERP components in four women with MPD, each tested 
in three different alters.  Ladle (1987) found that, overall, the P300 component was 
different among the three alters in each participant, with three of the four participants 
showing a distinctive pattern.  Their “emotional” personalities had longer latencies for 
the P300 than did their “host” and “unemotional” alters, taking longer to process 
information.  Although this effect did not reach full statistical significance, it supports 
Nijenhuis’ theory of structural dissociation, as the emotional alters were the ones who 
had memory for abuse and processed information differently than the other two types of 
alters, especially words related to sexual abuse.  Ladle’s (1987) sample size was probably 
too small to detect most effects, but the results did demonstrate overall differences in the 
way that different alters within the same person process information.     
A recent study using university students grouped into low- and high-dissociation 
groups revealed that high dissociators were better than low dissociators at both directing 
and dividing their attention (de Ruiter, Phaf, Veltman, Kok, & van Dyck, 2003).  ERP 
positivity was larger and began earlier for the high dissociators, in comparison to the low 
dissociators.  This positivity remained strong throughout the entire recording for the high 
dissociation group only, demonstrating greater focused attention in addition to a greater 
ability to attend to irrelevant aspects of the stimuli (de Ruiter, et al., 2003; de Ruiter, et 
al., 2004).         
A brief report by Bahnson and Smith (1975) described the autonomic nervous 
system (ANS) features of a single case of MPD partway through therapy.  They noted 
that switching between alters was associated with bradycardia and extremely slow 
breathing, as well as a temporary drop in skin conductance.  Heart rates and skin 
potentials varied among the alters, with the most intellectual and unemotional personality 
showing the lowest physiological reactivity.  Related to this report is a study by Brende 
(1984): in a single case of MPD, electrodermal response fluctuated during switches 
between alters and was associated with emotional responses of the alters, triggering 
switching.  However, Brende’s methodology did not allow adequate control of artifacts 
(Zahn, Moraga, & Ray, 1996). 
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Excellent work by Williams, Haines, and Sale (2003) demonstrated how 
dissociation protects against extreme distress by modifying physiology.  In a series of 
scripts, psychophysiological arousal as measured by heart rate and self-reported distress 
increased during the lead-up to a traumatic event, and then suddenly dropped during the 
report of the traumatic incident, as dissociative responses came into play.  This case 
study, bolstered by similar findings in a sample of self-mutilators (Haines, Williams, 
Brain, & Wilson, 1995), certainly merits replication and expansion.  Research by 
Nijenhuis and colleagues, as yet unpublished, demonstrated the same pattern of results.  
Control participants were unable to imitate the pattern of heart rate change that DID 
participants showed in response to emotional faces, and simulators also could not imitate 
the DID participants’ patterns of blood pressure and self-reported distress in response to 
traumatic scripts (Nijenhuis, 2003). 
Other physiological oddities have been reported, as well.  Braun (1983a, 1983b) 
summarized early reports of how serious allergic reactions, handedness, microstrabismus, 
and various electrophysiological measures varied strongly between alters.  Putnam (1984) 
also described common reports of varying medication response, physical symptoms, and 
allergies.  Braun (1983b) reported cases in which multiples developed scars, rashes, and 
other visible skin changes in response to which alter was present.  When alters who had 
not experienced the traumas that originally caused these scars or irritations appeared, the 
skin slowly returned to normal and cleared.  He suggested that these results may not be as 
surprising as they first appear, because many previous studies from the 1950s through 
1980s demonstrated that vascular changes can be due to emotion, hypnosis, conditioning, 
or beliefs.  These vascular changes can lead not only to skin conditions but also to severe 
headaches, which are a common symptom in people with multiple personalities (Braun, 
1983b). 
An article along somewhat similar lines by Putnam, Zahn, and Post (1990) 
includes an early form of Putnam’s Discrete Behavioral States theory.  Putnam and 
colleagues studied nine multiples and five control participants who attempted to simulate 
alter personalities.  Of the nine participants with MPD, eight of them consistently showed 
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physiological differences according to differences among alters (the ninth had differences 
that were not significant).  Three of the five simulators also produced significant 
differences, and these were as large as the differences among the MPD group.  However, 
the specific types of physiological differences shown were not the same between the two 
groups.  Whereas in the MPD group alters tended to be differentiated by heart rate and 
respiration, in the control group the simulated “alters” tended to differ on skin 
conductance.  The authors concluded that muscle tension may play an important role in 
differentiating alters in a person with MPD, and also that generalized ANS arousal may 
transfer between alters.  They further concluded that “alter personalities of MPD subjects 
are highly organized, discrete states of consciousness” (Putnam, Zahn, & Post, 1990, p. 
256).  Zahn and colleagues (1996) later elucidated some of the flaws in this study, 
including the artificiality of the experimental timing procedures and the lack of individual 
predictions for each participant.  Furthermore, many of the points raised by Putnam and 
colleagues (1990) are unclear because important details were omitted from the article.      
More general physiological differences among alters have been reported in many 
places.  Alters may have different handedness or different handwriting, and differential 
response to drugs or alcohol (e.g., Coons, 1988; Miller & Triggiano, 1992; Putnam, 1984; 
Putnam, Guroff, Silberman, Barban, & Post, 1986; Taylor & Martin, 1944).  They may 
show differences in color-blindness, vision in general, deafness, response to pain, 
paralysis, or language use (e.g., E. T. Carlson, 1989; Coons, 1988; Ischlondsky, 1955; 
Taylor & Martin, 1944).  Compared with insomniac controls, patients with MPD showed 
significantly more slow-wave sleep, although there was no difference in REM sleep 
(Jenkins, Radonjic, & Fraser, 1987, unpublished, as cited in Miller & Triggiano, 1992).  
MPD patients also had different patterns of thyroid functioning among their alters, which 
was not the case in control participants (Hunter, 1986, unpublished, as cited in Miller & 
Triggiano, 1992). 
Brain Mapping Techniques; More EEG Findings 
Braun (1983a) reported on the physiological changes that occurred in two MPD 
patients after integration.  One of his participants regained her ability to see color; the 
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other participant suddenly developed diabetes during treatment, and her required insulin 
dosage varied depending on which alter was in control of the body.  Braun also found 
changes in the visual evoked potentials of his participants following integration.  Post-
integration, the topographic maps were more complex and showed more frontal activity.  
The visual evoked potentials of each alter were different from each other and from the 
post-integration potentials.  Interestingly, the brain maps of those personalities who were 
formed by integrating several other personalities were more complex than the maps of 
adult personalities tested before integration (Braun, 1983a).  Pitblado and Cohen (1984) 
also found that visual evoked potentials in one woman with MPD were significantly and 
stably different among her five alters.  These results were replicated by an unpublished 
study reported in Putnam (1984), using 11 MPD patients and 10 control participants.  The 
MPD participants had different patterns of potentials across their alters, a pattern which 
could not be replicated by controls simulating MPD.    
A study by Coons, Milstein, and Marley (1982) had questionable methodology, 
including the use of Coons as a control participant.  At the time, he was a dissociation 
researcher, the paper’s first author, and the therapist of one of the participants.  
Additionally, a doctor who may have been aware of the study’s hypotheses interpreted 
the EEGs.  This study included two women with DID and one male control (Coons), who 
attempted to simulate the alters of one of the DID participants.  The authors reported that, 
in contrast to the control participant, the DID participants did not show compelling EEG 
differences among their alters.  They argued that reported EEG differences reflect not 
different personalities but rather changes in concentration, muscle tension, and mood 
(Coons, Milstein, & Marley, 1982).  This interpretation, however, is consistent with 
Putnam’s Discrete Behavioral State (DBS) theory of dissociation as a lack of integration 
between differing states that are characterized by differences in muscle tone, respiration, 
heart rate, etc.  It is also consistent with the results of Putnam, et al. (1990).   
 Hughes, Kuhlman, Fichtner, and Gruenfeld (1990) used EEG measurements to 
assess changes among ten alters in a case study.  This study was unique because the 
participant acted as her own control group.  Measurements were taken in the host 
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personality, the alters, and again in a condition where the host personality was instructed 
to act like descriptions of four of her alters, without switching to them.  A professional 
actress impersonating the alters was also studied.  The topographic maps showed large 
differences between the host and some of the alters, and only subtle differences between 
the host and other alters.  Without knowing the results of the study, the participant’s 
psychiatrist independently classified the similarity of each alter to the host personality, 
and these results were remarkably similar to the results shown by brain mapping.  There 
were no significant differences found between the host and the host simulating alters; 
there were also no significant differences among simulated alters in the actress (Hughes, 
et al., 1990).  This study definitely deserves replication because of its unique design and 
intriguing results. 
 Tsai, Condie, Wu, and Chang (1999) also studied brain differences in a female 
case study, using the relatively new technique of fMRI.  Scans performed as the 
participant switched between alters showed significant hippocampal inhibition during the 
switch process.  Tsai and colleagues also measured hippocampal volume, which was 
significantly smaller than normal, perhaps due to the participant’s concurrent diagnosis of 
PTSD.  However, the participant did not show significant memory impairment when 
tested as a system.  The authors concluded that volitional switching may be mediated by 
changes in hippocampal function, although involuntary switching may involve different 
processes or areas.  In another study of brain function, Markowitsch, Kessler, van der 
ven, Weber-Luxenburger, Albers, and Heiss (1998) demonstrated that an emotionally 
traumatic shock can produce drastic hypometabolism in the hippocampus and other 
memory areas nine weeks after the trauma, although there was no evidence of 
hippocampal volume reduction.      
 A recent study (Hopper, Ciorciari, Johnson, Spensley, Sergejew, & Stough, 2002) 
used a measure called EEG coherence, which is “an objective measure of phase 
synchrony” (p. 77).  It is said to be a measure of cortical connectivity and, possibly, of 
cortical maturity.  Five participants with DID (“hosts”) produced 15 alter personalities for 
testing.  Five experienced professional actors, matched for age and with no psychiatric 
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history, portrayed the specific alters that appeared for testing, including their gender and 
personal characteristics (“acted alters”).  There was very little difference between the 
hosts, the actors, and the acted alters.  The hosts and the genuine alters showed significant 
differences in some regions of the frontal, central, temporal, and parietal lobes.  In most 
regions, the EEG coherence was lower for the alters than for the host, indicating 
functional disconnection and possibly less developmental maturity of those brain regions.  
“The professional actors were not able to simulate the coherence patterns of the alter 
personalities” (p. 84).  In fact, EEG variations in DID have been reported consistently 
when they have been studied (see also Larmore, Ludwig, & Cain, 1977; Ludwig, 
Brandsma, Wilbur, Bendfeldt, & Jameson, 1972; but cf. Cocores, et al., 1984).  This 
evidence is consistent with other reports that trauma can seriously affect and impede the 
brain’s development, especially in the limbic system (e.g., Bremner, 1999; Hopper, et al., 
2002; Schore, 2001a, 2001b).  However, one criticism of this study is that the genders of 
the DID participants, their alters, and the actors are not described, nor are possible gender 
effects explored.  
Visual Functioning 
Smith (1989) reported on a Native American patient who had culturally-congruent 
non-human alters.  Differences in visual acuity between the alters were reliable, with the 
best vision in the “hawk” alter and the worst vision in the “old man.”  Other studies have 
also examined visual functioning in patients with multiple personalities.  Unpublished 
data from Shepard and Braun suggest that there were clinically significant differences in 
visual or optical functioning among the alters of their seven MPD participants.  They 
found that, for seven of nine measures of visual function, there was evidence that 
participants’ performance on these measures was related to which alter was tested (cited 
in Miller, 1989 and Miller, Blackburn, Scholes, White, & Mamalis, 1991).      
 In order to replicate and extend these results, Miller (1989) conducted a new study 
using nine participants with MPD and nine simulating controls who met none of the 
DSM-III criteria for MPD.  All participants underwent, in three different personality 
states, a detailed eye exam, conducted by an ophthalmologist who was blind to diagnosis.  
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This exam involved both subjective measures (measures that require some degree of self-
report or interaction with the examiner) and objective measures (in which there is little or 
no opportunity for interaction, or measures that examine physical properties of the eye 
itself).  Previous research has found differences among alters in MPD patients more 
consistently using subjective than objective measures (Miller, 1989).  Miller found 
differences in visual functioning among alters in his MPD group on five of the six 
measures used, including eye-muscle balance.  In fact, compared with controls simulating 
alters, the participants with MPD had more than four times the average number of optical 
changes among their alters.  Miller also reported several MPD participants who displayed 
eye disorders that are usually found only in children when they were in their child alter 
but not when they switched to an adult alter (Miller, 1989).     
Miller and colleagues (1991) followed up on this study with a replication using 20 
MPD outpatients and 20 role-playing controls of similar age.  Their results confirmed 
those of the previous study, viz., that there were differences among alters in certain 
aspects of visual functioning.  The MPD group demonstrated a significant difference 
from the control group on two measures of visual acuity.  Multiples also demonstrated 
“more clinically significant variability in visual functioning than controls” (p. 133).  That 
is, among their different alters, the MPD group had almost twice as many changes in 
visual functioning as did the simulating control group (Miller, et al., 1991).  However, the 
particular visual changes that were found were not entirely consistent across this and 
previous studies.  In the 1991 study, the most consistent differences were found on 
subjective (self-report) measures of visual functioning, but there were also clinical 
differences found on the objective measures of keratometry and eye muscle balance.       
The 1991 experiment also improved the methodology used in the 1989 study in a 
number of ways; for example, the authors included a question to assess the experimental 
control of the single-blind technique.  The ophthalmologist who performed the 
assessments of both the MPD and control participants was blind to participants’ 
membership in the MPD diagnostic category; he was asked after each participant to 
indicate the degree to which he believed that each participant was in the control or MPD 
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group.  Results demonstrated that the examiner was not able to distinguish the two groups 
reliably (Miller, et al., 1991).  One shortcoming of this study was that the participants 
were assessed only once; the experimenters were not able to draw conclusions about the 
stability of visual differences among particular personalities in the MPD group (Miller, et 
al., 1991).          
Another paper on this topic reviewed previous research demonstrating 
physiological differences among alters in MPD, and presented a case study of one 
participant diagnosed with MPD and seen in therapy over a period of three years 
(Birnbaum & Thomann, 1996).  The participant came in with complaints about her 
glasses and explained that they no longer worked because they had been made to the 
prescription of another alter who now was integrated with most of the others.  A later 
visual field examination revealed that she was having extreme difficulty seeing to her 
right side; in a subsequent session she explained that this problem only manifested when 
certain alters (who had looked away from other children being abused) became present.  
Like Miller et al. (1991), this case study found differences among alters in several tests of 
visual functioning.  Over five visits, both subjective and objective measures showed 
variability too great to be explained by testing error, and the authors were unable to 
explain the physiological mechanisms that could account for some of the changes, such 
as corneal curvature (Birnbaum & Thomann, 1996).     
A final study on visual functioning and dissociation used a nonclinical population 
recruited from a variety of sources in Finland (Lipsanen, Lauerma, Peltola, & Kallio, 
1999).  Lipsanen and colleagues investigated the prevalence of visual distortions and 
their relationship to dissociation.  They found that some form of distortion was 
reasonably common, but was often dismissed.  For each of the four types of visual 
distortions studied, those who reported experiencing at least one episode of dissociation 
scored significantly higher on the DES than those who did not report the distortion.  The 
authors suggested that, at least in nonclinical populations, visual distortions may be 
partially accounted for or caused by trait dissociation (Lipsanen, et al., 1999).     
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Proposed Brain Areas and Mechanisms of Dissociation 
One model of the process of dissociation involves the connections between the 
limbic system and higher cortical areas.  According to this model of the functioning of 
the reticular activating system, stressful experiences cause the hippocampus to 
compartmentalize memory storage and the pathways to the higher processing areas, 
which then leads to automatic behavior any time a similar situation arises.  Thus, 
experiences cannot be viewed as new situations or in a new way, remaining in a sense 
state-dependent, and eventually connections to some areas of the frontal lobes will be 
shut down (Sternlicht, Payton, Werner, & Rancurello, 1989).  This model bears some 
similarity to that of Nijenhuis (see previous chapter). 
In addition to state-dependent memory, differences between implicit and explicit 
access systems have been hypothesized to play a role in dissociation (Siegel, 1996; van 
der Kolk & Fisler, 1995).  Van der Kolk has additionally proposed that a narrowing of 
awareness and the disabling of Broca’s area are partially responsible for the difficulty of 
retrieving memories of trauma.  As a result, traumatic memories are encoded without 
words and are difficult to access.  This reduction in Broca’s area activity, leading to an 
emotional rather than verbal encoding of memories, is consistent with an earlier study by 
Mathew, Jack, and West (1985).  In a study using a measure of regional cerebral blood 
flow (rCBF) with one DID participant and three control participants, Mathew and 
colleagues (1985) found that the only significant difference in blood flow among the 
alters of the DID participant was in the right temporal lobe.  The authors speculated that, 
because the right temporal region is associated with memory and emotional experience, 
the increase in activation in this region may be due to a surge of emotional childhood 
memories.  This particular study suffers from some methodological flaws, including a 
somewhat incomplete write-up and the fact that the DID participant appears to be a 
slightly unusual case.  Nevertheless, the findings are suggestive and deserve further 
research.  An unpublished study by deVito and colleagues also found that patterns of 
rCBF varied significantly among alters, and were abnormal (as cited in Miller & 
Triggiano, 1992). 
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 A newer study with a larger pool of participants (15 male and female DID patients 
and 8 controls) and more advanced scanning technology contradicted in some ways the 
findings of Mathew and colleagues.  Sar, Unal, Kiziltan, Kundakci, and Ozturk (2001) 
found that, compared to the control group who did not report any childhood trauma, the 
DID group had increased rCBF to the left lateral temporal area, not the right.  There were 
also no differences in rCBF among the alters of the DID participants in this study.  In 
addition, Sar and colleagues (2001) found decreased blood flow to the orbitofrontal areas 
bilaterally in DID participants as compared to the controls.  Although this difference did 
not remain significant after Bonferroni correction, it is a very interesting finding given 
Forrest’s (2001) orbitalfrontal theory of the development of dissociation that was 
discussed in the previous chapter.  The study by Sar and colleagues (2001), while 
inconsistent with Mathew and colleagues (1985), does support an earlier study by Saxe, 
Vasile, Hill, Bloomingdale, and van der Kolk (1992).  Saxe and colleagues (1992), again 
using only a single participant with DID but with a higher-resolution method than 
Mathew et al., found that there was increased blood perfusion in the left temporal lobe 
when the participant’s alters were active. 
 This pattern of increased left activity was replicated in a sample of right-handed 
university students who had no history of psychiatric treatment (Spitzer, Willert, Grabe, 
Rizos, Möller, & Freyberger, 2004).  Using the DES as a measure of dissociation, the 
authors divided participants into low (n = 66) and high dissociators (n = 8).  Transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) techniques assessed motor thresholds and inter-hemispheric 
transfer times.  As hypothesized, there were significant differences between the low and 
high dissociators on both measures.  When comparing hemispheric excitability, as 
measured by motor thresholds, the high dissociators had significant lower excitability 
threshold in the left than in the right hemisphere.  Additionally, they had a shorter left-to-
right inter-hemispheric transfer time than did the low dissociators; in other words, their 
hemispheres were less well balanced.  These results led the authors to conclude that 
dissociation on a neural level involves either a dysfunction and lack of integration in the 
right hemisphere, or superiority of the left hemisphere.  However, these results may not 
43 
 
be limited to dissociation but may to some extent apply to many kinds of psychiatric 
disorders; further research must extend these findings into clinical populations (Spitzer, et 
al., 2004).  One study that does so is a PET case study of a man with dense and persistent 
psychogenic amnesia and fugue (Markowitsch, Fink, Thöne, Kessler, & Heiss, 1997).  
The patient, NN, in contrast to a control group, showed increases in rCBF only in his left 
hemisphere when presented with autobiographical information.  The control group 
processed autobiographical information mostly in the right hemisphere, which specializes 
in processing self-relevant information (Schore, 2001a), but NN seemed to process 
information about his own life in a semantic, neutral way that was not personally 
relevant.  An additional interesting feature of NN’s experience is that his allergic asthma 
disappeared after his fugue state caused him to start a new life as a different person 
(Markowitsch, et al., 1997). 
 These data are also consistent with findings by Flor-Henry, Tomer, Kumpula, 
Koles, and Yeudall (1990).  In a study of two female participants with MPD and several 
kinds of control participants, the MPD participants showed much larger than usual 
differences in hand strength between the left and right hands.  A battery of 
neuropsychological tests showed that there was dysfunction in the left temporal region 
and bilateral dysfunction in the frontal lobe for both participants, with more deficits on 
the right side.  EEG results showed that there were no differences among alters in the 
MPD participants.  However, the left hemisphere was, relative to the right, significantly 
more activated in the MPD participants during all conditions.  The opposite pattern was 
found in the participants with chronic hysteria and no MPD.  The authors hypothesized 
that the extreme abuse the MPD participants suffered during childhood might disrupt the 
organization of the dominant hemisphere through disrupting hippocampal function (Flor-
Henry, et al., 1990).  
 Hopper and colleagues have also implicated the hippocampus and prefrontal areas 
in the initiation of dissociative states, as well as seeing differences in the temporal and 
parietal cortices (2002).  Tsai and colleagues (1999) have discovered differences in the 
hippocampus and the nigrostriatal system in DID, which may explain why both 
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declarative and nondeclarative memory are impacted.  Moreover, Nijenhuis (2003) 
reported unpublished research that showed not only a lower hippocampal volume in 
florid than in recovered DID, but also a case study wherein hippocampal volume 
increased over time as healing took place.    
Forrest (2001) has proposed that the orbitalfrontal cortex also plays a crucial role 
in dissociation (see previous chapter).  In addition, the thalamus may play a role in 
dissociative responses and in sensory distortions that result from stress.  The thalamus is 
associated with the onset of night terrors, which can be differentiated from simple 
nightmares by their similarity to flashbacks, including the presence of motor activity, and 
which often include amnesia (Krystal, Bennett, Bremner, Southwick, & Charney, 1996).   
 Research by Simeon and colleagues on depersonalization disorder implicated 
several more specific brain areas that may be related to dissociative experiences.  Using 
PET, they found that participants with depersonalization disorder had abnormalities in 
glucose metabolism in the posterior cortex, as well as in portions of the temporal, 
occipital, and parietal lobes.  Scores on the Dissociative Experiences Scale were strongly 
positively correlated with activity in Brodmann’s area (BA) 7B in the parietal lobe, as 
well as with other areas (Simeon, Guralnik, Hazlett, Spiegel-Cohen, Hollander, & 
Buchsbaum, 2000).   
Nearby Brodmann’s areas are also implicated in the findings of another study 
using PET (Reinders, Nijenhuis, Paans, Korf, Willemsen, & den Boer, 2003).  Like 
Simeon and colleagues, Reinders and colleagues found differences in parietal integration 
areas for participants with DID.  They concluded that different patterns of rCBF among 
alters in a sample of 11 DID participants corresponded to qualitatively different senses of 
self, who found different things personally relevant.  When listening to a personally-
relevant trauma script, Traumatic Personality States had a reduced perfusion in BA 7/40, 
as well as visual association areas, BA 18/19, and other areas.  The authors argue that the 
reduced blood flow to association areas reflects a blockage in processing emotional 
material, which enables people with DID to function (Reinders, et al., 2003).     
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 Although each of these studies individually has its limitations and alternate 
explanations, taken as a group they provide a strong argument that there are measurable 
neurophysiological differences shown in DID.  These studies need greater expansion, 
wider and more numerous subject populations, more control over factors like psychiatric 
medication and time in therapy, and certainly replication.  However, they are an 
important and intriguing basis for future research. 
Summary 
 In this chapter, physiological methodologies have illustrated the neural effects and 
correlates of dissociation.  Among other issues addressed was the question of how 
separated is the functioning of different alters.  The evidence reviewed suggests that there 
can be genuine differences among alters, and that these differences correspond to the 
phenomenological reports of people with DID.  Separateness among alters is related to 
the research in this dissertation because the daily functioning of people with DID may 
rely on this separation, which will be displayed during the experiment.  The degree to 
which participants’ alters act as independent agents will affect the results of various 
memory tasks used in this study, perhaps especially those that rely on participants having 
sustained and focused attention.  The more physiologically separated are the alters in my 
participants, the more compartmentalization of autobiographical memory they may show.  
In addition, separation among alters may also preserve or improve functioning, for 
example, by allowing participants to perform better on certain tasks when they employ 
dissociation to put distractions out of awareness, or when participants with DID can 
recruit several internal parts to work on a task at once.    
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
DISSOCIATION IN THE LAB, PART 2: COGNITIVE TESTS OF MEMORY, 
ATTENTION, AND DISSOCIATION 
 
 
Memory, Attention, and Directed Forgetting 
 The phenomenon of state-dependent memory is well documented and does appear 
to play a role in DID.  Context exerts a definite influence on what is remembered.  For 
example, people in a depressed state tend to disproportionately report negative memories, 
while people in a manic episode inflate their recall of personal successes (Putnam, 1997).  
An intriguing application of this effect is Sahakyan and Kelley’s (2002) theory of 
contextual change and amnesia in directed forgetting tasks1.  In the list method of 
directed forgetting, participants are given a list of words and then either told to forget or 
remember it.  Then participants see a second list, and finally they are tested on recall of 
both lists.  Participants told to forget List 1 recall fewer items from that list (cost), and 
more items from List 2 (benefit), than the participants who were told to remember List 1.  
Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) proposed that both the costs and benefits, which have been 
well replicated in this task, can be explained by the participants in the “forget” group 
changing their internal context in between the lists.  For participants in the “forget” 
group, they are told to forget List 1 but not List 2, so therefore the testing situation is 
different than the context of List 1, and more closely matches the context in which they 
saw List 2.  For the “remember” group, there is no difference between the two lists and 
therefore the testing context is similar to the context of both lists, essentially creating one 
long list with a break in the middle.   
                                                          
1
 Special thanks to Ulrich Mayr for bringing this article to my attention! 
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Solid cognitive experimental evidence supports this theory, but Sahakyan and 
Kelley (2002) have not extended their results to the realm of memory for trauma.  The 
conditions of child abuse that lead to dissociation are very similar to a directed forgetting 
task.  First, an event happens and the child is implicitly or explicitly given a strong 
instruction to forget about it.  Then a context change occurs.  The abusive father is a 
pillar of the church community and the terrified victim goes to school and tries to act 
normal.  It is easy to see how this situation, in conjunction with the contextual hypothesis 
of forgetting, can explain the dissociation of traumatic memory.  In most of everyday life, 
the context is radically different from the context in which abuse occurs.  Abuse usually 
happens only in private, in secret, often at night.  Therefore the context mismatch makes 
it less likely that the victim will recall the abuse until placed in a similar situation.  The 
more effectively the encoding context is reinstated, the easier it is to recall the memories 
(Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002).   
As compelling as this account is, however, state-dependent memory is not likely 
to be the main explanation for the patterns of amnesia seen in DID.  Amnesia in DID 
tends to be more robust under recognition conditions than is amnesia caused by state-
dependent memory, which usually only manifests under conditions of free recall (e.g., 
Bower, 1994).  The amnesia seen in DID also tends to be much more severe (Bower, 
1994; Peters, Uyterlinde, Consemulder, & van der Hart, 1998; Silberman, Putnam, 
Weingartner, Braun, & Post, 1985; Szostak, Lister, Eckardt, & Weingartner, 1994). 
Studies conducted with non-diagnosed college student participants have shown 
some interesting results regarding the interactions of attention, memory, and dissociation.  
While it is debatable how well their results would generalize to actual memories and 
experiences of abuse, these studies provide an intriguing look at the advantages and 
cognitive processes of dissociation.  Freyd, Martorello, Alvarado, Hayes, and Christman 
(1998) found that high dissociators showed greater Stroop interference but not overall 
reaction time slowing in a standard, selective attention Stroop task.  The stimuli were all 
neutral words; the use of kinship terms had no effect on results.  DePrince and Freyd 
(1999) found that performance on the Stroop task was related to the attentional demands 
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of the task, such that high dissociators (DES > 20) performed worse in a selective 
attention task and better in a divided attention task relative to low dissociators (DES < 
10).  The high dissociators also recalled fewer sexual trauma words and more neutral 
words compared to the low dissociators.  These results may indicate that at least non-
pathological dissociation is a distinct style of information processing.  This study was the 
first standard laboratory study in which highly dissociative participants were shown to 
have better than normal performance.  
Another study of 105 female college students also assessed dissociation and 
attentional direction (Waller, Quinton, & Watson, 1995).  Participants were split at the 
median DES score into high and low dissociator groups.  In a selective attention task with 
neutral and threatening words, the high dissociation group responded more slowly to the 
presence of threatening words than did the low dissociation group, although they 
perceived the words equally well (Waller, et al., 1995).  This effect was mostly the result 
of high levels of absorption in the high dissociators, not of the presence of “pathological” 
dissociation, which is not surprising because participants with present or past DSM 
diagnoses of any kind were excluded from analysis.  
In contrast to the results of Freyd and colleagues (1998) but supporting the 
findings of DePrince and Freyd (1999), de Ruiter and colleagues (2003) found that  high 
dissociators in a college population had an advantage in both selecting and dividing 
attention relative to low dissociators.  In this study, nonspecific threat words, but not 
neutral words, helped only the high dissociators reduce reaction time in detecting a 
relevant characteristic of the words.  Low dissociators did not show a reaction time 
benefit with negative emotional valence and overall performed worse than the high 
dissociators.  Like DePrince and Freyd, this study supports the assertion that divided 
attention is a situation in which high levels of dissociation are differentially adaptive.     
High dissociators also showed slightly longer verbal working memory than low 
dissociators in another college sample (de Ruiter, et al., 2004).  A difference of about half 
a word may be attributable to the effects of having a few very high or “pathological” 
dissociators in the high dissociation group; this advantage was more associated with 
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identity confusion/amnesia than it was with absorption.  In a smaller followup study, 
Veltman, de Ruiter, Rombouts, Lazeron, Barkhof, van Dyck, and colleagues (2005) 
found that high dissociators (n = 11) performed better than low dissociators (n = 10) on 
two different working memory tasks.  In addition, the high dissociators recruited relevant 
brain networks more highly during the tasks than did the low dissociators.   
Further evidence of a distinct information processing style in clinical samples of 
DID participants comes from the work of Dorahy and colleagues, who assessed cognitive 
inhibition.  Cognitive inhibition is the extent to which distracting or irrelevant stimuli can 
be inhibited or ignored in order to free up attentional resources to focus on relevant 
stimuli.  In an initial study assessing inhibitory functioning in DID with the use of neutral 
words as distracters, the participants with DID had slower reaction times compared to 
general population and psychiatric samples.  The DID participants also showed weakened 
inhibitory functioning compared to the general population (Dorahy, Irwin, & Middleton, 
2002).  In contrast, two subsequent studies found that, when single numbers rather than 
words were used as distracters, the DID participants did not have lower inhibitory 
functioning than other groups.  All the DID participants in these studies completed the 
experiments while in their host alters, which were ANPs by Nijenhuis’ definition and 
were therefore disconnected from the emotions of traumatic memories.  Unfortunately, 
neither of these two studies could determine whether the findings were affected by 
gender differences among the groups (Dorahy, Irwin, & Middleton, 2004; Dorahy, 
Middleton, & Irwin, 2004).   
A final study did use comparison groups matched for gender, and attempted to 
explain the discrepancy in these three studies with regard to the presence or absence of 
deficits in cognitive inhibition in DID (Dorahy, Middleton, & Irwin, 2005).  The authors 
hypothesized that the initial study using words as stimuli was a more anxiety-producing 
context for the DID participants than for the other groups, because some participants had 
reported that they were constantly on alert for triggering associations from the seemingly 
neutral words.  This anxiety therefore reduced the DID participants’ abilities to 
effectively filter distracting stimuli, but the single digits used in the other two studies did 
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not present this problem.  Therefore, the final study used a manipulation of numbers and 
words in order to vary the experimental context from neutral to negative.  DID 
participants reported more anxiety in the negative context than did the depressed and 
general population control groups.  DID participants showed reduced cognitive inhibition 
in the negative but not the neutral context, while for the other two groups the neutral and 
negative contexts did not affect performance.  Furthermore, the DID participants also 
displayed an attentional bias that slowed their RTs to negative but not neutral words, and 
this result did not occur in the other two groups (Dorahy, et al., 2005).  This experiment 
provided support for the theory that anxiety differentially affects high dissociators’ 
abilities to process information.         
A related line of research using different methodology also examines information 
processing in dissociation.  In a directed forgetting paradigm, again using a college 
student sample, DePrince and Freyd (2001) again found the same pattern of memory 
results that they had found before, viz., high dissociators recalled fewer trauma and more 
neutral words when divided attention was required, while low dissociators again showed 
the opposite pattern of results.  This pattern was true of the to-be-remembered (TBR) 
words that had been presented using the item method; there was no difference between 
high and low dissociators on memory for to-be-forgotten (TBF) words.  The authors 
concluded that high levels of dissociation were helpful in blocking out traumatic 
information only in situations where participants could not ignore it.   
Results that seem to contradict this pattern came from two other directed 
forgetting experiments using the item method (Elzinga, de Beurs, Sergeant, van Dyck, & 
Phaf, 2000).  In the first experiment, 35 college students were split at the median DIS-Q 
score into two groups, labeled high and low dissociative groups.  When presented with 
neutral words, the two groups had no significant difference in directed forgetting 
performance.  In fact, using only the performance of the 15 lowest and highest 
dissociators, the high dissociators appeared to have a decrease in directed forgetting 
ability, being less able to forget the TBF words.  A follow-up experiment included 43 
college students, again split into high and low dissociators, as well as 14 patients with 
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dissociative disorders.  In this experiment, sexual words and anxiety words were added to 
the neutral words.  Again, the patient group showed a decreased ability to forget the TBF 
words, especially words related to sex.  The overall results showed that the high-
dissociating students and the diagnosed patients outperformed the low-dissociating 
students on memory tests (Elzinga, et al., 2000).  These experiments were performed 
under selective attention demands.  Therefore the lack of benefit in high levels of 
dissociation from the first experiment is not surprising, as DePrince and Freyd only find 
these benefits under divided attention conditions.  The other results are slightly more 
puzzling, however, and more careful control over and analysis of experimental conditions 
is needed in future research.          
In a further examination of these effects, Elzinga and colleagues conducted a 
directed forgetting experiment within and across the alters of 12 patients with DID who 
could switch on command (Elzinga, Phaf, Ardon, & van Dyck, 2003).  Stimuli were 
neutral and sexual trauma words.  Consistent with participants’ reports of inter-identity 
amnesia, they recalled more words when tested in the same alter who had read the words 
than when tested across alters.  Overall, the participants recalled more trauma words than 
neutral words, which is the normal finding under selective attention conditions.  Also 
consistent with their previous research, the authors found that, when tested within an 
alter, there was a lack of forgetting for the TBF words.  However, when tested across 
alters, directed forgetting functioned so that TBF words were recalled less frequently than 
TBR words.  There was also evidence of perceptual priming across alters equal to that 
found within alters on a picture-fragment completion task.  The authors suggested that 
switching alters is a major strategy that DID patients can use to block out unwanted 
information (Elzinga, et al., 2003). 
Memory and DID 
 A second, expanding group of studies has used participants with DID and 
measured their performance on a variety of cognitive and memory tasks.  Dorahy (2001) 
provided the most comprehensive and thoughtful review of these studies, tying them 
together to form a comprehensive theory of memory and amnesia in dissociative identity 
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disorder.  One of the most interesting and frequently cited studies was conducted by 
Nissen, Ross, Willingham, MacKenzie, and Schacter (1988).  In one participant with 
DID, mutually amnesic alters reported no transfer of information on explicit memory 
tests, although some of the implicit tests showed some “leakage” of information.  The 
authors hypothesized that this pattern of results was due to differences in the stimuli.  
Material most likely to leak were stimuli that were interpretable without knowledge-
based processing; material that did not leak required interpretation and gist for 
understanding.  One example that illustrated this interpretation was the differing results 
for word stem completion and word fragment completion.  In stem completion, the 
participant could complete the stem with any word that began with the three letters 
presented.  In fragment completion, the participant was asked to complete a word 
fragment with any word that could be spelled given the blanks presented between letters.  
Both tasks are implicit tests of memory, but they have one key difference.  Whereas the 
fragment completion task is likely to be interpreted as a problem-solving task with one 
right answer, the stem completion task is likely to be seen as an opportunity for 
idiosyncratic free association.  The authors hypothesized that this difference contributed 
to the finding of cross-alter priming in the fragment task, yet no cross-alter priming in the 
stem task (Nissen, et al., 1988). 
 In two studies, Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, and Dihle (1997a; 1997b) found 
that, again, while there was no explicit transfer of knowledge between amnesic alters, 
there was some leakage of information when measured on tests that used priming, such as 
picture-fragment completion.  The authors concluded that “Testing memory implicitly is 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for demonstrating transfer of information from 
one personality state to another” (1997b, p. 421).  Simulators were unable to mimic the 
inter-identity priming.  Their results were consistent with Nissen et al.’s interpretation, as 
were the results from Peters and colleagues (1998).   
 Peters and colleagues (1998) examined the transfer of neutral information 
between amnesic alters in four participants with DID.  Word list memory was assessed 
both explicitly, using free recall and recognition, and implicitly, using word stem 
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completion.  Contrary to the authors’ hypothesis, but in line with the findings of Nissen 
and colleagues (1988), there was no leakage of information between alters on the word 
stem completion task.  On the explicit memory tests, evidence supported participants’ 
reports of one-way amnesia, though one participant showed mixed results (Peters, et al., 
1998).      
A related study, Silberman and colleagues (1985), found that there was 
interference on related word lists between supposedly amnesic alters in nine participants 
with MPD, and that the MPD participants were statistically no better than normal at 
compartmentalizing information.  These results could be consistent with Nissen et al.’s 
interpretation if the task required implicit as well as explicit processing.  The materials 
that “leaked” between alters were emotionally neutral, so it is not surprising that there is 
more transfer than there would be of emotionally upsetting material.  Silberman and 
colleagues (1985) also found that, while a group of simulating control participants was 
able to replicate some of the memory findings of the DID group, their cognitive 
performance was qualitatively different.   
Huntjens and colleagues have also studied priming and memory in DID 
(Huntjens, Postma, Hamaker, Woertman, van der Hart, & Peters, 2002).  On perceptual 
and conceptual priming tasks using neutral stimuli, the DID participants were no different 
from control participants, although the DID participants were slower and less efficient in 
most tasks than were controls.  The study also included a word stem completion task, 
whose findings were in direct conflict with the results of Nissen and colleages (1988), 
Eich and colleagues (1997a, 1997b) and Peters and colleagues (1998).  DID participants 
in Huntjens’ study did demonstrate cross-alter priming on the word stem task.  The 
authors suggested that this discrepancy could have been due to their use of slightly 
different and possibly more sensitive methodology than had been used in previous 
experiments, or to the greater power of their experiment, which had 22 DID participants 
in the word stem task (Huntjens, et al., 2002).       
 Ludwig and colleagues (1972) examined both cognitive and neurological 
measurements in their participant; however, they did not draw a clear distinction between 
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implicit and explicit memory access and so it is difficult to compare this study to the 
others, although Dorahy (2001) argued that it could weakly support the Nissen 
interpretation.  On a test of paired-associate learning, there was no transfer of learning 
across personalities.  Another test that is not described in the article appeared to show 
priming across personalities, but more detail is needed.  There was also some information 
leakage in a logical memory task.  All the information that leaked during various tests 
was emotionally neutral; emotions did not appear to be shared across alters (Ludwig, et 
al., 1972). 
 A later study that also used paired-associate learning in an MPD participant did 
find leakage of the neutral stimuli across three alters who reportedly had amnesia barriers 
between them.  There were also practice effects across the three alters on a perceptual-
motor task (Dick-Barnes, Nelson, & Aine, 1987).  While these results are consistent with 
other studies, they are not compelling because the participant had previously been 
integrated for a brief period of time before re-fragmenting, and was in the process of re-
integrating when the experiment was conducted.  Therefore, sharing of information 
across alters should be more expected than in many cases of DID.  Of note, however, is 
the other finding in the study.  In a selective attention task with color matching, ERPs 
showed that the three alters processed words differently from each other.  The oldest and 
most responsible “host” personality was most able to direct attention, while the child alter 
was least able (Dick-Barnes, et al., 1987). 
 A more recent study of information transfer in DID used a one-week delay to test 
memory for word lists in 21 DID participants that reported the presence of one-way 
amnesia between two of their alters (Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & van der 
Hart, 2003).  The stimuli used in this experiment were all emotionally neutral.  Overall, 
the performance of the DID participants was equivalent to that of control participants.  
When exposed to lists of words that shared categories and therefore caused interference, 
the DID participants were no better than other participants at resisting the memory 
interference or at discriminating lists.  On explicit memory tests of recall and recognition, 
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however, the DID participants did not perform as well as the controls (Huntjens, et al., 
2003).    
 In order to evaluate whether emotionally salient information transferred implicitly 
between alters in a laboratory task, Huntjens and colleagues assessed the transfer of 
affective priming between reportedly amnesic alters in 19 participants with DID 
(Huntjens, Peters, Postma, Woertman, Effting, & van der Hart, 2005).  The study used 
four trauma-related words and a conditioning procedure that formed associations between 
nonwords and real words that were either positive, neutral, or negative (trauma-related).  
At odds with the authors’ hypothesis, emotional priming did transfer across alters 
(Huntjens, Peters, et al., 2005).    
 Further research by Huntjens and colleagues specifically assessed the explicit 
memory transfer of trauma-related words in 19 participants with DID (Huntjens, Postma, 
Peters, Woertman, & van der Hart, under review).  Using lists that included 8 trauma-
related words and 8 neutral words, the participants learned the lists in one alter and were 
tested in another, reportedly amnesic, alter.  On the test of free recall, DID participants’ 
performance was equivalent to that of control participants instructed to simulate DID.  On 
the recognition test, too, inter-identity amnesia could not be rigorously demonstrated.  
The authors point out that these results are in stark conflict with participants’ own reports 
of their memory functioning.  However, the DID participants did show reduced 
recognition sensitivity compared to simulators, meaning that they were somewhat 
impaired when making “old” vs. “new” judgments in recognition (Huntjens, et al., under 
review).   
 Although several studies have examined transfer of memories between alters, one 
study has particularly addressed autobiographical memory function within one alter 
(Schacter, Kihlstrom, Kihlstrom, & Berren, 1989).  Using the Crovitz word technique, the 
researchers asked the participant with MPD to generate autobiographical memories in 
response to three different types of words: objects, activities, and affect words.  The 
participant recalled almost entirely recent memories.  She was very slow to retrieve the 
few childhood memories that she produced, and it upset her to be asked to recall 
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memories from before the age of ten.  Her first memory of her father dated from age 16, 
and she also reported discovering new childhood memories during the experiment.  Her 
results were quite different from a group of 30 control participants, who did not show 
amnesia for childhood.  The MPD participant also responded faster to affect words than 
did the control participants (Schacter, et al., 1989).  The authors gave no explanation for 
this finding, but Dorahy (2001) suggested that it may be due to the MPD participant 
responding quickly in order to prevent herself from remembering other traumatic 
memories triggered by the emotion words.  In order to evaluate this hypothesis, Schacter 
and colleagues would have had to analyze the data by emotional valence of the affect 
words, as both positive and negative words were included.  Unfortunately, they did not 
report these results.  This study will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.       
Bryant (1995) is also unique in that it was a study where the test procedure was 
administered both before and after the participant’s diagnosis of DID.  Bryant found that 
compartmentalization of childhood memories increased after the diagnosis, or perhaps 
the DID participant was merely less hesitant about displaying it.  Furthermore, before the 
DID diagnosis, the participant produced only recent autobiographical memories, while 
after the diagnosis she produced both recent and childhood memories.  After her 
diagnosis, the participant switched into a child alter when recalling childhood memories, 
and this child personality became increasingly specialized at holding negative memories.  
In order to address demand characteristics of the experiment, Bryant (1995) also had two 
groups of simulators take the same memory tests as the DID participant, but they did not 
reproduce the pattern of memory results.   
 Although most of this research demonstrates imperfect compartmentalization of 
knowledge, it is not inconsistent with reports of how DID works.  As long ago as 1944, 
Taylor and Martin reported that there was a great deal of subtlety in the amount of 
compartmentalization of information.  Zahn and colleagues (1996) pointed out that the 
implicit transfer of priming between alters is necessary but insufficient evidence to 
demolish claims of robust inter-identity amnesia.  Most of the material that has been 
studied in the laboratory has perforce been neutral material, which the person would have 
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less motivation to section off from the rest of consciousness.  The studies that have used 
negative stimuli, such as the work of Huntjens and colleagues, are one step towards 
understanding memory functioning in DID, but further expansion is needed.  For 
example, van der Hart, Bolt, and van der Kolk (2005) have recently reported that not only 
did their 30 DID participants report amnesia for childhood trauma, they also reported 
amnesia for other events that were emotionally significant but not traumatic.  
Furthermore, the participants with DID remembered their experiences in qualitatively 
different ways than has been reported in the memory literature.  In addition to having 
somatosensory flashbacks (or “body memories”) for traumatic events, they also recalled 
their non-traumatic important events through their bodies (van der Hart, Bolt, & van der 
Kolk, 2005).  Despite this complexity, which should be explored in future research, the 
studies demonstrating at least some degree of amnesia are convincing, although they 
should be replicated with larger samples.  Several of them also included simulators 
attempting to “fake” DID, for the most part unsuccessfully. 
Summary 
 Much of the foundation for this dissertation research has been laid in chapter 3.  
This chapter reviewed existing cognitive research on dissociation and DID, thereby 
clarifying what knowledge we possess and what areas still need exploration.  Cognitive 
experiments on memory in DID provide the framework within which this dissertation 
was designed.  The research reviewed in this chapter provides basic knowledge about 
processes in dissociation from which to expand into the current study.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RATIONALE FOR CURRENT STUDY 
 
 The research discussed in previous chapters has opened the door for a scientific 
understanding of the way DID operates.  Since the 1990s, studies have been conducted 
more frequently in a manner that is well-designed and well-controlled.  Some recent 
studies, notably the work of Huntjens, have also used larger samples of DID participants 
than have been used in the past.  As acceptance of DID has spread and methodology has 
advanced, knowledge of dissociation and of dissociative identity disorder has become 
increasingly robust and nuanced.  However, previous research still leaves many areas 
unexplored. 
 Research such as that done by Eich and colleagues is an essential foundation for a 
full delineation of how memory functions in DID.  Nonetheless, the experimental 
techniques used by Eich and many others do have the drawback that they require a 
certain specialized sub-sample of the already small group of people diagnosed with DID.  
Participants in many studies of memory in DID must be able and willing to switch to 
certain pre-specified alters at will, and to regulate how long each of those alters remains 
in control of the body.  This type of executive control can take years to develop, and is 
usually the result of intensive psychotherapy, the goal of which is to break down amnesia 
barriers so that alters can communicate and cooperate with each other.  By requiring 
participants to have this kind of control over their switching during lengthy and 
challenging experimental sessions in an unfamiliar laboratory, some researchers have 
limited their participants to only those people with DID who are furthest along the path to 
resolving their DID and thus changing the very phenomenon being studied.  Such 
participants are few and far between, and are most accessible in large urban areas. 
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A more serious criticism of previous laboratory research regards its striking lack 
of ecological validity and narrow focus.  Most of the well-controlled empirical research 
on memory functioning in DID has used word lists or similar stimuli.  While such basic 
memory research is to be applauded, it can evaluate only a small portion of overall 
memory usage in the real world, and it is difficult to generalize from these types of 
studies.  People do not develop DID in order to create cross-identity amnesia for lists of 
neutral words!  DID is a coping mechanism for sectioning off knowledge of unbearable 
trauma.  Therefore, experiments that show leakage of inconsequential and neutral 
information between reportedly amnesic alters do not address the question of how 
memory functions during daily life, in which people are rarely assessed on whether or not 
they have acquired conditioning for nonsense syllables.  Zahn and colleagues (1996) 
pointed out that testing inter-identity amnesia based on conditioning results does not 
provide conclusive answers, and that paradigms using simple stimuli such as word lists 
are also not definitive.  They argued that more complex stimuli are necessary in order to 
fully assess the presence and extent of memory and memory transfer in DID.  In real life, 
people deal with memories about their own past (autobiographical memory).  They share 
information about themselves with others, or they keep such information to themselves.  
They also encounter semantically rich and varied stimuli, as well as stimuli with a variety 
of emotional valences.  
      Very little research has thus far addressed the impact of emotion on memory in 
DID.  The studies that have used negative stimuli, such as the work of Huntjens and 
colleagues, are one step towards understanding this relationship, but further expansion is 
needed.  Seeing a few isolated words, no matter how negative, is of debatable relevance 
to the real-life context in which people live complex lives, with interactions among 
various emotions occurring during various events. 
 Finally, no study thus far has attempted to quantify or to measure the extent of 
integration in DID participants with any degree of standardization.  If DID is developed 
in order to hold various parts of memory away from each other, then experimenters who 
assesses memory functioning must necessarily be concerned with the pattern and extent 
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of fragmentation and integration in their participants.  These patterns can be subtle, quite 
complex, and not very amenable to awareness, verbalization, or classification.  This 
dissertation represents a step forward for the field of dissociation studies by its 
development of an integration scale. 
   Researching DID is extremely difficult.  Many of the limitations apparent in 
previous research are the inevitable results of the methodological and conceptual 
challenges inherent in conducting studies with this population.  Those challenges, such as 
participants who are relatively rare and difficult to recruit, who show immense individual 
variability in their behavior, and who may be emotionally fragile, limit this dissertation as 
well.  Nevertheless, this dissertation was designed to examine memory in DID from a 
broad and rich perspective.  To this end, some degree of laboratory control has been 
traded for relatively high levels of ecological validity.   
 Several different types of memory measurements are the basis for the research 
reported in this dissertation.  The experiment began by collecting spontaneous 
autobiographical memories from participants’ lives.  Phenomenological data were also 
collected for two of these memories, one memory that was shared with the experimenter 
and one that was unshared.  Freyd’s (1983) shareability theory proposed that there are 
measurable differences between memories that are shared with other people versus those 
that are unshared (see also Freyd, 1996).  This theory has received some support in the 
general memory and philosophy literature, but it has never been applied to the situation in 
which many identities exist with varying degrees of separation within a single person.  It 
was hypothesized that shared memories, compared to memories that had not been 
extensively shared with others, would show greater sensory detail, a more linear and 
comprehensible structure, and better connection with surrounding memories. 
      Next, participants were given a list of word stimuli, similar to the stimuli used 
in previous research.  It was hypothesized that participants with DID would perform 
generally well on a standard assessment of free recall.  Based on previous research, this 
type of memory assessment generally does not show large deficits in participants with 
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DID.  Moreover, the words were not trauma-specific, and therefore they should not 
trigger distinctly dissociative information processing styles.  
 Participants also heard three vignettes concerning events from the narrator’s 
childhood.  The first vignette was emotionally neutral, the second contained fear, and the 
third contained happiness.  These stories were an important ingredient in the design of 
this study, because they were semantically rich, ecologically valid stimuli that contained 
a variety of emotions.  Based on previous research, it was hypothesized that the DID 
participants would show better memory for the neutral and happy stories than for the fear 
story.  Due to the detailed nature of these stimuli and their possible relevance to the 
participants’ own lives, it was theorized that the stimuli would provide sufficient cues for 
the employment of dissociative information processing. 
 Participants also completed a procedural learning task that measured perceptual 
skill without the influence of motor skills.  This study was specifically concerned with 
procedurally assessing memory and mental skill learning, rather than with assessing 
procedural learning of motor skills.  The task used in this study was therefore a relatively 
pure assessment of procedural learning, allowing conclusions to be drawn about this area 
of memory performance independent of any possible physical correlates of DID.  It was 
hypothesized that participants with DID would show performance equal to the 
performance of college students on this task, as there were no stimuli in the task that were 
directly related to trauma and therefore no reason to believe that the DID participants 
would necessarily process the task differently.   
 In addition, and unique to this study, participants reported when they had 
switched alters during the testing session and filled out the newly-designed Integration 
Measure (IM).  Unlike in previous research, the participants were not asked to switch at 
certain times nor to certain alters, but were rather given their choice over when and 
whether to switch.  Participants also filled out questionnaires regarding dissociation and 
trauma history.  Finally, this study is distinct from previous laboratory research in its 
focus on DID as adaptive and especially in its treatment of participants as the experts on 
their own internal experience. 
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Summary of Hypotheses 
1.  Compared to unshared memories, shared memories will be more sensory, have a more            
linear and comprehensible structure, and be better connected with surrounding memories. 
2.  DID participants will show no deficit on word list recall. 
3.  DID participants will have better memory for neutral and happy stories than for the 
story containing fear. 
4.  DID and student participants will have equal performance on a procedural learning 
task. 
5.  Switching and integration will be assessed. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
METHOD 
 
 
Participants 
Recruiting 
Student Group   
A comparison group of college students was recruited from a psychology 
department subject pool at a large state university in the Pacific Northwest.  This student 
group provided a measure of baseline or “normal” performance on the memory tasks, as 
well as allowing the experimenter to pilot and refine the procedure before running the 
experimental group participants.  Some participants completed a prescreening test that 
included a modified version of the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; see below); 
students who scored on the high or the low ends of this scale were then invited to 
participate in the experiment.  Some time slots were also opened to any students, 
regardless of whether they had completed the prescreening.  Participants signed up via a 
human subjects website that did not contain any description of the studies (for some 
reasons why this procedure is important for validity of results, see Barlow & Cromer, in 
press).  
DID Group 
There were two waves of recruitment.  The first type of recruitment took place at 
McLean Hospital in Belmont, Massachusetts, and resulted in one inpatient participant.  
After discussing the project with doctors and staff members, recruitment began with daily 
chart review of all patients in the Dissociative Disorders Treatment Program and 
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Women’s Treatment Program.  For each patient who had a diagnosis of Dissociative 
Identity Disorder (DID), either confirmed or possible, recorded on her chart, the 
experimenter contacted the doctor primarily responsible for that patient’s treatment.  
Doctors were asked to determine whether, in their clinical judgment, the patient was 
appropriate for the experiment, and if so, to pass along the experimenter’s contact 
information to the patient.  Reasons for low recruitment were many; for example, there 
was a fair amount of clinical disagreement about the diagnosis itself.  Often it was put on 
the chart by a different doctor than the one who was currently responsible for the patient, 
and the doctors disagreed about whether the diagnosis was correct.  Such was the case for 
almost half the potential participants and this situation resulted in lengthy telephone 
exchanges, by which time the patient was often discharged.  Several patients were 
discharged after only one or two days, thus not staying long enough to be recruited and 
run.  Additionally, approximately half the potential participants were judged by their 
doctors to be too unstable to participate in research of any kind, despite the protocol 
being approved by the Chief of Hospital Clinical Services and the McLean IRB for use in 
this population. 
 The second type of (outpatient) recruitment took place in the Pacific Northwest, 
mainly in the Eugene and Portland areas of Oregon and the Seattle area of Washington.  
A letter explaining the project was sent to clinicians and treatment centers that 
specialized in dissociation or trauma.  The letter asked clinicians to have eligible and 
interested clients contact the experimenter.  Information was also sent out over an 
electronic mailing list, and a website provided more details about the study.     
Demographics 
Student Group 
The student group consisted of 13 female university students, with a mean age of 23.07 
years (SD = 6.42, range = 18 – 37).  No student participant reported being diagnosed with 
a dissociative disorder, although three reported current or past depression.  One 
participant reported a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, but she still had a 
dissociation score below the group average. 
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DID  Group 
 The experimental group consisted of 11 women who had been diagnosed with 
DID.  One was an inpatient at McLean Hospital in Massachusetts, and the rest were 
community members in the Pacific Northwest.  One participant did not answer 
demographic questions.  The average age was 35.35 years (SD = 12.57, range = 23 – 62).  
Seven participants reported being currently on psychiatric medications, mostly 
antidepressants.  The DID group had one member with a high school education or GED, 
four people with some college or technical school, two people who had completed 
college or technical school, two people with some graduate school and one person who 
had completed graduate school.  This group had been hospitalized an average of 3.6 times 
(range = 0 – 15 times) and had been in therapy for an average of 12.05 years (SD = 6.73, 
range = 2 – 20 years).  One participant had been diagnosed with DID between one and 
three years ago, four had been diagnosed three to six years ago, and four had been 
diagnosed more than six years ago (two participants did not answer).  
Materials 
Experimental materials 
Stories 
Participants heard three vignettes during the first session; these stories may be 
found in the appendix.  Two of the stories were adapted from those originally used in a 
previous study in our laboratory (Klest, 2002).  Each of the three stories was 
approximately 200 to 330 words long and described a family event from the narrator’s 
childhood.  The first story had no overt emotional valence and was recorded in an 
unemotional voice.  The second story contained fear, both in the wording and in the 
narrator’s recorded tone of voice.  The third story (newly created) contained happiness, 
again in both the wording and the reading. 
Word Lists 
 The words used in the procedural learning tasks, as well as the word-list learning 
task, were taken from a previous study (Barlow & Freyd, unpublished data).  In creating 
stimuli for the previous study, a list of negative words was created and the frequency of 
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each negative word in English was determined using the norms of Kucera and Francis 
(1967).  For each negative word, five control words were chosen that were the same part 
of speech (noun, verb), the same length to within one letter, and had the same frequency 
in English.  The 100 control words were also chosen to be neutral in emotional valence.  
Words were presented in a random order.   
Measures 
 The measures detailed below are all self-report, pen-and-paper questionnaires.  
Most have been used in prior studies and several have strong research backing their 
validity and reliability; some were created for this study.  All participants completed the 
following measures: 
 Memory Characteristics Questionnaire.  This instrument, called MCQ for brevity, 
is a modified version of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire developed by Johnson 
and colleagues (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988).  The original MCQ assesses 
qualities of a specific episodic memory, such as the degree of visual and other imagery, 
perceived importance of the memory, clarity and impact of the memory, as well as how 
long ago the event occurred.  The 31-item modified version clarifies some of the 
questions and is slightly shorter.  
 Demographics.  The demographics form varied slightly between the student and 
DID groups.  Both versions asked basic questions (open-ended) such as age and gender.  
The college student control group reported whether they had been diagnosed with any 
mental illness or dissociative disorder, year in school, and number of psychology classes 
taken.  The DID group reported level of education, job, psychiatric medication, and 
amount of therapy and prior hospitalization.  
 Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986).  The DES is a 
28-item self-report measure that can be used to assess different types of dissociative 
experiences, ranging from “highway hypnosis” and “spacing out” to amnesia for 
important autobiographical events, lack of pain awareness, depersonalization, and 
derealization.  It has been used extensively with a wide range of populations in countries 
around the world, and has been found to have strong reliability and validity (see Briere, 
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1997; Carlson & Putnam, 1993 for reviews).  Bernstein and Putnam (1986) found that the 
test-retest correlation for normal participants was .84 across one to two months.   
For each item, participants are asked to circle the percentage of the time (0 to 
100%) that each experience happens when they are not under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs.  This scale was not designed for diagnostic use, and the general population of 
adults usually scores in a narrow range below 10 (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Carlson & 
Putnam, 1993; Carlson & Rosser-Hogan, 1993).  The DES is, however, well able to 
distinguish DID from other psychiatric and dissociative disorders (Bernstein & Putnam, 
1986; van IJzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996).  Bernstein and Putnam (1986) also reported 
DES scores for several different types of clinical groups.  Normal adults had a median 
score of 4.38, alcoholics of 4.72, phobics of 6.04, schizophrenics of 20.63, PTSD patients 
of 31.25, and multiples (DID participants) of 57.06 (p. 731).  Although males and 
females score similarly on the DES, scores on the measure may be related to IQ or 
educational level because the items require a high school reading level for 
comprehension; the instrument may also be susceptible to malingering (van IJzendoorn & 
Schuengel, 1996).  Van IJzendoorn and Schuengel (1996) reported that the mean alpha 
reliability of the DES in their meta-analysis was .93.   
Brief Betrayal Trauma Survey (BBTS; Freyd & Goldberg, 2004).  This measure 
has 14 questions, each with two parts.  It is designed to measure the frequency of various 
traumatic events, including natural disasters, sexual trauma, physical and emotional 
abuse, and witnessing violence.  An example of a low-betrayal trauma is “Been in a 
major earthquake, fire, flood, hurricane, or tornado that resulted in significant loss of 
personal property, serious injury to yourself or a significant other, the death of a 
significant other, or the fear of your own death.”  A high-betrayal trauma item is “You 
were made to have some form of sexual contact, such as touching or penetration, by 
someone with whom you were very close (such as a parent or lover).”  Each item asks the 
participant to circle the number of times an event has happened before age 18 and after 
age 18 (there were five increments, ranging from never, coded as 0, to more than 100 
times, coded as 5).  The BBTS has good test-retest reliability (Goldberg & Freyd, under 
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review).  Participants also rate how upsetting are the questions, compared to everyday 
life, how important it is to ask about such events, and how good an idea it is to include 
such questions in research. 
 Post-experiment Questionnaire (PEQ).  This survey measured variables such as 
whether participants took the experiment seriously, whether they understood the 
instructions, and whether they had previously practiced mirror-reading (the procedural 
learning task, discussed below).  The PEQ also had open-ended questions about the best 
and worst parts of the experiment, taking into account both sessions. 
Participants in the DID group also completed several additional questionnaires: 
 Integration Measure (IM).  Developed by Barlow and Chu, this questionnaire is 
the first of its kind (see Appendix).  Currently, there is no existing empirical measure of 
how integrated or fragmented a person with DID is.  There are clinician and patient 
reports describing degrees and components of integration qualitatively, as well as some 
limited and not well-replicated data that integration is associated with physiological 
changes.  This questionnaire is a first attempt to measure components of integration, such 
as awareness of other alters, communication between alters, shared executive control, and 
co-consciousness. 
Three additional questionnaires were included in the DID group as part of an 
undergraduate honors project and will not be reported here. 
Equipment 
 Equipment for the experiment included a Panasonic HD Digital 5100 video 
camera on a tripod, recording to VHS tapes in a VCR, as well as a portable cassette 
player. 
Procedure 
Session 1 
 All participants in the student group as well as the DID group participants who 
were from the Eugene, Oregon area came into a university psychology laboratory for 
both sessions.  Other DID group participants in the Pacific Northwest region (Seattle and 
Portland areas) participated in their own homes or in the home of a friend and fellow-
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participant.  The experimenter offered to find alternate locations such as a public meeting 
room in case participants felt uncomfortable with the experimenter coming to their 
homes, but all participants declined this accommodation.  In the case of home visits, 
equipment set-up and suitably arranging furniture as needed for the experiment was the 
first step.  One participant with DID participated in an office in the building where she 
was attending residential psychiatric treatment, on the grounds of McLean Hospital in 
Belmont, Massachusetts.   
All participants had individual experimental sessions with the experimenter.  
Except in the case where several of the DID participants were friends with each other, 
participants did not see each other or know who else had participated.  All participation 
was coded with an anonymous code number, and the link between number and name was 
destroyed after the second session.  In the case of the hospitalized DID participant, the 
experimental sessions also included a licensed clinical psychologist who was on the staff 
of the treatment program there.  Allison Berger, Ph.D., was a consultant on the McLean 
Hospital phase of the experiment and remained in the room as a trusted figure in order to 
ensure the participant’s well-being. 
 All participants were first given a general informed consent form describing the 
experiment’s purpose, procedure, risks, and benefits, as well as an additional consent 
form regarding the videotaping procedure.  No participant declined to participate in the 
experiment or to be videotaped.  All participants were also given an opportunity to ask 
questions. 
 The first task was a modification of the Crovitz Word Technique (Crovitz & 
Schiffman, 1974).  This task is a classic method of assessing autobiographical episodic 
memory.  It consists of a series of 10 neutral cue words.  The instructions state that 
participants should briefly describe the first memory about a specific personal event that 
comes to mind when they hear the word.  Participants can choose not to use any 
memories that they are uncomfortable describing, instead choosing another memory that 
relates to the word.  The memories described can be from any time in the past, from 
minutes to decades ago, and can be of any event, from the life-changing to the mundane. 
70 
 
 Next, participants chose one of the 10 memories they had produced to describe on 
a questionnaire.  This instrument, called MCQ for brevity, is a modified version of the 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988).  The 
MCQ assesses qualities of a specific episodic memory, such as the degree of visual and 
other imagery, perceived importance of the memory, clarity and impact of the memory.  
After filling out the MCQ for a memory they had just described, participants filled out the 
same questionnaire again, this time for a different memory of their choice.  Participants 
filled out the second MCQ for a memory they had not previously described in the 
experimental session, and that they had not talked much about with other people.     
 The experimenter then read a list of 25 words out loud, at the rate of 
approximately one word per second.  Most participants reported later that during this 
time, they were making an effort to remember the words for later, though they had not 
been instructed to do so.  Then participants listened to three stories that were recorded on 
a cassette tape (see description of stories above).  The stories were presented verbally 
rather than written to control for reading time and ability differences among and within 
participants, and to ensure that participants spent the same amount of time on neutral, 
fearful, and happy stories.  Stories were always presented in the same order: first neutral, 
then fear, with the happy story always coming last in order to end that task on a positive 
note and ameliorate any negative affect that may have occurred in response to earlier 
stories.  Listening to the stories took approximately four minutes.  Many of the 
participants reported later that they attempted to memorize details of the stories, though 
they had not been asked to do so.  Participants then performed free recall on the list of 25 
words.  They were given as long as they wanted to complete this task; when participants 
gave up, they were informed that there were only 30 seconds left in the task, so as to give 
them one final opportunity to recall more words. 
 The procedural learning task was next.  In this task, participants saw a mixture of 
53 neutral and mildly negative words printed on 4 x 6-inch index cards (for development 
of word lists, see above).  The words were printed in a large, sans-serif font and were 
mirror-reversed.  Mirror-reading was chosen because it is a simple perceptual skill that, 
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while difficult at first, shows improvement with practice and, unlike some other tests of 
procedural learning such as pursuit rotor tasks, it is not confounded with motor skills.  It 
has also been shown to be spared in amnesic patients who have impairments in other 
cognitive tasks, as well as in patients with Alzheimer’s Disease, which implies that it is 
relatively unconnected to explicit memory for the words that are read (Deweer, Pillon, 
Michon, & Dubois, 1993; Squire, Cohen, & Zouzounis, 1984).  In a procedure similar to 
that of a previous study (Barlow & Freyd, unpublished data), participants saw words one 
at a time and had to read each word out loud as quickly and accurately as possible.  
Participants employed a variety of techniques to complete this task.  There was a 
maximum exposure time of approximately 10 to 20 seconds for each word (a slow count 
to 10).  Once a participant read a given word out loud, either correctly or incorrectly, or 
once time ran out, whichever came first, that card was flipped down and the next word 
appeared.  This task took anywhere from two to ten minutes. 
Participants then filled out a memory test regarding the stories they had heard on 
the cassette tape.  This test had both free recall and multiple-choice questions for each of 
the three stories.  After filling out this test, participants completed the test portion of the 
procedural learning task.  The test portion was identical in procedure to the learning 
portion.  That is, participants saw a new list of 23 neutral and mildly negative mirror-
reversed words on index cards and read them out loud.  The test phase of procedural 
learning took between 42 seconds and four minutes. 
All participants were then given both an oral and a written debriefing, and were 
provided with copies of the consent forms to keep.  They also had an opportunity to ask 
any questions.  Participants in the DID group were given $20, with the exception of the 
participant covered under the earlier McLean Hospital protocol, who received $10 
(payment was lower in the hospital setting so as not to be considered coercive).  
Participants in the university student group automatically received credit towards a class 
requirement in exchange for participation.  The entire first session took no more than an 
hour for the student group, and usually less than 70 minutes with the DID group. 
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The participants with DID did not receive any explicit instructions regarding 
switching among their alters.  If they asked, the experimenter explained that the study 
would still work whether they switched or not, and that either way was perfectly fine.  
The rationale behind this strategy was explained in the previous chapter; to wit, that 
limiting participation to only those people with DID who could control both the timing 
and the execution of their switching would create a very small and non-representative 
sample from which to draw.  All but one of the participants in the DID group later 
reported that they had switched several times during the experiment; some participants 
switched quite visibly, though not all did. 
Session 2 
 The details of meeting and informed consent were similar in the first and second 
sessions.  Participants were seen one at a time.  The primary purpose of the second 
session was to collect participants’ reports of what they had experienced in the first 
session.  Although assessing experiences retrospectively rather than online does have its 
limitations, the first session was already long and participant fatigue would have become 
a factor.  In order to aid participants’ recollection of the experiences, the second sessions 
took place in the same location as the first sessions but on a different day, anytime from 
the next morning to a few days later.  Participants had the option to view the videotape of 
themselves from the first session; almost all the student group participants consented to 
this viewing but most of the DID group participants declined it. 
 Verbally and/or with the aid of the videotape, the experimenter reminded 
participants of each of the tasks they had performed in session 1.  For each task, the 
student group participants verbally reported on their thoughts and feelings during the 
task, and whether those thoughts and feelings changed during the course of the task.  In 
the DID group, participants instead verbally reported which alter performed each task, as 
well as whether there were other alters watching or listening, and whether they switched 
during the task.  For each of the two memories that had an MCQ associated with it, DID 
participants additionally reported whether the part that filled out the questionnaire 
experienced the event or got the information from somewhere else, and approximately 
73 
 
what proportion of their alters knew about each event.  At the conclusion of the verbal 
interview, participants filled out several questionnaires (see Materials).  All participants 
filled out a version of a demographics form, the DES, the BBTS, and the PEQ.  Before 
the PEQ, participants in the DID group also filled out the IM and three additional 
measures for a separate project. 
As in session 1, all participants were then given both an oral and a written 
debriefing, and were provided with copies of the consent forms to keep.  They also had 
an opportunity to ask any questions.  Participants in the DID group were given $20, with 
the exception of the participant covered under the earlier McLean Hospital protocol, who 
received $10.  Participants in the university student group automatically received credit 
towards a class requirement in exchange for participation.  The entire second session took 
no more than an hour for the student group, usually much less, as their answers to the 
verbal interview were short and they filled out the questionnaires quickly.  In the DID 
group, the second session took 40 to 90 minutes. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptions of DID Participants 
The participants in previous DID studies have differed greatly from each other.  
These differences, for example differences in amount of control over their switching or in 
length of time since their diagnosis, may affect the results of such studies or even the 
methodology that is feasible to use in DID samples.  Therefore, it is useful to examine 
each of the current DID participants individually in order to get a sense of who they are 
and to understand their contributions to the results of this research.   
Participant 1 
 This participant, who did not report her age, was one of the most well-integrated 
women in the study, and was a “frequent flier” at the psychiatric hospital near Boston.  
She was living in the Women’s Treatment Program house at the time of the experiment, 
having been transferred recently from the inpatient dissociation unit, where she had been 
hospitalized several times before.  Her “host” personality for the past several years had 
been a 16-year old male, and she switched alters visibly during the course of the first 
session.  During the second session, she reported that she had been feeling fragile and 
easily-triggered after the first session, because part of the procedure had reminded her of 
her ritualistic abuse.  She declined to watch herself on video.  She also declined to receive 
payment for the second session, and gave the money back.  On a questionnaire she 
expressed the hope that the data from this experiment would help clinicians and others 
better understand DID. 
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Participant 2 
 The second participant, who reported her age as approximately 49 or 50, reported 
that most of her alters watched her life most of the time and that they were fairly co-
conscious.  She switched floridly during the first session, and then asked the 
experimenter whether switching was acceptable.  Upon receiving the answer that 
switching or not switching was completely up to her, she continued to switch frequently 
throughout the session.  She also reported the ages, genders, and names of seven of her 
alters, and the fact that she had not learned to read until she was a teenager.  She declined 
to watch the video of herself from the first session.  She was taking an antidepressant and 
a sleep aid.  The participant reported that the experiment was fun and interesting, and that 
the best thing about it was that “We got to be ‘us’, not hide as one.  Cool.”     
Participant 3 
 Participant 3 was the only one who reported that she did not switch at all during 
the first session, although she did report that she “spaced out” during one of the tasks.  
She was currently on an antidepressant.  She also took a medication used for bipolar 
mania or schizophrenia; however, she showed no overt symptoms of either condition.  
She had some graduate training in Psychology and reported that the experiment was 
interesting and that she was glad it was furthering research.  This 44-year old had been 
hospitalized for psychiatric reasons at least five times, but never on a trauma or 
dissociation unit. 
Participant 4 
 At age 62, this participant was the oldest participant in the study.  She had an 
unusually low dissociation score, looking more like the student group in this respect.  
While surprising, this finding is not unknown, as the measure relies to some degree on 
the participant’s self-awareness of dissociative lapses.  She reported that her alters were 
very inter-connected, and that she had been working towards this goal for 20 years.  She 
also reported that writing was difficult because part of her abuse experiences included not 
being allowed to write, as well as not being allowed to use her dominant (left) hand very 
often.  Approximately 32 years ago, at age 30, she went back to being left-handed.  The 
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separation between her alters allowed her to write when she wished, because the alters 
that wrote were a different group than those who had been abused.  This participant 
reported that the study was interesting and that she appreciated research “that doesn’t 
regard multiple personalities as freakish.”   
Participant 5 
 Participant 5 (age 27) was not the youngest participant, but she was the one who 
had been diagnosed most recently with DID, between one and three years before the 
experiment.  She reported that the experiment was interesting but that it made her realize 
for the first time how fragmented her memory really was and how much she did not 
remember in daily life.  She said that it was neither a good nor a bad realization, merely 
an observation. 
Participant 6 
 This participant reported that she tried to hide her switching, even though she 
knew it was acceptable to switch during the experiment.  She said that, at age 29, she was 
still “trying to look good and perfect in the world.”  In each session she switched several 
times between adult and child parts, both male and female, including switching to a child 
alter during the second session interview.  The participant appeared to have a non-
standard gender.  She reported that the experiment was somewhat upsetting because it 
brought up “hard emotions” but that it was also interesting and fun, and the best thing 
about it was “helping people learn more about dissociation.”  She was friends with 
Participants 7 and 8 through a self-help group for multiples.  She had been hospitalized 
for psychiatric reasons an estimated 15 times, more than any other participant, and she 
was taking an antidepressant and a benzodiazepine. 
Participant 7 
 This participant referred two other multiples from the self-help group she 
facilitated to the study.  She reported that she did not have perfect observation for all of 
her switches but she was aware of some dissociation and at least one switch during the 
first session.  She also reported some performance anxiety during the first session but 
wrote that she felt comfortable having the experiment in her home and that she would “be 
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fascinated to hear the results.”  She was particularly interested in the memory measures 
and was creating a database of her memories.  This participant reported a history of 
ritualistic abuse and drugging, as well as childhood prostitution and pornography.  At age 
23, she was the youngest participant and had been hospitalized “roughly” eight or nine 
times.  She was taking two antidepressants and an anxiolytic. 
Participant 8 
 Referred to the study by the Participant 7, this participant was taking an 
antidepressant.  She switched several times during the first session, including into a child 
alter, but she reported that she tried hard to keep just one alter participating at a time.  She 
had brought her teddy bear to the experiment “just in case.”  She reported that the 
experiment was somewhat stressful and it gave her a headache, but that it was also 
interesting and that she was glad she was able to participate.  Filling out any sort of form 
took her a very long time and caused her stress in general, but her forms were very 
complete.  Although the experimenter made it clear that she could stop writing at any 
time, she stayed after her session and continued finishing the forms while another 
participant completed her session.  Interestingly, this participant showed clear changes in 
her handwriting on one of the memory questionnaires, in what appears to be an 
interjection by another alter.  She later reported that this alter was a 17-year-old who was 
logical and protective of her mother, and that she intruded with the logical reasoning 
shown on the form.  The participant was 29 years old. 
Participant 9 
 This participant reported that she was very unaware of what her different parts 
were and of what the different parts were doing.  She assumed that other parts were 
always watching but did not know much about them or about their switching, and in fact 
she scored much lower than the other participants on a measure of integration.  She was 
29 years old and was taking an antidepressant.  She reported that she “loved the 
questionnaires in the second session” and that she found the experiment “fascinating.” 
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Participant 10 
 Participant 10 was given information about the study by Participant 5, who lived 
in a different state.  This participant seemed somewhat unfocused, talking and writing a 
great deal throughout both sessions without necessarily answering the questions at hand.  
She reported that she was 36.5 years old, that she switched easily and flexibly, and that 
she had a history of ritualistic abuse, being stalked, anorexia, and irritable bowel 
syndrome.  She was taking an antidepressant and an anxiolytic.  She also reported that the 
best thing about the experiment for her was learning about and identifying her parts.  She 
wrote that she had “high hopes” that the experiment would help other trauma survivors. 
Participant 11 
 The last participant, a 25-year old woman, thought that it was “hilarious!” to 
watch herself on videotape, and her switches were very apparent to her on the video.  She 
wrote that she had always wanted to fill out the DES (and she had the highest score on it).  
She also wrote that the experiment was fun and interesting. 
Equipment Limitations and Number of Participants 
 There were difficulties with the equipment for six of the DID participants.  In five 
cases the videotape did not record at all, and in one case it did record, but the quality of 
the tape was unusable due to poor lighting conditions and sound pickup in the 
participant’s home.  Therefore, two of the analyses reported in this chapter included five 
DID participants and the thirteen student participants.  Much of the previous research on 
DID has used samples of one to five participants (e.g., Nissen, et al., 1988; Loewenstein, 
Hamilton, Alagna, Reid, & deVries, 1987; Peters, et al., 1998; Schacter, et al., 1989; 
Tsai, et al., 1999), so this sample size is not unusual in this field.  Additionally, DID 
participants were occasionally unable to answer some of the questions they were asked, 
due to lack of knowledge.  Again, this situation is not uncommon in research about DID.  
Refer to Table 1 for the number of participants included in each analysis. 
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Table 1. 
Number of Participants Measured for Each Variable 
Variable DID Group Student Group 
DES 11 13 
BBTS 10 13 
Crovitz Word Technique 5 13 
Word List Recall 11 13 
Vignette Memory Analyses 11 13 
Procedural Learning 5 13 
Shareability Analyses, Shared/Unshared Memories 11 13 
Switching 11 0 
Percentage of Alters Who Knew About 
Shared/Unshared Memories  8 0 
IM 11 0 
 
Demographic Summary 
The student group had a mean DES score of 9.01 (SD = 10.13), which is within 
the normal range, as would be expected in this college population.  The DID group had a 
mean DES score of 56.16 (SD = 21.88), which is well above the normal range.  This 
difference was significant and large, t(22) = 7.00, p < .001, effect size d = 2.78.  A one-
way ANOVA revealed that the DID group reported much more trauma in all areas of the 
BBTS (see Table 2 for means).   
 
Table 2. 
Mean Score on the BBTS 
 Student Group DID Group Effect Size 
All trauma before age 18 3.00 (2.61) 31.40 (13.05) 3.02 
All trauma after age 18 1.15 (2.03) 19.1 (10.84) 2.30 
High betrayal trauma before age 18 1.08 (1.61) 13.00 (3.37) 4.52 
High betrayal trauma after age 18 0.85 (1.57) 9.20 (4.57) 2.45 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
All tests reported in this chapter are two-tailed.  The DID group had more trauma 
before the age of 18 than did the student group, F(1, 22) = 59.30, p < .001, d = 3.02.  The 
DID group also reported more trauma after the age of 18 than did the student group, F(1, 
22) = 34.55, p < .001, d = 2.30.  Trauma that is high in interpersonal betrayal, especially 
80 
 
in childhood, is related to the development of dissociative disorders (e.g., Chu & Dill, 
1990; Draijer & Langeland, 1999; Kisiel & Lyons, 2001).  Indeed the DID group 
reported quite a bit more high betrayal trauma before the age of 18 than did the student 
group, F(1, 22) = 126.94, p < .001, d = 4.52.  They also reported more high betrayal 
trauma in adulthood, F(1, 22) = 38.12, p < .001, d = 2.45.  Because the two groups were 
not matched on age or psychiatric diagnoses, it is not surprising that the older DID group 
would report more adult trauma than the younger student group, simply because they had 
lived longer.  Of note are the comparisons that show that the DID group also had more 
childhood trauma than did the student group.    
Memory Results 
Autobiographical Memory  
 On the Crovitz word technique, where participants produced autobiographical 
memories in response to cue words, all participants in both the student and DID groups 
were able to produce a memory for each stimulus.  The task was conducted in an 
unconstrained manner, meaning that memories could be from any point in participants’ 
lives and were not constrained to a certain time period.  Schacter and colleagues (1989), 
in their study of one DID participant and 30 controls, found that the DID participant was 
somewhat slower to produce memories than were the controls.  The current study did not 
replicate this finding.  Table 3 presents the mean and median reaction times (RT) that the 
student participants and the five DID participants took to come up with memories.   
 
Table 3. 
Time to Produce Autobiographical Memories in Crovitz Task, In Seconds 
 Mean Time Median Time 
DID Participant 1 5.30 (2.84) 4.50 
DID Participant 2 3.90 (2.79) 2.00 
DID Participant 4 3.40 (1.90) 3.00 
DID Participant 9 5.00 (4.77) 4.00 
DID Participant 11 4.60 (3.06) 4.00 
Student Group Mean 6.09 (2.20) 4.62 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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The student participants were younger than the DID participants, and college 
students generally have faster RTs on a variety of laboratory tasks than do middle-aged 
participants.  However, in this case the DID participants were faster than the student 
participants.  Although this difference was not statistically significant [F(1, 16) = 2.62, p 
= .125], the effect size was large, d = 1.00.  Observed power was .33.  Within the DID 
group, time to produce autobiographical memories was most highly correlated with 
childhood high betrayal trauma (r = .93, p = .07), with DES score (r = .62, p = .26), with 
total memory score for the shared memory (r = .81, p = .10, see Figure 1), and with 
percentage of alters who knew about the shared memory (r = .88, p = .11).  Although due 
to small sample size none of these correlations were statistically significant at an alpha 
level of .05, they are nonetheless high correlations that deserve consideration. 
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Figure 1. 
Relationship Between RT to Produce Memories and Total MCQ 
Score on Shared Memory in DID Participants 
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Word List Recall 
 The student group recalled an average of 6.85 words (SD = 3.16), and  the DID 
group recalled an average of 5.73 words (SD = 3.74).  The two groups were not different, 
t(22) = -.80, p = .44, d = -.32.   
Memory for Vignettes 
 Memory for vignettes was assessed in two ways.  Participants summarized each 
vignette in a sentence or two, and also answered five multiple-choice questions about 
each story.  Story summaries were coded as either 0 (did not answer), 1 (few details), or 2 
(good summary with a few details).  On the story summaries, the DID participants overall 
did slightly worse than the student participants, but this difference was not statistically 
significant, F(1, 22) = .16, p = .695, d = -.15, using repeated measures ANOVA.  There 
were also no statistically significant differences among the three stories. 
 On the multiple choice items, the DID group also did worse than the student 
group, though again the difference was not statistically significant, F(1, 22) = 1.12, p = 
.301, d = -.30, using repeated measures ANOVA.  An interesting pattern emerged when 
looking at each story individually.  The first story was neutral in tone, the second 
contained fear, and the third contained happiness.  In Figure 2, the top line is the student 
group, and is functionally a straight line.  The bottom line is the DID group.  Although 
scores in the DID group for vignette 1 (neutral) and vignette 2 (fear) were not statistically 
different [paired samples t(10) = 1.268, p = .233], there was a larger effect size difference 
between these two points than between any of the other points, d = .56.     
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Figure 2. 
Mean Number of Items Correct on Three Vignettes by Group 
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Procedural Learning 
 There were no statistically significant differences between the two groups on 
number of words read correctly, on baseline mean time per word, or on amount of 
procedural learning as measured by an increase in speed.  Table 4 presents the means of 
the student participants and the five DID participants.  The five DID participants 
improved more than did the student group on percentage of words read correctly.  
Although this effect was not statistically significant [F(1, 15) = 2.14, p = .163], the effect 
size was moderate, d = .65.   
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Table 4.   
Procedural Learning Data   
 % Words 
Read 
Correctly –  
Initial 
Phase  
% Words 
Read 
Correctly –  
Test Phase  
% 
Improvement 
in Correct 
Reading 
Procedural 
Learning  
(improvement,  
in sec.) 
DID Participant 1 56.60 91.30 34.70 1.98 
DID Participant 2 52.83 65.22 12.39 0.70 
DID Participant 4 90.57 95.65 5.08 2.43 
DID Participant 9 86.79 100.00 13.21 3.24 
DID Participant 11 94.34 95.65 1.31 1.03 
Student Group 
Mean 
84.91 91.64 6.73 1.92 
 
Shareability Results 
 Participants filled out the MCQ twice, once for a memory they had shared with 
the experimenter during the Crovitz technique (“shared”), and once for a memory that 
they had not discussed with others (“unshared”).  The experimenter also asked DID 
participants how many of their alters knew about each memory and whether the alter(s) 
that filled out the questionnaires were the ones who experienced the events, but 
participants answered these questions in an open-ended manner.  Shareability theory 
(Freyd, 1983) would predict that unshared memories would be more sensory than shared 
memories.  This prediction was not supported, however.  Across groups, repeated 
measures ANOVAs showed that the shared and unshared memories did not differ on 
amount of visual detail, sound, smell, touch, or taste.  Looking only within the DID 
group, however, the unshared memories did include significantly more taste on a seven-
point scale (M = 2.36, SD = 1.57) than did the shared memories (M = 1.09, SD = .30), 
F(1, 10) = 8.83, p < .02.  This effect was large, d = 1.13, and had an observed power of 
.764.  Shareability theory would also predict that, compared to unshared memories, 
shared memories might be less confusing or more comprehensible, and better connected 
with surrounding memories.  Neither of these predictions was supported in either the total 
sample or within the DID group only.  As in other analyses, observed power was very 
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low, ranging from .052 to .445, at best less than a 50% chance of detecting an effect.  
Having a larger sample size would make these analyses more effective.     
The DID and student groups were significantly different on their total MCQ score across 
both shared and unshared memories, F(1, 22) = 7.62, p < .02, using repeated measures 
ANOVA.  The student group had higher scores than did the DID group, indicating better 
memory, more vividness, and better connection of the memory to related memories (see 
Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking only at shared memories, the student group (M = 125.62, SD = 17.65) 
scored higher than did the DID group (M = 99.45, SD = 23.24) on the total MCQ score, 
F(1, 22) = 9.82, p < .01, with a large effect size of  d = 1.27.  The difference between the 
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two groups for MCQ total was smaller on the unshared memories than on the shared 
memories.  For the unshared memories, the student group (M = 122.62, SD = 20.01) 
scored higher than did the DID group (M = 106.59, SD = 26.90), F(1, 22) = 2.80, p = 
.109.  Although this finding was not statistically significant, the effect size was still 
moderate, d = .68.  The interaction of group by sharing was not statistically significant, 
F(1, 22) = 1.15, p = .296.  Because the observed power was .176, a larger sample size 
might better illuminate this possible interaction. 
The DID group reported memories from longer ago than did the student group, 
but the participants were also older.  After accounting for age using repeated measures 
ANOVA, the two groups did not differ significantly on how long ago their memories 
took place, F(1, 20) = .005, p = .943.  However, observed power was low, .051.  Across 
groups, the shared and unshared memories did not differ significantly in how long ago 
they took place [paired samples t(23) = .66, p = .514, d = .15].  This finding is not 
surprising given that how long ago the shared and unshared memories took place were 
correlated (r = .41, p < .05).  Within the DID group, shared and unshared memories also 
did not differ statistically in how long ago they took place [paired samples t(10) = .74, p 
= .476].  Again, the shared and unshared memories were correlated on how long ago they 
took place (r = .53, p = .090).      
Across both the DID and student groups, shared and unshared memories were not 
statistically different on emotional valence (positive or negative), χ2 (1, N = 41) = 3.06,   
p > .05.  Looking within the DID group only, the shared and unshared memories also did 
not differ on emotional valence, χ2 (1, N = 21) = .04, p > .05.  Across shared and 
unshared memories, the two groups did not differ on emotional valence, χ2 (1, N = 47) = 
.03, p > .05.   
Switching 
 All but one of the DID participants reported switching alters at least once during 
the first session of the experiment.  Additionally, one participant reported being unaware 
of when switches occurred.  Participants switched both as task demands changed and 
within tasks in response to perceived difficulty or emotionally triggering stimuli.  Some 
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switches were obvious to the experimenter, consisting of visibly different posture, 
differing use of language, different tone of voice, visible moments of inattention, etc.  
Other switches were perceived by the participants, either at the time or in the second 
session when watching the videotape of session 1, but were not visible to the  
experimenter.  Participants indicated that the alters who completed the tasks were a 
mixture of children, adolescents, and adults, both male and female.  Ten of the 11 
participants reported that during at least one task there were other alters watching or 
listening but not participating directly in the tasks.   
Participants self-reported switching anywhere from 0 to 12 times during the first 
session, coded conservatively and not counting co-consciousness.  The mean number of 
switches reported in Session 1 was 5.8 (SD = 3.60).  The experimenter also observed 
some switching during Session 2, but this session was not coded for switching.  Figure 4 
displays the distribution of switching.  Figure 5 displays the strong relationship (R2 for a 
linear regression line =  0.57) between high levels of lifetime betrayal trauma and number 
of reported switches during the first session.  This relationship is explored further in the 
last part of this chapter.    
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Figure 4. 
Distribution of Number of Switches in Session 1 
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Integration Measure (IM) 
 The Integration Measure (IM; see Appendix A), developed for this study with 
input from James Chu, is a first attempt at measuring the extent to which someone with 
DID is integrated or fragmented.  Higher scores imply more co-consciousness, shared 
awareness, communication, and cooperation among the alters, and thus less 
fragmentation.  Descriptive data are provided here.  Future research, especially using 
factor analysis on larger and more diverse samples, should be aimed at refining this 
measure.   
After examining responses to the scale, items 5 through 9 provided the clearest 
answers and the most coherent measure of integration itself, as opposed to measuring co-
consciousness or executive control.  These five items, called “integration”, were therefore 
the only ones analyzed for this dissertation.  In Appendix A, the numbers written next to 
Figure 5. 
Relationship Between Lifetime High Betrayal Trauma and 
Number of Switches in Session 1 
89 
 
each possible response indicate the scoring for these items.  Possible integration scores 
therefore ranged from 0 to 20, with 0 indicating almost total fragmentation with little or 
no communication or awareness among alters, and 20 indicating almost total integration, 
with all parts aware of and cooperating with each other.  This group of DID participants 
had a mean score of 6.54 on these items, with a standard deviation of 3.39.    
Based on their answers to the IM, two of the participants seemed noticeably more 
fragmented than the others.  One of these two people reported only having been in 
therapy for three years, while the other reported 15 years of therapy, which is closer to 
the average for this group.  The participant who had spent three years in therapy also was 
one of the participants most recently diagnosed with DID (one to three years ago) and 
had never been hospitalized.  The other participant had been diagnosed more than six 
years ago, and had been hospitalized four times, which is approximately the average for 
this group.  Of the participants with the two highest scores, one was the inpatient and the 
other had been in therapy for 11 years, diagnosed more than six years ago.  This 
participant had been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons more often than any other 
participant: 15 times.   
Scores on the integration scale were apparently related to number of reported 
switches in Session 1.  Figure 6 is the scatterplot of this relationship with two fit lines 
overlaid, a quadratic and a cubic.  The quadratic and cubic lines both fit the data well (R2 
are .54 and .76, respectively).  Removing the two participants at the extreme left side of 
the graph produced a linear regression line that did not fit the data as well as either the 
quadratic or the cubic lines fit the whole data set.  Although this plot is based on only 11 
participants, possible implications and directions for future research will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
On the open-ended questions of the IM, DID participants reported a wide variety 
of ways that their alters communicated with them, such as journaling, hearing thoughts 
inside, sensing emotions, etc.  Seven participants reported that more than one alter helped 
to fill out the IM.  Participants reported that they had been working on developing 
communication and cooperation between their alters for anywhere from a few months (in 
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the case of one of the two least integrated participants) to 11 years (in the case of the two 
most integrated participants). 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations and Regression Analysis 
 Appendix B gives correlations among variables in the student group.  For the DID 
group, Table 5 gives correlations among memory variables.  MCQ scores on the shared 
and unshared memories were highly correlated, as would be expected from an individual 
differences perspective.  Also note the pattern of correlations that shows that 
performances on the first (neutral) and third (happy) vignettes were related to each other, 
while the measures of the second vignette (fear) did not correlate highly with either 
Vignette 1 or Vignette 3.  As in Figure 2, the DID participants seemed to be performing 
particularly badly on the fear vignette.  Examining the correlations further, note that, for 
Vignettes 1 and 3, the number of multiple choice items correct was highly correlated with 
Figure 6. 
Relationship Between Integration Score on IM and Number of 
Session 1 Switches 
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the summaries for those vignettes.  For the first story, the correlation between the two 
measures was .74, and for the third story it was .75.  However, for the second story, the 
correlation between multiple choice items and summarizing was only .14.  The 11 DID 
participants scored worse on the multiple choice measure for the second vignette than 
they did on the summarizing measure for that vignette.  Constructing a 95% confidence 
interval around the difference between the correlations for the first and second story (.74 
- .14 = .60) using Fisher’s Z showed that the difference was within the confidence 
interval and so therefore the null hypothesis that the correlations were not different was 
retained.  In other words, .74 was not statistically different from .14 at an alpha level of 
.05, so performances on the first versus the second story were not statistically different.  
Although sample size may have affected this result, possible interpretations will be 
discussed in the next chapter.      
  
Table 5. 
Pearson’s Correlations Among Memory Variables in DID group  
Note:  All reported significance levels (Sig .) are 2-tailed. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 Vig1 
Sumry 
Vig1 
Crct 
Vig2 
Sumry 
Vig2 
Crct 
Vig3 
Sumry 
Vig3 
Crct 
shared 
MCQ 
unshared 
MCQ 
r 
.533 -.002 .305 .138 .315 .113 .218 .413 Words 
Recalled Sig . 
.091 .996 .362 .685 .345 .741 .520 .207 
r 1 .741(**) .405 .043 .791(**) .625(*) .130 .272 Vignette 1 
Summary 
(neutral) Sig .  .009 .216 .901 .004 .040 .704 .418 
r 
 1 .172 -.082 .595 .438 .033 -.077 Vignette 1 
Correct 
(neutral) Sig .   .612 .812 .053 .178 .924 .822 
r 
  1 .136 .269 -.049 -.175 .410 Vignette 2 
Summary 
(fear) Sig .    .689 .424 .886 .608 .210 
r 
   1 .010 .363 .260 .403 Vignette 2 
Correct 
(fear) Sig .     .977 .272 .441 .219 
r 
    1 .746(**) .310 .496 Vignette 3 
Summary 
(happy) Sig .      .008 .353 .121 
r 
     1 .227 .309 Vignette 3 
Correct 
(happy) Sig .       .503 .355 
r 
      1 .738(**) shared 
MCQ Sig . 
       .010 
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 Table 6 gives correlations among trauma variables, integration, switching, and 
aspects of the shared and unshared memories in the DID group.  The measures of trauma 
were highly correlated with each other but they were not highly correlated with the 
integration score.  It is possible that the instrument is not a good measure of integration, 
and it is also possible that there is a complex relationship between these two variables, 
one that changes over time and from person to person.  The correlations, though small, 
were in the anticipated direction.  Arguably, integration should  be related not to amount 
of experienced trauma within this sample, but rather related in a non-linear way to some 
measure of healing, for example, number of years of therapy.  The Pearson’s correlation 
between these two variables is .22, p = .549.  Figure 7 demonstrates that the relationship 
of therapy to integration is far from a simple one.  Future research should aim to more 
fully understand this relationship. 
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Table 6. 
Pearson’s Correlations Among Trauma, Integration, Switching, and Shared/Unshared Memories in DID Group 
 
 
adult 
trauma 
HiBT 
child 
HiBT 
adult 
HiBT 
life Integration 
How 
long 
ago 
was 
shared 
memory 
How long 
ago was 
unshared 
memory 
% of alters 
who know 
about the 
shared 
memory 
% of alters 
who know 
about the 
unshared 
memory 
# of reported 
switches in 
session 1 
r 
.144 .855(**) .226 .567 -.010 -.361 -.637(*) .406 -.097 .281 childtma 
  Sig .  
.691 .002 .530 .087 .978 .305 .048 .367 .836 .432 
r 1 .359 .979(**) .824(**) .001 .568 -.259 -.494 .463 .696(*) adulttma 
  Sig .  
. .308 .000 .003 .997 .087 .469 .260 .296 .025 
r 
 1 .499 .819(**) -.241 -.062 -.309 .186 -.104 .523 HiBTchild 
  Sig .  
 . .142 .004 .502 .864 .385 .690 .825 .121 
r 
  1 .906(**) -.124 .534 -.233 -.460 .436 .758(*) HiBTadult 
  Sig .  
  . .000 .733 .112 .517 .299 .328 .011 
r 
   1 -.200 .323 -.305 -.403 .394 .758(*) HiBTlife 
  Sig .  
   . .580 .362 .391 .370 .382 .011 
r 
    1 -.158 -.170 -.380 -.017 -.182 Integration 
  Sig .  
    . .643 .617 .353 .969 .593 
r 
     1 .534 -.819(*) -.165 .087 How long 
ago was 
shared 
memory 
Sig .  
     . .090 .013 .697 .800 
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Table 6, continued. 
 
 
      
How long 
ago was 
unshared 
memory 
% of alters 
who know 
about the 
shared 
memory 
% of alters who 
know about the 
unshared 
memory 
# of 
reported 
switches in 
session 1 
r 
      1 -.540 -.419 -.243 How long 
ago was 
unshared 
memory 
  
Sig .  
      . .167 .302 .472 
r 
       1 .251 -.010 % of alters 
who know 
about the 
shared 
memory 
  
Sig .  
       . .549 .981 
r 
        1 .117 % of alters 
who know 
about the 
unshared 
memory 
  
Sig .  
        . .782 
Note:  All reported significance levels (Sig .) are 2-tailed. 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Within the DID group, another interesting finding was the correlation of -.82 (p < 
.02) between how long ago the event that formed the shared memory took place and 
percentage of alters who knew about that memory.  The longer ago the memory was 
formed, the fewer alters knew about it.  This relationship is consistent with theories about 
how and why alters are formed.  It may be that events from long ago took place before 
some of the alters came into existence.  It may also be that memories from distant events 
were formed during a traumatic period of participants’ lives, and therefore those 
memories are more isolated within the knowledge system than are more recent memories.  
Shared memories in this group recounted events that reportedly took place an average of 
over 14 years ago.  Unshared memories that DID participants chose to write about took 
place an average of over 11 years ago.  In most participants, most of their alters knew 
about the events they chose to report. 
Finally, regression analyses were performed in order to understand more fully the 
observed correlation of .76 (p < .02) between lifetime amount of high betrayal trauma and 
number of reported switches in the first session.  Overall, lifetime high betrayal trauma 
emerged as the best predictor of switching.  Childhood high betrayal trauma and adult 
high betrayal trauma were both highly correlated with each other and with lifetime 
incidence, so therefore only lifetime betrayal trauma was entered.  Adding any other 
variables to the regression reduced its predictive ability (see Table 7).  Several other 
variables were also correlated with switching, such as how long ago the unshared 
memory took place (r = -.24, p = .472), but these did not turn out to be helpful predictors.  
The mean time the DID participants took to produce memories in response to cue words 
during the Crovitz task had a correlation of .32 with switching (p = .599), but this 
variable could not be entered in regression equations because it was collinear with the 
trauma measures and because there were Crovitz RT data for only five participants.  
Switching was also positively related to RT in procedural learning, r = .66, p = .223.  
Because this relationship was based on only five participants, neither of the RT variables 
could be entered into a regression analysis.  Nevertheless, together they imply that 
frequent switching slows reaction time.         
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Table 7. 
Regression Models Predicting Number of Reported Switches in Session 1 
 
Model 
Number 
Adjusted 
R2 
F Predictors Zero-order 
r 
Tolerances Squared 
Semi-
partial r 
1 .52 10.77** HiBTlife .76** 1.00 .57** 
HiBTlife .76* .96 .53* 
2 .46 4.83* 
Integration -.23 .96 .01 
HiBTlife .76* .85 .47* 
Integration -.23 .93 .01 3 .37 2.76 
Unshared 
Ago 
-.22 .88 .00 
Note: ** p < .02, * p < .05.  All models include a constant as one of the predictors. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Demographics 
The participants in this study were 11 women with DID and 13 women who were 
university students.  These students were not matched with the DID sample on age, 
psychiatric diagnoses, trauma history, or other demographic variables; they were included 
as a baseline measurement of “normal,” non-dissociative responses to the experimental 
tasks.  Participants were, however, matched on gender, which was important given the 
different rates of betrayal trauma and dissociative disorders between the genders.   
Consistent with the etiological literature on DID, the DID group reported very 
high levels of all kinds of trauma that were measured, including trauma in childhood.  
Freyd’s (1994, 1996) betrayal trauma (BT) theory proposes that for children who are 
abused and betrayed by the caregivers upon whom they depend for attachment 
relationships, it is adaptive to remain unaware of the abuse in order to preserve the 
relationship.  Dissociation is one way to keep relationship-threatening information out of 
conscious awareness and memory.  Betrayal trauma in childhood is a major contributor to 
the development of DID (e.g., Chu & Dill, 1990; Draijer & Langeland, 1999; Kisiel & 
Lyons, 2001), and the DID group did report much higher levels of childhood BT than did 
the student group.  The effect sizes for trauma endorsement were very large, ranging from 
2.30 to 4.52, with the largest effect size being the difference between the student and DID 
groups on amount of childhood BT.   
 Probably due to this extensive trauma history, participants with DID were unable 
to listen to two of the five stories that were originally written for the vignette memory 
task, and the stories had to be removed, leaving three that were analyzed for this 
dissertation.  All five stories were approved by a university institutional review board 
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(IRB) and by a psychiatric hospital IRB for use in their DID population, and the stories 
had also been cleared with the director of the trauma and dissociation unit at the hospital, 
who was Chief of Hospital Clinical Services.  All five stories had also been heard by a 
pilot group of university students, both male and female, whose data were not analyzed 
for this dissertation.  However, the staff members who worked in the trauma and 
dissociation unit instantly vetoed one story that included both fear and betrayal because 
of its child abuse content.  The other story, which included betrayal with sexual overtones 
but no fear, incurred debate and was piloted with a dissociative trauma survivor in order 
to ascertain its appropriateness.  This person (whose data were not analyzed for this 
dissertation) became upset when she heard this story, and it was removed for all future 
participants.   
Memory Results 
Autobiographical Memory 
 In this study, data about reaction times (RTs) to produce autobiographical 
memories were collected from five DID participants (mean age = 41) and 13 university 
students (mean age = 23).  The student participants were, on average, approximately 18 
years younger than were the DID participants, yet the DID participants had faster RTs.  
This finding was unexpected both because RT generally increases with age, and because 
it contradicted a previous study.       
 Schacter and colleagues (1989) studied one 25-year-old woman, called I.C., who 
had been diagnosed with multiple personalities not long before the experiment.  In the 
unconstrained version of the Crovitz task, in which participants could generate memories 
from any point in time, I.C. showed a very large recency bias.  The authors speculate that 
one explanation for this bias could be the short amount of time that had elapsed since the 
life-changing event of being hospitalized due to multiple personalities for the first time 
(Schacter, et al., 1989).  It is possible, moreover, that I.C. either was an atypical case of 
multiple personalities, or that she was merely displaying an individual difference in RT. 
 Importantly, Schacter and colleagues (1989) only tested memory in one alter, the 
host, because other alters would not appear for the experiment on command.  The current 
study, in contrast, usually tested several alters for each DID participant, the choice of 
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switching being up to the participant.  Also, while I.C. was slower than a college-age 
control group to produce memories both overall and in response to nouns, she was 
actually faster than controls at responding to affective cues in the unconstrained 
condition.  In the present study, which was unconstrained, participants could generate 
memories from any period in their lives, but all the cues were affectively neutral nouns.  
Therefore it is impossible to compare RT results for affective cue words across these two 
experiments.  
In addition, although I.C. was slower than her control group, Schacter and 
colleagues (1989) did cite a study in their paper that found that a control group had RTs 
very close to those of a DID participant.  The Schacter study also found that both I.C. and 
the control group had RTs longer than were found for any participants in the current 
study.  This effect was probably due to the greater number and specificity of cues used by 
Schacter and colleagues, and may also have been affected by the various constrained 
conditions that made that experiment more difficult.  For example, in Schacter’s 
condition where participants had to produce memories from before their 12th birthdays, 
only 86% of cues led to memories for the control group.  I.C. was only able to produce 
memories from before age 12 in response to 21% of the cues.  In this under-12 condition, 
100% of IC’s memories came from ages 10-12, while only 33% of controls’ did.  I.C. 
also reported that most of the memories she reported in the under-12 condition were ones 
she discovered for the first time when she heard the cue.  In fact, I.C. could not recall 
anything at all from before age 10, and her first memory of her father was from age 16 
(Schacter, et al., 1989).  However, because I.C. was the only alter who participated in the 
experiment, these memories were most likely being held inaccessible by other alters; I.C. 
may not even have existed as an entity for some of the participant’s childhood and would 
hence be unable to remember it.    
Why were DID participants in this dissertation faster to produce memories than 
were the young adult students?  Because data come from only five DID participants, the 
effect could be just noise in the data.  However, the effect size was large.  Within the DID 
group, RT to produce and share memories in response to cue words was highly correlated 
with total memory score on the MCQ for the shared memory (r = .81).  In the student 
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control group, this correlation was smaller (r = .26).  Previous research, discussed in 
chapter 3, has shown that under certain conditions, high dissociators have an advantage 
over low dissociators in allocating attention.  Abuse survivors may also have an 
advantage over non-survivors in some memory situations (see Cloitre, Cancienne, 
Brodsky, Dulit, & Perry, 1996).  Further research is necessary in order to untangle these 
possible relationships.  
In the five members of the DID group for whom RT data were analyzed, RT to 
produce autobiographical memories was highly correlated with childhood high betrayal 
trauma (r = .93) and with DES score (r = .62).  These findings are in accord with the 
general literature about how DID develops, and with betrayal trauma theory.  The more 
high-betrayal events, such as abuse, that are experienced in childhood, the greater is the 
motivation to isolate autobiographical episodic memories from awareness.  The 
fragmenting of memory that occurs in order to survive severe abuse can also affect 
memory performance in general.  More betrayal and abuse in childhood therefore lead to 
more dissociation, which leads to more difficulty in accessing autobiographical episodic 
memories.  Although the correlational nature of these results precludes causal inferences, 
this explanation is consistent with previous knowledge and findings about trauma, 
memory, and dissociation.   
In the DID participants, RT to produce autobiographical memories was also 
highly correlated with percentage of alters who knew about the shared memory (r = .88).  
This result too is consistent with phenomenological reports from people with DID in 
general and from the participants of this study in particular.  The more alters who know 
about an event, the more voices there are to contribute their points of view and the longer 
it takes to sort them all out and decide who will speak for the group. 
Word List Recall 
 The DID group and the university student group did not differ on number of 
words recalled.  Participants from both groups reported during the second session that 
they used similar techniques for remembering the words, such as constructing mental 
images of the objects and settings interacting with each other.  The generally good 
performance on this task by the DID group is not surprising, given that all the stimuli 
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were neutral words and therefore there would be no motivation to separate awareness of 
them from consciousness.    
Memory for Vignettes 
Examining the story summaries, the DID participants overall performed slightly 
worse than the student participants, but the effect size was small.  There were also no 
differences among the three stories for either group.  On the multiple choice items, the 
DID group also did worse than did the student group, though again the effect size was 
small.  For the multiple choice items, however, differential performance according to 
emotional valence emerged in the DID group.  DID participants performed less well on 
questions about the fear vignette than they had on questions about the neutral vignette.  
Additionally, for the neutral and happy vignettes, the number of multiple choice items 
correct was highly correlated with the summaries for those vignettes.  In contrast, for the 
second story the correlation between multiple choice items and summarizing was much 
lower.  The 11 DID participants scored worse on the multiple choice measure for the 
second vignette than they did on the summarizing measure for that vignette.  The dip in 
DID participants’ multiple choice performance for the second vignette, which contained 
fear, was not present in the student participants.  This evidence, taken together, suggests 
that although both groups were equally good at recalling the gist of all three stories, the 
DID participants had trouble remembering details, especially in the fearful story. 
This pattern of results is consistent with the DID participants’ verbal reports given 
during Session 2.  They reported being more distracted during the second story and 
giving less attention to the details because they were either “spaced out,” trying not to 
switch, actively switching, or having internal dialog in order for older alters to reassure 
younger ones.  Putnam (1994) suggested that during the switch process, participants’ 
abilities to observe stimuli, to learn, and to form new memories are impaired.  Further 
research is needed in order to more fully understand the triggers and effect of switching.  
Future research should also explore a broader range of emotions and situations in the 
construction of memory stimuli. 
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Procedural Learning 
 Somewhat unexpectedly, the five DID participants improved more than did the 
student group on percentage of words read correctly, and the effect size was moderate, d 
= .65.  Previous research has found that many kinds of procedural learning are spared in 
cases of amnesia (Cavaco, Anderson, J. S. Allen, Castro-Caldas, & Damasio, 2004).  One 
other study found that in adolescent psychiatric inpatients, performance on the procedural 
task of the Tower of Toronto was unexpectedly related to scores on the adolescent 
version of the DES (Prohl, Resch, Parzer, & Brunner, 2001).  This result cannot be taken 
with certainty though, because the measurement of procedural memory in that study may 
have been confounded with declarative memory (Prohl, et al., 2001).   
Also confounding the study of procedural memory and dissociation, Dick-Barnes 
and colleagues (1987) reported transfer of learning among three alters in a pursuit rotor 
task, thereby conflating procedural learning and motors skills, in a study of a single 
participant who had integrated at least once before.  Nissen and colleagues (1988) 
demonstrated transfer of learning across amnesic alters using a serial RT task, but did not 
statistically assess this result.  Huntjens and colleagues also used a serial RT task, in 
which 27 DID participants, who had also participated in Huntjens’ other experiments, 
pressed one of four computer keys in response to cues that followed an unobtrusively 
repeating sequence (Huntjens, Postma, Woertman, van der Hart, & Peters, 2005).  The 
DID participants overall had longer RTs than did student participants and participants 
instructed to simulate DID.  The pattern of RTs in DID participants did demonstrate 
inter-identity amnesia, but the authors concluded that this demonstration was 
unconvincing because simulators were able to mimic the pattern of results (Huntjens, 
Postma, et al., 2005).   
In the current experiment, the procedural learning task was not confounded with 
motor skills.  The stimuli included neutral words and mildly negative words, but overall 
the task was relatively affectively neutral.  Some members of both the student and the 
DID group reported that they viewed the task as a challenge or game, and some members 
of both groups reported frustration with the task.  It is possible that the DID group was 
more able than the student group to concentrate on the task or to allocate their attention.  
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Because these results are based on a small number of participants, and because very little 
research has empirically examined procedural learning in DID, more studies are 
necessary before definitive conclusions can be drawn.  
Shareability Results 
 Shareability theory (Freyd, 1983) predicts that unshared memories would be more 
sensory than shared memories.  This prediction was not supported.  Across groups, the 
shared and unshared memories did not differ on amount of visual detail, sound, smell, 
touch, or taste.  Looking only within the DID group, however, the unshared memories did 
include significantly more taste imagery than did the shared memories, with a large effect 
size.   
Shareability theory would also predict that, compared to unshared memories, 
shared memories might be less confusing or more comprehensible, and better connected 
with surrounding memories.  Neither of these predictions was supported in either the total 
sample or within the DID group only.  As in other analyses, observed power was very 
low, at best less than a 50% chance of detecting an effect.  Further research with a larger 
sample size would increase the effectiveness of these analyses. 
 The student group had higher total MCQ scores than did the DID group on both 
shared and unshared memories, indicating better memory, more vividness, and better 
connection of the memory to related memories.  The difference between the student 
participants and the DID participants was smaller for the unshared memories than for the 
shared memories.  The interaction of group by sharing may need to be investigated in 
future research, as the power for this analysis was low.  For both the shared and unshared 
memories, differences between the two groups had medium to large effect sizes.  Further 
research should attempt to replicate or refine these results.  No differences emerged 
between the groups or between the shared and unshared memories regarding whether the 
memories were emotionally positive or negative.  This similarity was probably a function 
of participants’ choice of unshared memories that they felt comfortable writing down in 
front of a stranger. 
Within the DID group, another interesting finding was the strongly negative 
correlation between how long ago the event that formed the shared memory took place 
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and the percentage of alters who knew about that memory.  The longer ago the memory 
was formed, the fewer alters knew about it.  This relationship is consistent with theories 
about how and why alters are formed.  It may be that events from long ago took place 
before some of the alters came into existence.  It may also be that memories from distant 
events were formed during a traumatic period of participants’ lives, and therefore those 
memories are more isolated within the knowledge system than are more recent memories.  
In most participants, most of their alters knew about the events they chose to report. 
Switching 
Switching between alters has been reported to take anywhere from a few seconds 
(Putnam, et al., 1986) to 30 seconds (Tsai, et al., 1999) to brief times less than two to five 
minutes (Huntjens, et al., 2003; Peters, et al., 1998; Putnam, et al., 1986) to ten minutes 
(Putnam, 1994).  However, the switches that occurred during this study were rapid and 
appeared instantaneous.  Some switches were readily apparent, while others were not, but 
for the most part the DID participants were able to identify when they had switched in the 
previous session.          
Participants who can switch among alters at will provide unique opportunities to 
study memory and amnesia.  People with DID who have more executive control over 
their switching than did these 11 participants will be more able to participate in memory 
studies such as those conducted by Eich and colleagues (1997a, 1997b).  Although 
neither of the RT variables from this study could be entered into a regression analysis, the 
overall pattern of results also implies that frequent switching slows reaction time, which 
is in accord with some previous research.  Very little research has explored reaction time 
in DID participants or compared these RTs with appropriate control participants for a 
variety of tasks (one exception is work by Dorahy and colleagues).  Putnam (1994) 
suggested that during the switch process, participants’ abilities to observe stimuli, to 
learn, and to form new memories are impaired.  Therefore, future research using methods 
and stimuli similar to those in this study should employ an additional control group of 
non-clinical high dissociators in order to compare the results of dissociation without 
identity fragmentation or switching to the results obtained in this study and to future 
studies of switching and reaction time. 
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In this study, switching was closely related to lifetime high betrayal trauma.  In 
regression analysis, lifetime high betrayal trauma emerged as the best predictor of 
switching, even better than integration.  Childhood high betrayal trauma and adult high 
betrayal trauma were both highly correlated with each other and with lifetime incidence.  
Adding any variables besides trauma to the regression reduced its predictive ability.       
Integration Measure (IM) 
 The author generated the items on the IM (see Appendix A) from a thorough 
knowledge of the DID literature and from the extensive clinical experience of Dr. James 
Chu, with some input from clinician Pamela Birrell, Ph.D.  This study marks the first 
time that this or any measure has attempted to quantify or classify integration in a 
standardized fashion.  Although only items 5 through 9 were analyzed for this 
dissertation, there is still much information to be gleaned from an examination of 
participants’ answers to the open-ended questions.   
The measures of trauma in this study were highly correlated with each other, but 
they were not highly correlated with the integration score, although the correlations were 
in the anticipated direction of more trauma leading to less integration.  Arguably, 
integration should  be related not to amount of experienced trauma within this sample, 
but rather related in a non-linear way to some measure of healing, for example, number 
of years of therapy.  Figure 7 demonstrates that the relationship of therapy to integration 
is far from a simple one.  The present study did not ask about type or quality of therapy, 
only length, and there is some evidence, as discussed in Chapter 1, that suboptimal 
therapy for DID clients leads to continuing fragmentation and even more distress.   
Scores on the integration subscale of the IM were apparently related to number of 
reported switches in Session 1.  Figure 6 is the scatterplot of this relationship with two fit 
lines overlaid, a quadratic and a cubic.  The quadratic and cubic lines both fit the data 
well (R2 are .54 and .76, respectively).  Although this plot is based on only 11 
participants, either a quadratic and a cubic relationship between these variables is 
plausible based on the previous literature about DID.  The quadratic relationship would 
imply that there is a U-shaped curve such that very fragmented people report many 
switches exactly because they are so fragmented, while very integrated people with DID 
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report many switches because their increasing integration leads to an increasing ability to 
be aware of and remember the switches.  People in the middle of the curve may have 
fewer switches than do these two groups because they are more controlled in their daily 
functioning than are the less integrated people, but do not have as much awareness of 
their switching as have the more integrated people.  If this relationship between switching 
and integration is supported, it would also explain why the cubic curve fits so well.  In a 
cubic relationship, the two variables would start with the quadratic relationship just 
described.  The number of switches would then decrease towards zero as participants 
became more and more integrated, until eventually there were fewer alters to switch 
among, possibly leading to a single, fully-integrated personality.   
Because these results are preliminary, this area is rich with opportunities for 
future research that will illuminate the relationship between these two complex variables.  
The scientific examination and measurement of switching and integration has just begun.  
It is clear from this and other studies that switching among alters in DID participants can 
affect functioning in many ways, and memory studies that do not address these variables 
cannot provide a complete picture of memory functioning in DID.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation of this study is its lack of a genuine control group.  The student 
participants were essential to the research because their responses provided a baseline 
measure of “normal” performance on the memory tasks and enabled the procedure to be 
refined.  Without this group, for example, it would have been impossible to know 
whether the observed decline in memory for details of the fearful story was to be 
expected of most people, or whether it was related to the characteristics of the DID 
participants only. 
As previously noted, the students did differ from the DID participants in several 
ways.  They were younger and more homogenous in age, education level, and physical 
location than were the DID participants, although they were matched on gender.  The 
students were also all functioning at a high level because they were in college, while 
some of the DID participants were on disability leave.  Further, the student participants 
reported no dissociative diagnoses.  As previously noted, a few reported depression and 
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one reported PTSD, which had been treated.  In contrast, the DID participants often had 
numerous diagnoses, and some of them were simultaneously taking several psychiatric 
medications.  In addition to having lower dissociation scores, the student group also 
reported much less trauma history than did the DID participants.  Trauma itself may 
affect information processing, but it is difficult to separate the contributions of trauma 
from those of dissociation.  All people with DID have had significant trauma in their 
lives, and many people with significant amounts of trauma show at least some 
dissociation.       
Other types of control groups are possible for this type of experiment.  For 
example, including a group of highly traumatized participants with PTSD but not DID 
would be one step towards separating the effects of trauma from those of dissociation; 
however, it would not be a perfect solution to the problem because PTSD also includes 
dissociative symptoms.  It is also important to note that specific trauma history may also 
vary widely between these two groups.  High levels of betrayal may lead specifically to 
dissociation, while high levels of terror or fear of bodily harm may lead specifically to the 
intrusion symptoms of PTSD (e.g., Freyd, 1996).    
Comparing the DID participants in this study to a hypothetical group of PTSD 
participants, I believe that the experimental results would be similar in some ways and 
different in others.  Specifically, I hypothesize that PTSD participants’ memory 
performance will be worse than normal, but their overall autobiographical memory will 
not be reduced compared to the student group, as was the DID group’s.  Unlike the DID 
group, the PTSD group probably would not display difficulty answering questions about 
the fearful story, unless the stories happened to relate to their personal experiences of 
trauma.  A group of PTSD participants might, however, display differences between 
shared and unshared memories that the student group did not, as people with PTSD often 
have difficulty putting their experiences into words (van der Kolk, 1996). 
Additional psychiatric control groups might include participants with a 
completely non-dissociative diagnosis such as major depression, participants with 
schizophrenia, which shares Schneiderian first-rank symptoms with DID (e.g., Kluft, 
1987), or participants with other dissociative disorders such as simple dissociative 
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amnesia.  With these additional groups, it would be possible to match the DID 
participants with controls on the basis of amount of impairment, psychiatric medication 
usage, length of therapy, number of hospitalizations, and possibly on amount of trauma.  
Ultimately, however, only the examination of DID participants will reveal knowledge of 
what the experience of DID is like.     
This study bases its conclusions on data collected from 11 participants with DID.  
Much of the previous research on DID has used samples of one to five participants (e.g., 
Nissen, et al., 1988; Loewenstein, Hamilton, Alagna, Reid, & deVries, 1987; Peters, et 
al., 1998; Schacter, et al., 1989; Tsai, et al., 1999), so having a sample this size is not 
unusual in this field.  However, an N of 11 does limit the amount of inferential statistical 
tests that can meaningfully be performed.  The small number of participants meant that 
observed power was very low in many of the analyses, in some cases having less than a 
50% chance of detecting a legitimate effect.  Low power was a particular issue in the 
shareability analyses; no strong conclusions can be drawn from their results.  In the 
future, dividing the concepts of interest into several smaller, more focused studies should 
alleviate some of these problems.  Furthermore, if future studies also have small sample 
sizes, a replication of the current results in a different sample would support the 
interpretations made here even if the results of future studies were also not statistically 
significant.  
Performing a large number of statistical analyses relative to the number of 
participants also raises the probability of a Type I error.  Type I errors consist of 
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis by finding spuriously significant results.  These 
errors are more likely to arise in exploratory than in narrowly hypothesis-driven studies.  
The Bonferroni statistical correction can correct for Type I errors, but unfortunately it 
also reduces power, which is already low in this study due.  Therefore, rather than 
focusing on specific alpha levels to determine statistical significance, this study instead 
interprets trends and gives effect sizes as a guide to the magnitude of the effects found, 
independent of statistical significance.  This interpretive approach is in line with recent 
thinking about the misuse of p-values and null hypothesis significance testing (e.g., 
Kline, 2004).  Because this study was designed to be exploratory, its main objective is not 
  
109
to achieve statistical significance but rather to assess general patterns of results, thereby 
opening the door for more focused research in the future.    
Future research will further explore shareability and memory in DID participants.  
Planned modifications to the research design include more empirical control over sharing, 
by providing different types of stimuli to be shared in different ways among alters.  
Experimental control over sharing of information among alters will be enhanced by the 
use of a different sample of DID participants, who are more able to control their 
switching and to have specific alters appear at will.  The process of increasing executive 
control over switching and information sharing is facilitated by competent 
psychotherapy.  Although this process takes time and effort to develop, it is a key step 
towards a more functional system and perhaps towards eventual integration.  Future 
research will also incorporate measurements of empathic accuracy and perspective-
taking, as well as attachment relationships between alters.   
This study also examined self-reported switching.  One drawback to this approach 
is that it was not an on-line measure of switching; that is, reports of switching relied on 
participants’ memory and awareness of their own switching.  At least two of the 
participants reported that they were not always sure of when they had switched or of 
which alter was present.  Ideally, measures of switching and integration must be able to 
distinguish the construct being measured from meta-awareness of the phenomenon itself.  
Future research will assess more objective measures of switching, for example a 
combination of EEG measurements and reports from the participants’ therapists.  As 
Hopper and colleagues (2001) and other researchers have noted, there can be verifiable, 
robust differences among alters on physiological measurements, which would enable 
researchers to examine when switches occurred in a laboratory setting.  Furthermore, the 
second author of the Hopper and colleagues paper has reported that EEG readings 
fluctuate wildly at the moment of switching (personal communication).  A case study 
from 1975 also demonstrated that switching between alters was associated with 
bradycardia and extremely slow breathing, as well as a temporary drop in skin 
conductance (Bahnson & Smith, 1975).  Additionally, experienced therapists develop 
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sensitivity to switching in their DID clients who receive therapy for extended periods of 
time, and can often distinguish one alter from another before they are told.   
Another promising technique is experience sampling, which has been used in 
other domains for years but has only once been applied to studying DID (Loewenstein, et 
al., 1987).  Experience sampling uses a beeper or personal digital assistant to send signals 
to participants at random times over a period of several days as they go about their daily 
lives.  Upon receiving the signal, participants fill out a questionnaire noting what they are 
doing at that moment.  Loewenstein and colleagues (1987) used this technique to study 
switching in a female inpatient with DID.  They found that the differences among alters 
in mood, handwriting, and motivation were as large and consistent as the differences 
found among different people.  They further found that the experience sampling method 
of on-line assessment provided information that was at odds with the information the 
participant reported to her therapist (Loewenstein, et al., 1987).  With improvements in 
technology and computer resources since the 1980s and 90s, this type of study has 
become easier to conduct.  Although it would be somewhat resource-intensive, future 
studies of switching in DID should investigate the use of experience sampling. 
This technique might also be one way to validate Putnam’s (1994) statements that 
evidence of the internal hierarchical organization of the alters can be seen in the patterns 
of which alters tend to switch to each other.  Almost without exception, people with DID 
report that their alters are organized into groups, that some groups communicate with 
each other while others do not, that some groups watch out for others, and that some 
alters are “gatekeepers” or “spokespersons” who control which alters are present.  
Putnam (1994) reported that certain alters are more likely to come out when preceded by 
specific others, and that some alters have a tendency to be followed by specific others.  
Moreover, Putnam (1994) also reported preliminary results showing that each alter’s 
physiology may be affected by the alters that precede him or her, making it difficult to 
determine what should be regarded as a baseline measurement and therefore potentially 
confounding results.  Putnam appears not to have followed up on this intriguing finding 
or methodological application, having published only one empirical paper about 
switching (Putnam, 1988). 
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The results of this dissertation research imply that frequent switching may slow 
reaction time for a variety of tasks.  Switching may also affect the ability to allocate 
attention, and future research will examine this area further.  Divided attention tasks can 
be stressful for participants, but there is some evidence that dissociative responses to 
stress may lower physiological arousal (e.g., Williams, Haines, & Sale, 2003).  I propose 
a study of physiological and self-reported stress responses in low dissociators, high 
nonclinical dissociators, and people with diagnosed dissociative disorders, using a task 
that includes emotionally salient stimuli and requires divided attention.  I hypothesize 
that the three groups will show distinctly different patterns of stress responses.  As task 
difficulty increases, all three groups will show an initial increase in both self-reported and 
physiological stress, with the nonclinical high dissociators then showing a decrease in 
self-reported stress, and the diagnosed group showing a decrease in both measures of 
stress.  This information about responses to stress has implications for other clinical 
conditions, as well as for the study of normal coping mechanisms. 
Further physiological techniques may provide a bridge between cognitive 
measures of dissociation and social assessments of the self.  Gray and colleagues (2004) 
found that the P300 evoked potential can measure how self-relevant a stimulus is: 
attention to one’s own name buried in a list of other names, for example, or other self-
relevant stimuli such as one’s high school.  This effect occurs even when one’s self is not 
relevant to the current task.  I propose that, in future research, event-related potentials 
should be used to investigate dissociative barriers and interconnections among alters in 
DID.  That is, will this P300 self-relevance effect occur if the stimulus is relevant to a self 
that is not present?  I hypothesize that, unlike non-diagnosed participants, participants 
with DID will show augmented P300 responses to both self-relevant and other-relevant 
stimuli, when the other-relevant stimuli are self-relevant for a closely related alter.  Based 
on the closeness of the organizational relationship, the effect should be smaller for alters 
that are more fragmented from each other, and larger for alters that share some amount of 
co-consciousness.  A pilot study can assess the robustness of the published effect by 
testing trained actors performing as themselves and as other characters. 
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The current study is also groundbreaking in its development of the Integration 
Measure.  Planned research in the future will attempt to revise and refine this measure, 
and to acquire norms that will enable the IM to distinguish among polyfragmented 
multiples, multiples with only a few alters, fully integrated multiples, and people with 
other clinical conditions involving some degree of dissociation, such as dissociative 
disorder not otherwise specified, dissociative fugue, and borderline personality disorder.  
At least one large-scale study is necessary for robust item analysis, and further 
replications will employ factor analysis techniques.  Table 8 summarizes the main 
findings of this dissertation, and the next chapter will examine how to apply the insights 
gained from conducting this study to future research with DID samples. 
 
 
Table 8. 
Summary of Main Findings. 
• DID participants reported very high levels of trauma, including betrayal trauma in 
childhood. 
• DID participants were faster than student participants to produce autobiographical 
memories in response to cue words, and RT in the DID group was highly correlated with 
childhood betrayal trauma. 
• DID participants performed just as well as did student control participants on the 
number of words recalled from a list, and outperformed students on the number of words 
read correctly in a procedural learning task. 
• In memory for stories, the DID participants recalled the gist of all three stories equally 
well, but were less able to answer detailed questions about the story containing fear. 
• This study was the first to examine shareability in DID, although predictions were not 
supported with the current methods.  The longer ago a shared memory was formed, the 
fewer alters knew about it. 
• The methodology of this study was unique with regard to switching among alters.  DID 
participants switched freely during both sessions.  Switching was related to lifetime 
experience of betrayal trauma.  Frequent switching may slow RT, and future research 
should investigate switching in more detail. 
• This study also introduced the IM, which is the first standardized measure of integration 
in DID.  It provided preliminary results about integration and its potentially complex 
relationship with switching.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
ADVICE FOR RESEARCHERS NEW TO THE FIELD OF DISSOCIATION 
 
 
 This section addresses the ethics and logistics involved in selecting and 
implementing research methodology with dissociative identity disorder (DID) samples.  
It is based on the experience of conducting this research project.  Some of the information 
included in this section would have been helpful to know before the experiment was 
designed, rather than having to discover it during the course of the study.  The advice 
contained herein is necessarily a snapshot in time, created from situations encountered or 
considered during this research project.  However, the section has also benefited greatly 
from the insights and suggestions of the Freyd Dynamics Lab at the University of 
Oregon.  This section is written for an audience that has conducted research in 
psychology, but whose members may not have much experience studying DID.  The 
situations discussed pertain most directly to research in a university, clinic, or hospital 
setting, rather than a facility such as a prison, which brings additional restrictions.  All of 
the advice pertains to research with adult participants.     
Designing and Implementing the Study 
As in any fieldwork conducted in a population of which one is not a member, it 
may be useful to have consultants or collaborators from that population.  If possible, 
researchers should have someone with DID aid in the process at the 
conceptualization/design phase, or speak with a consultant who had DID in the past.  
Researchers who lack experience in the areas of childhood sexual abuse, trauma, and/or 
dissociation may seek an experienced collaborator who will know how to get around 
many potential pitfalls and who can help institutional review boards (IRBs) and granting 
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agencies feel that the researchers are qualified to conduct the study.  Working carefully 
with collaborators from the site where data collection will occur can enable researchers to 
better estimate which stimuli and techniques work best in that particular population. 
IRBs may not be well educated about research on sexual abuse survivors, and it may be 
necessary to provide information about such topics as prevalence of sexual abuse and 
trauma, as well as normal or commonly accepted research methods in dissociation 
research.  Below is an excerpt that was used in two full-review IRB applications, one for 
a university IRB and one for a psychiatric hospital IRB.  Its definition of trauma and 
dissociation as public health issues is also attractive to granting agencies.   
 
Benefits to science and humanity:  Highly dissociative individuals often 
have an extensive history of traumatic experiences.  Therefore, the 
research also has the potential to affect how science understands human 
responses to emotional trauma, how we define “normal” responses to 
trauma, and the study of individual differences in responses to trauma.  
Given the high rates of trauma experienced by the general U.S. population, 
a more thorough understanding of its effects is vital. 
  
The protocols that used this text were both conditionally approved on their first review, 
which speaks highly of the effectiveness of including education about basic principles of 
trauma and dissociation.  The university protocol application also included information 
about research practices such as chart review that were common in the hospital setting.  
An additional step that researchers can take in order to smooth the IRB approval process 
is attending an IRB meeting.  For example, by attending the meeting of the university 
IRB at which this protocol was reviewed, I was able to answer questions raised by the 
IRB members.  This practice may save time-consuming rounds of revisions.    
 Clear and frequent communication with IRBs is essential during and after the 
application phase, especially in multi-site studies.  IRB members may need reassurance 
of researchers’ qualifications to work with this population.  They may also have questions 
about the population itself, and they may need explanations of how DID appears in real 
life as opposed to in the movies.  IRBs also need to know that people with DID are more 
likely to hide than to flaunt their condition, and that it is difficult if not impossible to 
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malinger this condition for long (Kluft, 1986, 1987).  As with any IRB communication, 
using non-specialist language is essential.  It is also important to explain how DID relates 
to other areas of psychology and medicine, and why it is important and useful to study.  
Having a collegial relationship with the human subjects compliance officer will greatly 
aid the approval process and may also help researchers avoid potential pitfalls in 
submitting their protocol applications.   
 In designing a research project with DID participants, multiple measures are 
essential.  As noted in Chapter 3, concepts such as “inter-identity amnesia” can be shown 
to exist, or not exist, in various forms, depending on how they are assessed.  As 
researchers learn from their participants, they may decide to analyze the data differently 
than originally planned, or to analyze different variables.   
The ability of participants to complete various laboratory paradigms also depends 
on individual differences, including how long participants have been in therapy and how 
much executive control they have over their alters.  Measures of memory and information 
transfer may also be affected by how integrated participants are.  Alters that are willing 
and able to come out in a laboratory or hospital setting, in front of a stranger and possibly 
on demand, comprise only a subset of the total DID system of alters.  Researchers should 
carefully consider how these and other complex issues will affect their results, and should 
not assume the timing or presence of switching if it is not being verified, at the very least 
by self-report.  Because participants with DID have differing levels of ability to complete 
laboratory tasks, it is helpful to design the data-gathering session with “graceful 
degradation,” in which useful data can still be acquired if the procedure must be modified 
or tasks left out.  The more types of data that can be gathered within a reasonable time 
frame, the better.   
Potential participants also differ in other ways.  The perspective of this chapter is 
grounded in research within the North American mental health system, and most 
participants were Caucasian.  It is important to assess diversity of the participants when 
collecting any data, and this guideline applies to DID research as well.  The Western 
concept of dissociative disorders does not include experiences that are common 
worldwide, such as religious possession, animism, or communication with ancestor 
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spirits.  Depending on what aspect of dissociation or diagnosis one is interested in 
studying, this conceptualization may or may not prove limiting to participant recruitment.     
 It is undeniably difficult and time-consuming to recruit participants with a 
diagnosis of DID, especially in sparsely populated areas or areas without large 
psychiatric hospitals focused on research and teaching.  Recruitment techniques will 
depend on the aims of the study, but the snowball method may prove surprisingly 
effective when combined with recruitment through therapists, clinics, and support 
agencies.  When obtaining referrals from clinicians, it is even more imperative to 
maintain confidentiality and to make the non-coercive nature of the study abundantly 
clear both during recruitment and in the informed consent process.  Some research 
questions can be answered with the comparatively easy task of chart review, and require 
no further contact with participants. 
 When conducting chart review, researchers should bear in mind that charts may 
have inconsistent, incorrect, or incomplete information, especially about this diagnosis.  
Patients with DID are highly polysymptomatic, presenting with almost every other 
disorder in the DSM.  Because of this factor, they often receive many comorbid 
diagnoses (e.g., Arbour, 1998; Maldonado, et al., 1998; Ross, Norton, & Wozney, 1989), 
such as posttraumatic stress disorder, substance abuse disorders, borderline personality 
disorder, or dissociative disorder not otherwise specified.  Depending on their insurance 
policies, some patients may want DID kept off their charts.  It is also important to ask 
questions about medications, other drugs, and alcohol use when conducting reaction time 
or physiological research.  Researchers should make clear what relationship, if any, the 
research has to the participant’s treatment, chart notations, or diagnosis.    
Assessing Risk 
 Research on abuse survivors who have a diagnosis like DID, and who may be 
hospitalized, requires extra sensitivity to potential participant risks.  The IRB standard for 
psychological “minimal risk” includes stimuli that could be encountered in everyday life, 
for example, by viewing the nightly news.  However, trauma researchers may be 
interested in studying participants’ responses to potentially distressing questions or 
information.  Therefore it is important to include, as do members of our lab, information 
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in an IRB protocol about whether the proposed techniques and stimuli have been used in 
previous studies and how participants responded.  Below is an excerpt that was used in 
two full-review IRB applications, one for a university IRB and one for a psychiatric 
hospital IRB, both of which were conditionally approved on their first review. 
 
Psychological risks: Minimal.  The questionnaire about trauma could 
potentially be upsetting.  However, participants do not report distress 
when using this questionnaire in other research; in fact, they often report 
that the questions are important and valuable ones to include in research.  
Research indicates that asking these types of questions is not significantly 
distressing to participants, even those who have experienced traumatic 
events (e.g., Carlson, Newman, Daniels, Armstrong, Roth, & 
Loewenstein, 2003; Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002; Martin, Perrott, 
Morris, & Romans, 1999; Newman, Walker, & Gefland, 1999; Walker, 
Newman, Koss, & Bernstein, 1997).  The questions asked are similar to 
frequently-encountered descriptions on the news and in other media.  
Carlson and colleagues (2003) studied the effects of asking about trauma 
in a sample of psychiatric inpatients.  According to their findings, “70% 
experienced relatively low levels of distress, and 51% found participation 
to be useful in some way. […] perceived usefulness was not significantly 
related to any experiences or symptoms.” (p. 132). 
 
 These and other studies demonstrate that ethical and valuable research can be 
conducted on trauma survivors and highly dissociative participants.  In order to minimize 
the risks to this population, research assistants and experimenters should be well trained 
for a variety of situations.  Researchers should know what to expect in the experimental 
session with highly dissociative participants.  Before the study enters data collection, 
there should be a plan regarding what the experimenter will do in a session if a 
participant suddenly becomes a five-year-old alter.  Will the procedure stop?  Will age-
appropriate language be used?  Will additional verbal consent be necessary?  What if an 
angry protector alter comes out?  What will the experimenter do if one alter withdraws 
consent, but another wants to continue?  What if a participant becomes nonverbal or has a 
flashback?  Will experimenters reassure participants, and if so, how?  Training should 
also focus on instilling in experimenters an attitude of participants’ competence in 
dealing with upsetting situations, and on emphasizing the normalcy of their responses. 
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Consent 
 As far as possible within institutional guidelines, consent forms should be simple 
and easy to understand.  Our laboratory has found an FAQ style to be effective at 
communicating the required information in a relatively painless manner.  A consent form 
written as an FAQ can also be easily adapted to an actual FAQ page on a recruitment 
website.  Below is an excerpt that was modified from the standard language used on 
consent forms in our laboratory.  This text is from a consent form that was used for both 
college students and community participants in this study. 
 
Do I have to be here?  No.  Your participation is totally voluntary and it 
will not affect the services you receive.  Your doctor won’t even know 
whether you participate, unless you choose to tell him or her. 
Will anyone know which results are mine?  Confidentiality is strictly 
maintained; data collected during this experiment are coded by number, 
not by name, in order to assure anonymity.  Your name should only be on 
this consent form itself.  Although your responses on the testing materials 
are confidential, if you tell us verbally that you have abused a child or plan 
to abuse a child, we may report this to the appropriate agency. 
  
Although the consent process already includes the information that participants 
may withdraw their participation at any time during the experiment, it may be necessary 
to reinforce this message throughout the experimental session.  Highly dissociative 
people may be adept at camouflaging distress, and it is helpful to include a brief check-in 
periodically.  A question as simple as, “How are you doing?” or “You doing ok?” after 
potentially stressful or triggering tasks demonstrates the researcher’s respect and concern 
for the participant’s wellbeing.  Allow participants to take breaks as needed during the 
experimental session if they need to calm themselves.   
If researchers will be videotaping or audiotaping participants, they must follow 
IRB guidelines for explaining confidentiality and/or anonymity, who will have access to 
the tapes, and what the uses of the tapes will be.  In the current study, one of my 
participants in particular was reassured to hear that her videotape would not be shown to 
groups of people or used as a training aid.  Allow participants the opportunity to view 
their own videotapes.  Be aware that some DID participants find viewing a videotape of 
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themselves to be very helpful for learning to recognize and communicate among alters, 
while others find the viewing to be extremely upsetting, so do not require it.  This 
population may be uncomfortable being videotaped, especially if they were used for 
pornography in childhood.  Experimenters can make it clear when they are turning the 
camera on and off, and be aware that some participants may request that the camera be 
turned off or the tape erased if it covers topics that are uncomfortable for them to talk 
about.  If a participant does request that the camera or tape recorder be turned off, be sure 
to take excellent notes about what goes on during that time.   
Respect and Power in the Experimental Setting 
Respect for participants can be demonstrated in ways beyond what is strictly 
required by IRB guidelines.  For example, on the forms for the current study as well as in 
my words and attitude, I did my best to convey to my participants my conceptualization 
of DID as a “condition” rather than a “disorder”.  It is undeniably a “diagnosis,” but it 
need not necessarily be called an “illness,” mental or otherwise.  While not downplaying 
the serious and potentially debilitating effects of DID, I attempted to emphasize the 
adaptive nature of DID symptoms and my interest in my participants’ experiences.  I also 
made sure that I thanked participants for their time and did not pathologize their 
behaviors, even (or especially) within the pathologizing hospital environment.  In fact, 
Participant 4 explicitly stated her appreciation of research that did not regard her DID as 
“freakish”.  If participants asked about switching, I always explained that switching or 
not switching was totally up to them, and that the experiment would work either way.  I 
did not ask for certain kinds of switches, although I did remain alert for possible 
participant distress.   
Going to participants’ locations rather than asking them to come to a lab, if it is 
feasible to do so, appears to be a good way to increase their comfort level.  I originally 
expected that participants would be uncomfortable letting a stranger into their homes, but 
my participants reported that being in their own homes made them feel comfortable and 
secure.  Gendered power dynamics may have been in play here.  My name in my emails 
and my voice on the phone are both obviously female, as were all of my participants, 
several of whom freely gave me their unlisted phone numbers as well as their addresses.  
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Participants may or may not have been more reluctant to admit an unknown man into 
their homes.  Offering participants a choice of locations, at least for an initial meeting, 
may have helped participants see me as someone who was respectful of their privacy, 
safety, and space.  This option also reduces the burden of transportation for participants, 
which is especially important if they are low-income or on disability leave, as were 
several of my participants.  Several participants also found that having a pet or stuffed 
animal with them during the session helped them stay calm.  Another option is to conduct 
the experiment in the offices of the participants’ therapists, or to ask the participants 
whether they would like their therapists to be present during testing.  
 When working with DID participants, it is important to be aware of the demand 
characteristics inherent in the experimental situation, and of the power dynamics of the 
researcher-participant interaction.  These dynamics are extremely salient when 
conducting research with abuse survivors, and researchers should be aware of how the 
multiple identities of doctor/patient, male/female, ethnic majority/minority, 
older/younger, sick/well, and scientist/subject interact.  Jody Miller (1997) writes, 
“Although we are not dispassionate researchers who distance ourselves from our values 
and emotions, we continue to objectify our research subjects through the very power we 
employ as researchers” (p. 149).  By designing a project and deciding how to analyze the 
data, researchers define what they will accept as “real” evidence and what variables they 
will study.     
A small way for researchers to convey the importance of participants’ experience 
is through the language they use.  For example, compare these two statements about 
filling out questionnaires:  “Take as much time as you need” versus “Spend as much time 
as you want.”  The former implies that participants are taking valuable time away from 
the researcher, and that they should take only as much as necessary.  The latter implies 
that the session’s time belongs to the participants, to do with as they wish.  This verbal 
cue is a subtle way to show that researchers respect participants and value their time, and 
that participation is always the choice of the participants themselves.  
Researchers must not assume that there is only one perspective inside each 
person, or only one way that multiples act.  Throughout the course of the experiment, 
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treat participants as the experts on their own internal experience.  Researchers should 
provide ample room on questionnaires for lengthy, disjointed, or multiple answers to each 
question.  Tolerate ambiguity by allowing participants to skip questions, to guess, or to 
answer “don’t know”.  Treat gender as an open-ended question with an item that reads, 
“what is your gender? ________” rather than forcing a choice between two options.  
Some participants will want to write in the margins to explain why they answered the 
way they did or how they understood the question, so large margins or one-sided 
questionnaires will provide room for these comments.  Experimenters may also need to 
allow extra time to respond to questions and forms so that participants can sort out their 
internal voices.  On a final questionnaire, researchers can ask about the experience of 
participating and give participants a chance to write down what was good and bad about 
the experiment, and what they wish researchers would study about DID.    
 Additionally, survivors of abuse as severe as that which people with DID have 
lived through may have difficulties with writing and questionnaires.  For example, in this 
study Participant 2 had not learned to read until she was a teenager, and Participant 4 
found writing difficult because she had not been allowed to write as a child.  Participant 8 
experienced stress and headaches when filling out any sort of forms.  Participants who 
switch into child alters may be temporarily unable to write.  Researchers should create 
alternate procedures to have in place if needed. 
In designing experiments, researchers should also be especially sensitive to 
potential triggers, such as feeling watched or judged, or restrictive apparatus such as MRI 
or EEG equipment.  Arrange the experimental room so that participants do not have their 
backs to the door, and so that experimenters do not have to walk behind the participants.  
As with any participants, researchers should always get permission before touching 
participants, for example to attach electrodes or to put on headphones.  
Conclusions 
 The study of dissociation is a small but growing field.  It may seem complex and 
difficult for new investigators to initiate a study on participants with DID, and indeed it 
is.  However, there are many enigmas to this fascinating condition that have yet to be 
empirically examined, and there are numerous areas for potential studies to explore.  
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Researchers who are invested in the well-being of their participants can begin the 
process of conducting sensitive research by educating and communicating with IRBs.  
Researchers in this area should also be aware of individual differences and design studies 
to accommodate them.  Further, training is essential so that both the principal 
investigators and the research assistants on these studies are able to deal sensitively with 
trauma survivors.  This sensitivity is enhanced by clear and non-coercive recruitment and 
consent procedures.  Psychology researchers have a unique ability to be aware of 
hierarchy and power in the experimental setting, and to take these issues into account.  
Finally, participants are always the experts on their own internal experience.  
Recognizing this fact will facilitate ethical and respectful research with traumatized and 
highly dissociative participants.     
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 INTEGRATION MEASURE 
 
 
IM (Barlow & Chu, Fall 2004)  Participant #_____________________ 
 
The part or identity that generally occupies the body and manages day-to-day events 
should fill out this questionnaire.  Check off the best answer to each question.  If you are 
unsure of an answer or don’t know, just take your best guess.  You can also write on the 
back of this questionnaire.  Thank you.  
 
1.  Are you aware of there being other parts/identities within yourself? 
______ No, I'm not aware of other parts 
______ I sometimes believe that there are other parts 
______ I often believe that there are other parts 
______ I know there are other parts most of the time 
______ I always know there are other parts 
 
Approximately how many parts do you think there are?  ________________________ 
 
 
2.  Do you think there might be any parts that you don't know about?  
______ I don't know 
______ No, I know about most or all the parts 
______ There might be, but I don't like to think about it 
______ I think so, but I’m not sure 
______ Yes, I know there are  
 
 
3.  Do the other parts/identities communicate with you?  
______ No they don't 
______ They occasionally communicate with me 
______ They sometimes communicate with me 
______ They often communicate with me 
 
How do the parts communicate with you (voices, thoughts, other ways)?  
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Is there more than one part helping to fill out this questionnaire? 
 
 
4.  How do you feel about other parts/identities communicating with you? 
______ I don't want to know about them 
______ I usually don't want communication 
______ I sometimes feel I might  want communication 
______ I'm often open to communication 
______ I'm comfortable with most or all of their communication 
 
In what way do you perceive other identities/parts, for example, do you hear their voices, 
visualize them, or some other ways? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*for items 5-9, scoring information is next to each response 
 
5. Are you able to communicate with other parts/identities in general?  
___0___ I don't communicate with any of them 
___1___ I occasionally communicate with only a few of them  
___2___ I sometimes communicate with some of them 
___3___ I often communicate with many of them 
___4___ I communicate easily with all of them 
 
Approximately how many parts are you able to communicate at least a little with? _____ 
(not analyzed at this time) 
Approximately how many parts are you able to communicate very well with? _____ 
(not analyzed at this time) 
In what ways do you communicate with other parts (talking out loud, talking inside, 
thinking, other ways)? 
(not analyzed at this time) 
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6. Do you share co-consciousness with other parts, that is, are you aware of what they are 
thinking and/or doing?  
___0___ Never, or with none of the parts 
___1___ Rarely, or with only a few parts 
___2___ Sometimes, or with some parts 
___3___ Often, or with many parts 
___4___ Always, or with all of the parts 
 
7. When other parts are out (in the body), are you aware of what happens, for example, 
watching or listening or both being out at once?  
___0___ Never, or with none of the parts 
___1___ Rarely, or with only a few parts 
___2___ Sometimes, or with some parts 
___3___ Often, or with many parts 
___4___ Always, or with all of the parts 
 
8.  Is there cooperation between you and other parts/identities, for example about the 
times/places when other parts come out?  
___0___ None, or with none of the parts 
___1___ A little, or with only a few parts 
___2___ Some, or with some parts 
___3___ Quite a bit, or with many parts 
___4___ A great deal, or with all of the parts 
 
9. How would you describe how you feel about the other parts/identities?  
___0___ I don't want to know anything about them 
___1___ I understand a little about a few of them, but can't deal with most of them 
___2___ I understand some of them, but have a hard time with others 
___3___ I understand many of them, and am trying to learn about others 
___4___ I understand and value them 
 
10.  Approximately how long have you been working on developing communication and 
cooperation between your parts? 
 
 
  
 
11.  Overall, how often do you feel you communicate and work together with your 
identities/parts? 
(Please make a mark somewhere along this line) 
 
|_______________________________________________________________________| 
0%                                                                                                                                 100% 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Pearson’s Correlations Among Variables for Student Group (N = 13) 
  DES 
Word 
Rec 
Vig1 
Sumry 
Vig1 
Crct 
Vig2 
Sumry 
Vig2 
Crct 
Vig3 
Sumry 
Vig3 
Crct 
Procedural 
Learn 
shared 
ago 
unshard 
ago 
shared 
MCQ 
unshr 
MCQ 
r -.013 .121 .187 .540 -.019 .229 -.087 .047 .060 .720(**) .083 -.131 .623(*) HiBT 
life Sig. .965 .693 .541 .057 .950 .453 .777 .880 .845 .005 .787 .670 .023 
r 1 -.392 -.335 .236 -.612(*) -.502 -.529 .269 -.027 -.320 -.128 .058 -.044 
DES 
Sig. . .185 .263 .437 .026 .080 .063 .373 .930 .286 .678 .850 .888 
r  1 .636(*) .057 .643(*) .457 .544 .116 .021 .402 -.356 -.225 -.155 Words 
Recalled Sig.  . .019 .852 .018 .116 .055 .705 .944 .173 .232 .459 .613 
r   1 .258 .721(**) .522 .613(*) .040 -.245 .456 .148 -.305 -.118 Vignette 1 
Summary 
(neutral) Sig.   . .394 .005 .068 .026 .896 .420 .118 .629 .310 .701 
r    1 .067 .248 .077 .137 -.335 .320 .141 -.061 .060 Vignette 1 
Correct 
(neutral) Sig.    . .829 .415 .802 .655 .263 .286 .647 .842 .845 
r     1 .476 .568(*) -.040 -.235 .354 -.193 -.131 -.115 Vignette 2 
Summary 
(fear) Sig.     . .101 .043 .896 .440 .235 .527 .670 .707 
r      1 .628(*) .227 -.142 .189 -.149 -.010 .004 Vignette 2 
Correct 
(fear) Sig.      . .022 .457 .644 .537 .626 .974 .989 
r       1 .258 -.583(*) .085 -.077 -.052 -.163 Vignette 3 
Summary 
(happy) Sig.       . .396 .037 .783 .804 .865 .595 
r        1 -.433 -.360 -.333 .644(*) .152 Vignette 3 
Correct 
(happy) Sig.        . .139 .227 .266 .018 .620 
r         1 .162 -.083 -.307 .042 Procedural 
Learn Sig.         . .597 .787 .307 .893 
continued on next page 
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 DES Word Rec 
Vig1 
Sumry 
Vig1 
Crct 
Vig2 
Sumry 
Vig2 
Crct 
Vig3 
Sumry 
Vig3 
Crct 
Procedural 
Learning 
shared 
ago 
unshard 
ago 
shared 
MCQ 
unshr 
MCQ 
r          1 .160 -.610(*) .300 shared 
ago Sig.          . .601 .027 .320 
r           1 -.006 -.209 unshared 
ago Sig.           . .985 .492 
r            1 .026 shared 
MCQ Sig .            . .933 
Note:  All reported significance levels (Sig .) are 2-tailed. 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
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